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"[JJudicial action only achieves ... legitimacy by responding 
to, indeed by stirring, the deep and durable demand for justice in 
our society."l 
"Complexities about standing are barriers to justice; in 
removing the barriers the emphasis should be on the needs of 
justice."2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bush Administration's efforts to roll back vigorous 
enforcement of federal environmental laws are reigniting the 
interest of scholars and practitioners in common law remedies as 
judicial tools to address a wide range of environmental ills. 3 For 
1. Abram Chayes, The Role oj the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. 
REv. 1281, 1316 (1976). 
2. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law 0JStanding, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 
473 (1970). 
3. Eric Pianin & Michael Grunwald, Bush Plan Shifts Power Over Polluters to 
States, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at A03 (discussing Bush Administration's 
proposal to cut Environmental Protection Agency enforcement staff and budget, 
-mark[ing] a Significant departure from a more aggressive policy of federal 
enforcement and prosecution of polluters since the EPA's creation in 1970"), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arucles/A62130-2001Apr9.html. In 
anticipation of the conservative environmental agenda of the new Bush 
Administration. environmental lawyer Robert F. Kennedy. Jr. and nationally known 
torts lawyers from fifteen different firms launched a major Litigation campaign to 
address water pollution from factory hog farms In North Carolina using. among other 
tort theories, public nuisance and a tobacco-style direct -mass tort" approach rather 
than the politically vulnerable Clean Water Act. Douglass Jehl. Fearing Bush WUl 
Win. Groups Plan Pollution Suits, THE N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Dec. 7, 2000, available 
at http:www.nytlmes.com/2000/12/07/politics /07ENVI.html. Confmning that the 
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the past thirty years, tort and environmental law commentators 
have touted the state common law tort of public nuisance as a 
potentially powerful and flexible remedy for community-based 
social and environmental problems,4 as well as an important 
interstitial remedy to complement the increasingly complex 
framework of federal and state statutory schemes.5 Particularly 
special injury rule is still a weak link of public nuisance claims for such plaintiffs. the 
trial court recently dismissed the North Carolina hog pollution case for lack of 
standing. despite a range of allegations of damage including to a fishing business. 
James E. Shiffer. Suits aimed at hog farms dismissed, NEWS&OBSERVERCOM. at 
http:www.newsobserver.com/friday/news/Story/414510p (last visited Mar. 30. 
2001). 
4. See. e.g .. John W. Wade, EnVironmental Protection. the Common Law of 
Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts. 8 FORUM 165. 170 (1972) [hereinafter Wade. 
Environmental Protection] (expressing hope that "judicial growth and development" of 
public nuisance doctrine will "meet the mounting problems of protecting the 
environment"]; John Harleston & Kathleen M. Harleston. The Suffolk Syndrome: A 
Case Study in Public Nuisance Law. 40 S.C. L. REv. 379. 380 (1989) ("nuisance law 
survives today amid apparently comprehensive federal and state environmental 
regulations because of its nearly infmite flexibility and adaptability and its inherent 
capacity to fill gaps in statutory controls"); Robert Abrams & Val Washington. The 
Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance TIventy 
Years After Boomer. 54 ALB. L. REv. 359. 399 (1990) ("public nuisance law can playa 
vital role in the protection of public rights and. in particular. public rights to a 
cleaner. healthier environment"]; James A. Sevinsky. Public Nuisance: A Common-Law 
Remedy Among the Statutes. 5 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1990) (describing public 
nuisance as "inherently flexible and uniquely capable of application to abate 
pollution. clean up contaminated sites. and recover damages"); Gwyn Goodson 
Timms. Note. Statutorily Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Nuisance Suits: 
Jump Starting the Public Watchdog. 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733. 1738-39 (1992) 
[hereinafter Note. Public Watchdog] ("Public nuisance can be a potent component of 
the artillery of law against pollution. "I; Michael C. Skotnicki. Note. Private Actions for 
Damages Resulting from an Environmental Public Nuisance: Overcoming the Barrier to 
Standing Posed by the ·Special Injury" Rule. 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 591. 594-95 
(1992) [hereinafter Note. Overcoming the Barrier) (noting that public nuisance 
provides an appropriate remedy for modern environmental problems); Andrew J. 
Heimert. Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law To Affect the Location of 
Pollution. 27 ENVTL. L. 403 (1997) (arguing that nuisance law has advantages over 
modern environmental statutes and therefore should be preserved as a supplemental 
remedy); Interview with Victor M. Sher. former President. Sierra Club Legal Defense 
Fund. currently partner with Miller. Sher & Sawyer (Sacramento. Cal.). in Honolulu. 
Hawaii (Sept. 25. 1998) (describing public nuisance as the "model of litigation of the 
future" for environmental pollution cases). 
5. See John E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth. Public Nuisance. the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. and Environmental Law. 2 ECOWGY L.Q. 241. 279. 281 (1972) 
(public nuisance "fills in the cracks: e.g .. for air pollution. noise. odors. vibrations. 
and aesthetic harm); James D. Lawlor. Right to Maintain Action to Enjoin Public 
Nuisance As Affected by Existence oj Pollution Control Agency. 60 A.L.R 3d 665. 669 
(1974) (until federal statutes are more comprehensive. "public nuisance suits retain 
their vitality"); David R Hodas. Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law 
Citizen Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883. 887 (1989) 
(public nuisance can "fill regulatory gaps left by environmental statutes"); Miles 
Tolbert. Comment. The Public as Plaintiff: Public Nuisance and Federal Citizen Suits in 
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where the statutory avenues for redress are incomplete. weak. or 
under Siege. attention has turned toward restoring the vitality of 
public nuisance as a supplemental or alternative cause of 
action.6 Unfortunately. two doctrines historically have limited the 
utility of public nuisance as a cause of action to redress 
community problems: the thoroughly entrenched "special injury 
rule" and its constant companion. the strict "different-in-kind" 
test.7 Commentators have long criticized the traditional rule and 
test as unduly restrictive and illogical. barring worthy tort cases 
the Exxon Valdez Litigation. 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 511. 526-27 (1990) (hereinafter 
Comment. Public as Plaintiifl (noting that a "common law approach boasts more 
flexibility and may readily be adapted to all varieties of pollution"); Abrams & 
Washington. supra note 4. at 393 ("As broad and detailed as environmental 
regulation is today. however. there still exist large gaps in the law" that can be 
covered by public nuisance.); Fredric D. Bellamy. Common Law Environmental 
Nuisance Claims - Problematic Limits and Potential Growth. SA88 A.L.l.-A.B.A. 145. 
148 (1996) (public nuisance can "fill at least some of the void between the 
environmental statutes"). 
6. See Frank E. Maloney. Judicial Protectionfor the Environment: A New RoleJor 
Common-Law Remedies. 25 VAND. L. REv. 145 (1972) ("statutory remedies are failing. 
often because of insufficient funds for adequate enforcement"); Hodas. supra note 5. 
at 887 ("courts and private citizens have the opportunity to transform the public 
nuisance doctrine into a powerful and influential common law tool"); Robert R. 
Lohrmann. Comment. The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving 
Theories to Control Pollution. 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085. 1109 (1970) (hereinafter 
Comment. Environmental Lawsuit] (noting that environmental statutes are 
undermined by "powerful industrial lobbies." and unwilling. unable. and 
underfunded government enforcement agencies); Note. Public Watchdog. supra note 
4. at 1739-45 (public nuisance fills statutory gaps when administrative remedies are 
"slow," restricted. or too weak). This observation is also based on the author's own 
experience as a public interest litigator with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund for 
eight years and participation in strategic discussions during the 1990s. when the 
conservative backlash against federal environmental laws and citizen suits prompted 
the law flTI11 to look anew at common law causes of action. 
7. This article refers to the "special injury rule" and the "different-in-kind" test 
together as "the traditional doctrine." The special injury rule is the traditional 
reqUirement that. to be a proper plaintiff in a public nuisance suit. a private plaintiff 
must demonstrate what has become known as "special" injury - e.g .. physical harm 
or economic loss. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. The predominant 
test for application of this rule is the "different-in-kind" test. which requires that 
plaintiffs special injury be "different than that suffered by other members of the 
public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORrS § 821C(1) (1979) (Who Can Recover for 
Public Nuisance). Traditionally. the rule and this test have been virtually 
synonymous. but are often distinguished in this Article in order to understand the 
role of the competing minority "different-in-degree" test. which requires only that the 
plaintiff be hurt "more than" or "beyond" the general public. See infra note 222 and 
accompanying text. This Article's proposed actual community injury rule. see infra 
Part V. would replace the special injury doctrine with a test that requires shared 
injury not unique to the plaintiff. 
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and preventing judicial inquiry into the merits of the plaintiffs' 
allegations of injury to the community values the tort protects.s 
8. See Jeremiah Smith, Private Actionfor Obstruction To Public Right of Passage 
(pts I & II), 15 COLUM. L. REv. I, 7, 142 (1915) [hereinafter Smith. Private Action] 
("The adoption of a rule making it a requisite that there should be particular kinds or 
classes or actual damage must not unfrequently [sic] result in denying remedy to a 
man who has sustained very substantial damage ... [a]nd it must not unfrequently 
[sic] result in allowing a tort-feasor to escape civil liability. although his act has 
caused substantial loss. "I; Note, Right of Private Individual to Damages for Public 
Nuisance, 2 MINN. L. REv. 210, 214 (1918) [hereinafter 1918 Note] ("It would be highly 
unjust and inequitable to say that he has no right of redress in a private action on 
the ground merely that the injury had resulted from an act which is a public 
nuisance in itself, and because other persons might have been injured and damaged 
in the same marmer and to the same extent .... ") (quoting Page v. Mille Lacs Lumber 
Co .• 55 N.W. 608, 610 (Minn. 1893)): WILLIAM L. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF 
TORTS § 72, at 570 (lst ed. 1941) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941)] 
[noting courts' "greatll difficulty" in applying the special injury rule and "little 
conSistency in the decisions"); Boyd D. Taylor, Control of Stream Pollution. 33 TEx. L. 
REv. 370, 374 (l955) (pointing to Texas courts' application of the special injury rule 
in public nuisance cases as a procedural barrier to addressing water pollution): JOHN 
G. FLEMING, THE LAw OF TORTS 381 (6th ed. 1983) (noting that the rule "in its most 
extreme form" had "defeated the claims even of commercial fishermen for loss of their 
livelihood against polluters of public waters on the ground that their rights were no 
different from that of the general public"): William L. Prosser, Private Actionfor Public 
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1010 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Private Action] 
(suggesting injustice of denying remedy when loss is "common to the whole 
community"): Julian C. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion 
of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126. 1135 (l967) (noting courts' use of the 
different-in-kind rule and concluding "if the courts persist in their 'kind' rather than 
'degree' distinction. the increased understanding of the widespread effects of what 
has previously been thought of as localized air pollution may render the private 
[public] nuisance action against air pollution less frequently available than in the 
past."); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 485 n.45 (1970) [hereinafter Sax. Public 
Trust Doctrine] (suggesting that, "while nuisance law should not be ignored." it cannot 
be an effective common law doctrine to address pollution issues because it "is 
encrusted with the rule that permits lawsuits to be initiated only by the state 
attorney general, and not by private citizens."); JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE 
ENVIRONMENT 160 (1970) [hereinafter SAX, DEFENDING) ("in most every state [a citizen 
protesting a polluting factory) would be thrown out of court and told that conduct 
affecting him solely as an individual citizen, in common with every other citizen, can 
be challenged only by public officials"); Frank P. Grad & Laurie R. Rockett. 
Environmental Litigation-Where the Action Is? 10 NAT. REs. J. 742. 743 (1970) 
(suggesting that the special injury rule poses a barrier to effective nuisance actions in 
the environmental area); Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. 
L. REv. 734, 740 (1970) (observing that the special injury rule and different-in-kind 
test "[o]ften ... becomes a problem of semantics especially when various types of 
environmental nuisance have the same substantive effect on the community at large. 
but more seriously threaten the health and welfare of residents in close proximity to 
the source"); Note, Environmental Law-Nuisance-Injunctive Re[ief Denied in Private 
Action for Nuisance Created by Industrial Polluter-Boomer v. At[antic Cement Co., 45 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 919, 923-24 n.30 (1970) ("proof of special damages is difficult, 
especially in heavily populated areas because even a blatant polluter will often have 
the defense that the offensive conditions are actually the result of a multiple of 
sources of pollution, and the harm is suffered by the public in general. "); Bryson & 
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The special injury rule/different-in-kind doctrine-
attributed to ancient English case law and adopted almost 
universally by United States courts-is an anomaly in tort law. 
It limits up front the type of plaintiff who can bring a tort action. 
Only those who can first prove some injury that is "special," 
"particular," or "peculiar," defined as "different-in-kind" and not 
just "different-in-degree" from the general public who might also 
be affected by the nuisance, be it a house of prostitution9 or a 
polluting factory. may bring an action. lO 
The traditional doctrine presents a paradox: the broader the 
injury to the community and the more the plaintiff's injury 
resembles an iruury also suffered by other members of the 
public. the less likely that the plaintiff can bring a public 
nuisance lawsuit. Thus. if the rule is applied rigidly. it prevents 
plaintiffs with otherwise cognizable injuries from proceeding if 
Macbeth. supra note 5. at 264 ("The particular damage rule has unjustifiably 
thwarted the development of public nuisance law and forced plaintiffs to employ less 
appropriate causes of action."); Wade. Environmental Protection. supra note 4. at 167 
(noting "anomaly that if the defendant succeeded in injuring all in the community 
alike then no private remedy was available at all"); Mark A. Rothstein. Private Actions 
for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 453. 456. 459 (1974) 
(noting the strict application of the special injury rule "has long troubled both courts 
and commentators" and calling it "archaic" and "outmoded"); Tim E. Sleeth. Note. 
Public Nuisance: Standing to Sue Witlwut Slwwing "Special Injury." 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 
360. 366 (1974) [hereinafter Note. Public Nuisance] (calling rule "an obstacle 
preventing recovery for injury actually sustained" and resulting in "the lack of forum 
for the community to redress any common injuries"); Kenneth S. Boger. The Common 
Law of Public Nuisance in State Environmental Litigation. 4 ENV. AFF. 367. 378 (1975) 
("a serious obstacle to the emergence of the common law of public nuisance as a 
major environmental weapon at the state level is what has been termed the standing 
problem"); 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS. JR .. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER. § 2.2, at 
36 (1986) [hereinafter RODGERS. AIR AND WATER] (stating the rule has been applied 
with "absurd results" and calling it a "relic"); Hodas. supra note 5. at 888 (calling the 
special injury rule "the greatest hurdle facing private plaintiffs who bring a public 
nuisance action for damages"); Comment. Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 514 ("in 
trying to limit the number of suits by individuals representing the general public. the 
special injury rule actually requires that these representatives be as unrepresentative 
of the public as possible."); Note, Overcoming the Barrier. supra note 4. at 593 
(arguing that the special injury rule "has created a significant barrier to standing for 
private plaintiffs suing for an environmental nuisance that has caused them injury"); 
Bellamy. supra note 5. at 163 (rule is "principal impediment" to use of public 
nuisance law by raising the barrier to potential plaintiffs); Christopher Panoff. 
Comment. In Re The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural 
Resources. Subsistence Living. and the SpeciaLInjury Rule. 28 ENVrL. L. 701,710. 713 
(1998) [hereinafter Comment, Exxon Valdez) (calling special injury rule "the greatest 
hurdle faCing private plaintiffs suing for public nuisance," "counterproductive," and 
"stifling"). 
9. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8, at 1000; see infra notes 47-51 and 
accompanying text. 
10. See RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.1. at 29-30; see also infra notes 
47-51 and accompanying text. 
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many others in the community actually or theoretically share the 
injury. Many courts interpret the doctrine as requiring the 
plaintiff to prove a "unique" injury,11 not only widening the gap 
between the plaintiffs personal stake and that of the public's, 
but also directly undermining a plaintiffs ability to be a 
"representative" of the threatened public interests. 
The restrictive traditional doctrine is commonly justified by 
reference to its ancient roots-dating to a 1535 King's Bench 
casel2-as a limited delegation to a plaintiff of the sovereign's 
police power to enforce laws against "purprestures,"13 i.e. 
encroachments on the land of the Crown. Courts perceived a 
need to prevent multiplicity of similar actions in order to protect 
defendants' resources, conserve courts' resources, and prevent 
trivial suitS.14 While this tripartite rationale made sense in 
medieval times when the concept of a "public" lawsuit was in its 
nascent stage, it has substantially less appeal in the context of 
the modern American legal system that is now accustomed to the 
private attorney general concept and has a sophisticated judicial 
process and decades of experience with dramatic developments 
in federal environmental standing, class actions, and injunctive 
suits. Now encrusted with over four centuries of caselaw and 
often misleading commentary, the "ancient" doctrine has become 
an anomalous technical defense in tort law, acting as an unduly 
strict gatekeeper rather than honoring the fundamental purpose 
of public nuisance - to protect public values from tortious 
injury. 
To date, however, serious criticism of the traditional doctrine 
and calls for liberalization by distinguished torts and 
environmental scholars- from William L. Prosser to William H. 
Rodgers, Jr.15- as well as the bold rejection of the doctrine for 
injunctive actions in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 
821C/6 have utterly failed to penetrate the case law. Although 
the federal law of standing in environmental and administrative 
law cases has undergone dramatic evolution since the 1960s,17 
equally important but more obscure rules determining who can 
11. See infra note 90 (discussing the Exxon Valdez decision) and note 336; see 
also, e.g., Liddle v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 981 F. Supp. 544, 558 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1997) (applying this conservative interpretation of traditional doctrine and 
dismissing neighbors'lawsuit against a YMCA camp for lack of "unique" injury). 
12. The 1535 case is discussed in detail infra Part Il.A. 
13. See infra note 33. 
14. See irifra note 30. 
15. See supra note 8 and infra Part III.B and notes 504-507. 
16. See infra Part IV.B. 
17. See infra Part IVA 
2001] MODERNIZING PUBLIC NUISANCE 763 
sue privately for state common law public nuisance have been 
stubbornly resistant to change. Other than Hawai'i's lone 
adoption almost twenty years ago of the Restatemenfs modified 
fonnulation,18 the judiciary and the bar seem unaware of or 
uninterested in the Restatement's invitation to embrace public 
nuisance in order to redress shared community injury. Although 
courts still struggle with application of the different-in-kind test 
(often bending the rule to avoid unfair results), the traditional 
doctrine is nonetheless repeated like a mantra in virtually every 
public nuisance case. 
Many thoughtful commentators have criticized the special 
injury rule and bemoaned its entrenchment. 19 A few critics have 
suggested that it be eliminated entirely, 20 and a distinguished 
handful has proposed alternative fonnulations. 21 In light of the 
unique ability of public nuisance to be a flexible community-
based remedy for community-based problems in state courts and 
given the puzzling perSistence of the special injury rule and 
different-in-kind test, it is important to seek a deeper 
understanding of why these calls have gone unheeded and 
whether it is possible, as a practical matter, to modernize this 
important cause of action with an alternative approach to the 
doctrine. 
This Article seeks to break new ground in solving the 
special injury rule paradox by focusing on why the rule has 
become so embedded in American jurisprudence. Without 
understanding the reasons for the large gap between scholarship 
and jurisprudence, it seems impossible to advance the 
languishing dialogue regarding the modern role of public 
nuisance and the merits of the traditional doctrine. This Article 
therefore places a special emphasis on a detailed legal history of 
the rule-from "olde" English cases, to early American critique, 
to the Restatement (Second) debates-than has previously been 
18. See infra notes 127-140. 
19. See supra note 8. 
20. See, e.g., Rothstein. supra note 8. at 479 ("By abolishing the special injury 
rule the courts can reVitalize the law of public nuisance and make It a valuable deVice 
for private parties."). 
21. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 2 (suggesting an "actual pecuniary 
damages" test); Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8 (supporting the different-in-
degree formulation); FLEMING. supra note 8. at 381 (suggesting a "more liberal 
approach" based on difference-in-degree); RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.2. 
at 37 (proposing that "any person injured in fact should be able to sue for eqUitable 
relief or money damages"); Hodas. supra note 5 (advocating the rejection of the rule 
and defming the limits of liability With a tort prOximate cause analysis). 
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presented in the literature. Justice Holmes observed that an 
understanding of the law fIrst requires a study of its history: 
It is a part of the rational study, because it is the fIrst step 
toward an enlightened scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate 
reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the 
dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you 
can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his 
strength. But to get him out is only the fIrst step. The next is 
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful 
animal. 22 
This Holmesian critique proves liberating, as it suggests that 
the history of the special injury rule actually provides support for 
a more liberal alternative interpretation-either a "different-in-
degree" approach. an "actual (pecuniary) damages" test, or, as 
this Article suggests, a new "actual community injury" rule. By 
luring the dragon into the open and examining it carefully, we 
can take a fresh look at the prospects for positive developments 
in the future of the doctrine. Taming or killing the dragon of legal 
history is essential to developing alternative approaches to the 
rule and to modernizing public nuisance. 
Part I of this Article sets out the legal landscape of public 
nuisance and the traditional doctrine, and then provides three 
diverse illustrations of cases in which the special injury rule and 
different-in-kind test have barred private plaintiffs with 
cognizable injuries from the courts in public nuisance cases. 
Part II sheds new light on the English legal history of the rule 
and different-in-kind test, starting with a close examination of 
the 1535 case and ending in the mid-IBOOs. In Part III, the 
Article examines early American views of the traditional doctrine, 
and discusses how Prosser, despite struggling with the strict 
test, enshrined the conservative trend in the case law when 
drafting the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part IV analyzes the 
1970 rebellion by members of the American Law Institute against 
Prosser's reSigned formulation of the strict test and the resulting 
infusion of newly developed federal standing law into the 
Restatemenfs formulation of the special injury rule. Part V seeks 
to explain why the Restatemenfs attempt to eliminate the strict 
rule in injunctive cases failed. It then draws some lessons to 
apply to alternative formulations of the rule, and suggests an 
"actual community injury" standard that directly addresses the 
perSistent paradox and that may help revitalize public nuisance's 
22. Oliver w. Holmes. The Path oj the Law. 10 HARv. L. REv. 457. 469 (1897). 
2001] MODERNIZING PUBLIC NUISANCE 765 
role as a flexible. community-based remedy for a diverse range of 
social and environmental problems. 
PUBLIC NUISANCE AND TIiE SPECIAL INJURY RULE: TIiREE ILLUSTRATIONS OF TIiE 
PARADOX 
[T)he better is the defence of wrongdoers. the more numerous 
the persons whom they have injured. and the more extensive 
and wide spread the consequences of their injurious acts. A 
principle like this would undoubtedly be grateful to all 
wrongdoers; but it would hardly commend itself to the 
sufferers. "23 
Public nuisance is an anomaly in tort law. exhibiting hybrid 
characteristics of both private torts and public law. As a private 
action. public nuisance still retains features virtually unique 
among torts. such as the need to demonstrate that public rights 
are at stake. the balancing of harm and utility. the availability of 
injunctive relief in addition to money damages, the lack of 
certain common defenses. and the existence of a "standing 
test" -the special injury rule. Because public nuisance is a 
uniquely powerful tort, embodying a private attorney general 
concept. courts adhere to the special injury rule as a way to limit 
access to this unusual remedy. Section A explores the basic 
contours of public nuisance and the special injury rule and 
Section B illustrates. through three sets of modern cases where 
the courts grappled with the application of the traditional 
doctrine, the paradoxical barrier posed by the rule. 
A. The Doctrinal Landscape: Public Nuisance and the Special 
Injury Rule 
Although the three types of modern nuisance share some 
common doctrinal history and are often confused by bench and 
bar,24 there are important differences among them. At one end of 
the spectrum, there is a private nuisance action brought by a 
private plaintiff, typically involving conflicting contemporaneous 
and adjoining land uses, where the plaintiff has a legal interest 
in the land that is being adversely affected by the defendant's 
23. Brown v. Watson. 47 Me. 161. 164 (1859). 
24. See Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 999; see also F.H. Newark. The 
Boundaries of Nuisance. 65 L.Q. REv. 480. 490 (1949) (noting the confusion); Abrams 
& Washington. supra note 4. at 390 (observing "much confusion and so little 
understanding of public nuisance"). 
766 ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:755 
nearby nuisance activity.25 At the other end of the spectrum, 
there is a public nuisance action for interference with public 
rights such as health, welfare, and comfort brought by a public 
(governmental) plaintiff. For example, a state might bring such 
an action through its criminal or civil statutes or through a 
common law civil action (historically called "common 
nuisance,,26) . 
In the middle, there is the hybrid tort-private 
plaintiff/public nuisance-also for interference with public 
rights, but brought by a private plaintiff as a common law action. 
These private plaintiffs, according to the traditional doctrine, 
must show some recognized type of "special," "particular," or 
"peculiar" injury.27 According to the entrenched black letter test, 
an injury is sufficiently "special" if it is different-in-kind and not 
just different-in-degree from the injury to the general public.28 As 
expressed in Section 821 C of the Restatement (Second) oj Torts: 
"In order to recover damages in an individual action for a public 
nuisance, one must have suffered harm oj a kind different from 
that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right 
common to the general public that was the subject of 
interference. "29 The longstanding tripartite rationale for the 
different-in-kind rule is that it preserves the role of the sovereign 
to enforce the law, prevents multiplicity of actions, and 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7. § 821D (derming private 
nuisance); see also id. § 821E (Who Can Recover for Private Nuisance). §§ 822-831 
(Private Nuisance: Elements of Liability). 
26. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *167 
(1763) ("Common nuisances are a species of offenses against the public order and 
economical regimen of the state; being either a doing of a thing to llie armoyance of 
all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good 
requires"); William A. McRae. Jr.. The DeveIDpment oj Nuisance in the Early Comnwn 
Law. 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 30-35 (1948) (citing the Statute of 12 Rich. II. c. 13 (1389) 
(Eng.]); see also J.R. Spencer. Public Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48(1) 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55. 58 (1989J [hereinafter Spencer. Critical Examination] (discussing 
the evolution of "common" nuisance to public nuisance). 
27. See infra Part II (discussing evolution of rule's terminology in English 
caselaw). 
28. E.g .• PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 72. at 571; Prosser. 
Private Action, supra note 8. at 1009. 
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7. § 821C(1J (actions for 
damages) (emphasis added). Under Section 821C(2){a). the different-in-kind rule also 
applies to actions seeking injunctive relief ("In order to maintain a proceeding to 
enjoin or abate a public nuisance, one must (a) have the right to recover damages. as 
indicated in Subsection (1) ... "). but Section 821C(2)(cJ carves out the exception for 
citizen suits and class actions. which only Hawai'i has adopted. See inJra Part I.B 
(discussing Akaul. 
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discourages trivial lawsuits.3o Although this Article focuses only 
on the hybrid nuisance action, a brief discussion of the basic 
nature of nuisance law and public nuisance in particular is 
warranted to provide context for the paradox of the special injury 
rule. 
1. A Brief History of Nuisance Law 
Modem American nuisance law has its roots in medieval 
England, which gave birth to the tort as a judicial response to 
community conflicts caused by changing land use patterns and 
social conditions.3! As early as the twelfth century in England,32 
the only remedy for common nuisance, known then as 
"purprestures,"33 was a criminal writ34 brought by the Crown.35 
This was a police-power based remedy for interference with the 
rights of the sovereign.36 
Eventually, this right of the sovereign was partially shared 
with private citizens as urbanization and the dawn of the 
industrial age generated or increased both conflicts among land 
30. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8. at 1007 (commenting that the three· 
part rationale had been "stated many times"); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 
supra note 26. at *167 (stating that common nuisances "are indictable only. and not 
actionable; as it would be unreasonable to multiply suits by giving every man a 
separate right of action. for what damnifies him in common only with the rest of his 
fellow-subjects"). 
31. HERBERT SPENCER, JUSTICE: BEING PART Iv OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS 81 
(Appleton ed. 1891) ("In encampments of savages and in the villages of agricultural 
tribes. no one was led. in pursuit of his ends. to overshadow the habitation of 
another. . . . In later times. when towns had grown up. it was unlikely that much 
respect would forthwith be paid by men to the claims of their neighbors .... ") 
32. C.H.S. FiFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw: TORT AND 
CONTRACf. at 3-5 (1949) (dating the roots of nuisance back to ancient writs in twelfth-
century England). 
33. 4 BLACKSTONE. supra note 26. at *167 ("Where there is a house erected. or an 
inclosure made. upon any part of the king's demesnes. or of an highway. or common 
street. or public water. or such like public things. It is properly called a 
purpresture. "I; Prosser. Private Action, supra note 8. at 998 ("purprestures ... were 
encroachments upon the royal domain or the king's highway. "I. 
34. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the writs related to nuisance. 
see generally G.D.G. HALL. THE TREATISE OF THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF 
ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL xii-xiii (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993); 3 
BLACKSTONE. supra note 26. at 222; FiFOOT. supra note 32, at 93; Prosser. Private 
Action. supra note 8. at 997-98; PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 
71. at 550-51. 
35. See 3 BLACKSTONE. supra note 26. at 219 - 20 ("no action lies for a public or 
common nuisance, but an indictment only ... only the king [can act] in his public 
capacity of supreme governor. and pater:famUias of the kingdom.") 
36. See generally Sevinsky, supra note 4, at 29 ("At heart. then. public nuisance 
is not a tort; rather. when asserted by the sovereign. It is essentially an exercise of 
the police power to protect public health and safety."). 
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uses and adverse external effects that impinged on the property 
rights of nearby residents and on the basic quality-of-life "rights" 
(e.g .• open waterways. clear roads, wholesome air. and civil 
SOCiety) enjoyed by neighbors and the general public. Nuisance 
provided a flexible judicial remedy to address these conflicts 
between land use and social welfare. and. surprisingly. plaintiffs 
often won their individual legal battles against the relentless 
march of social and economic progress. 37 
Centuries later. the American states incorporated the notion 
of public nuisance both through common law and by statute.38 
The states enacted broad statutes making nuisance a crime39 
and covering a wide range of activity offensive to health. safety. 
and welfare, and morals.40 Specific types of nuisances, such as 
"houses of ill-repute," unsanitary housing. and fireworks. were 
targeted for criminal sanctions as common nuisances.4' 
Although criminal enforcement remains the exclusive province of 
37. See infra Part II.B (discussing English cases from the 1600s through 1800s) 
[The English Cases]. 
38. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 999. The early American definition of 
common nuisance was u a miscellaneous group of minor criminal offenses, which 
obstruct or cause inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to the public." PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 71a, at 
549. 
39. Critics have suggested that the modem need for any criminal sanctions for 
public nuisance is less urgent than before the modem statutory era. See Spencer, 
Critical Examination, supra note 26, at 76 (British commentator J.R. Spencer 
observing that U[o]ver the last hundred years ... virtually the entire area traditionally 
the province of public nuisance prosecutions has been comprehensively covered by 
statute."). 
40. See RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.2, at 35 (UVirtually every state 
has a sizable list of statutes branding as public nuisance a wide range of activities. "); 
see also Bradford W. Wyche, A Guide to the Common Law of Nuisance in South 
Carolina. 45 S.C. L. REv. 337, 339 (1994); Harleston & Harleston, supra note 4, at 
381 (state U[s]tatutes may defme and prohibit nuisances in general terms or define 
specific activities as public nuisances"). When many states modernized their penal 
codes in the 1960s and 1970s to add specifiCity to the proscribed behavior, they 
significantly narrowed the scope of some public nuisance statutes. See Marsland v. 
Pang, 5 Haw. App. 463. 476 (Haw. App. 1985) (holding that court had eqUitable 
powers to enjoin nuisance under general common law even though statute no longer 
provided general statutory authority for abatement). See, e.g .• H.R.S. Ch. 712 
(Offenses Against Public Health and Morals) and § 712-1271 (2000). Hawai'i's 
nuisance statute allows government. individuals, or organizations to enforce the 
statute. but applies only to prostitution, obscenity. gambling, and drugs/intoxicating 
compounds as defined in the Chapter. ld. 
41. See, e.g .. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, at ·168 ("The making 
and selling of fire-works and squibs, or throwing them about in any street. is, on 
account of the danger that may ensue to any thatched or timber buildings. declared 
to be a common nuisance. by statute .... "). 
2001] MODERNIZING PUBUC NUISANCE 769 
the governmental public plaintiff.42 some states also allow private 
citizens to bring civil abatement actions under their common 
nuisance statutes. 43 
The American states also inherited from English law civil or 
common-law public nuisance. enforceable both by the 
government and by qualified private plaintiffs. By the sixteenth 
century, the English courts had begun to recognize civil actions 
brought by private plaintiffs for "crimes" against the public.44 
Historically. the type of conduct proscribed by all three kinds 
of nuisance has been difficult to define. Numerous scholars have 
expressed exasperation in their attempts to deSCribe the 
boundaries of this "mongrel" tort. 45 Medieval English cases 
42. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 999 (calling state enforcement "the 
normal remedy" for public nuisance). 
43. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 339,413 (1942) [hereinafter 
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault) ("There are Texas statutes, however, of a type rather 
uncommon elsewhere, which authorue a suit by any prtvate Citizen to enJoin the 
continuance of certain designated public nuisances such as bawdy-houses and 
gaming resorts, without proof of any damage whatever to himself."); Bryson & 
Macbeth, supra note 5, at 279 & n.185 (listing six states with public nuisance 
statutes that allow citizens to brtng the action); Rothstein, supra note 8, at 465 (citing 
eight states with statutes allowing private actions for public nuisance, most enacted 
between 1969 and 1974). The statutory grant of the right to bring a citizens suit for 
public nuisance is, of course, one possible solution to the special injury rule paradox 
(particularly attractive, perhaps, because it addresses concerns about interference 
with state sovereignty). Few states, however, have such statutes, and some of the 
ones that do allow broad standing limit their use narrowly to "social Vices." See, e.g., 
H.R.S. § 712-7210 (suit to abate place of prostitution, obscenity, gambling, drugs can 
be brought by "any citizen of the State residing within such county. .. or any 
organization"). Use of such statutes for environmental protection is not common. But 
see Kirk v. U.S. Sugar Co., 726 So. 2d 822 (Fla. App. 1999) (allowing a plaintiffs 
lawsuit against a sugar company's pollution under Florida's public nuisance statute, 
which eliminated the need to show special injury). 
44. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 71, at 55l. See infra Part 
II.B, discussing the English Cases. The View that public nuisance actions brought by 
prtvate plaintiffs are inherently crtminaJ in nature has been deeply embedded in the 
common law and the torts literature but was rejected by the Amertcan Law Institute 
in the 1970s. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 4, at 366 (noting that the 
concept of public nuisance's criminal nature today is based on "repetition of obsolete 
black letter law in scholarly works and court dicta: and "[a)lthough some courts still 
defme public nuisance as a crime, the concept of crtminality ultimately was dropped 
from the Restatement (Second)"); cJ. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 999 
(reiterating that public nuisance is "a species of catch-all low-grade criminal offense"). 
Criminal public nuisance is now "exclusively a creature of statute" not the common 
law. RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.2, at 35; see also Abrams & 
Washington, supra note 4, at 365 (explaining that public nuisance as a crtme does 
not exist in modem Amertcan common law, but only by statute). 
45. See Newark, supra note 24, at 480 ("the subject as commonly taught 
comprises a mass of matertal which proves so intractable to defmition and analysis 
that it immediately betrays its mongrel ortgins"); see also Jeremiah Smith, Torts 
Without Particular Names, 69 U. PENN. L. REv. 91, 110-12 (1921) (noting that the term 
"private nuisance" has been "severely criticized" as "too broad, too general"); Spencer, 
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focused on purprestures-such as obstructions of the highways 
and waterways-but, over time, "the principle had been 
extended to cover such other invasions of general public rights 
as interference with a market, smoke from a lime-pit, and 
diversion of water from a mill. "46 The term "nuisance" came to 
"mean[] all things to all men, and has been applied 
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to 
a cockroach baked in a pie. "47 
Public nuisance has been particularly hard to defme. 
Prosser's oft-repeated colorful list includes "obstructed highways, 
lotteries, unlicensed stage-plays, common scolds, and a host of 
other rag ends of the law,"48 as well as rights highly valued in 
modern SOCiety-from public decency to quiet neighborhoods, 
pollution-free air,49 and clean streams. 50 In the modern 
environmental context, private plaintiffs have used public 
nuisance to challenge leather tanning operations, parks in 
disrepair, noisy campers, shopping centers, helicopters, 
buildings, polluting vehicles, plants, airports, dumps, and 
interference with viewplanes and sunlight.51 Although this 
"amorphous and mutable quality seems to vex scholars more 
than it does the courts,"52 it does help explain courts' tendency to 
enforce strictly the ostenSibly bright-line special injury rule, as a 
way to clamp down on public nuisance claims that are often 
quite different from the normal run of tort cases. 
Criticru Examination, supra note 26, at 56 (calling nuisance "a chameleon word, with 
a meaning technical or general. depending on who is using it when and where"); 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 550 (noting "a rather 
astonishing lack of any consideration of [the meaning and limits] of nuisance on the 
part of the legal writers"). 
46. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 998; see also Prosser. Nuisance 
Without Fault, supra note 43, at 420 ("A nuisance in brief ... may be merely the right 
thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." (quoting 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,388 (1926)). 
47. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 549. Because the 
range of rights it protects is so hard to derme. Prosser called it "unhappily ... a sort 
of legal garbage can." Prosser. Nuisance Without Fault. supra note 43. at 410. 
48. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 998. 
49. Air pollution was considered a nuisance as early as 1611. when the King's 
Bench decided the frequently cited case of William Alldred. who claimed a hogstye 
near his house "corrupted" and "infected" the air. William Alldred's Case. 77 Eng. 
Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). 
50. See, e.g .• FRANCIS HILLIARD. THE LAw OF TORTS OR PRIvATE WRONGS 639 n.(a) 
(2d ed. 1861). 
51. See RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 21. at 29-30. 
52. Harleston & Harleston. supra note 4. at 383. The authors concluded that 
"this adaptability explains nuisance law's Survival in environmental litigation. " ld.. 
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The now classic black-letter definition of public nuisance is 
found in Prosser's Handbook: "A public nuisance is an act or 
omission which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to 
the public in the exercise of rights common to all."53 The key 
element to a public nuisance claim, in contrast to a private 
nuisance claim, then, is that the annoyance, inconvenience, or 
injury must be to a public right or interest (e.g., a public road or 
beach), not just a private one.54 
2. Unique Aspects of the Three Types of Nuisance Actions 
Although amorphous in definition, all nuisance actions have 
in common three important doctrinal aspects that provide 
unique scope to their application by the courts: substantiality of 
interference, unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and 
equitable flexibility. 
The first important limitation on nuisance actions imposed 
by the common law is that the defendant's interference with the 
plaintiffs right, public or private, must be "substantial" or, in 
equity, threaten to be substantial. 55 The standard for 
distinguishing a substantial or "material" interference from a 
mere annoyance is (or, at least, according to Prosser, should be) 
a "community standard": "definite offenSiveness, inconvenience 
or annoyance to the normal person in the community."56 The 
53. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 72. at 566; see 
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7, § 821B(1) rA public nuisance is an 
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."); see id. § 
821B(2) (interference with a public right is unreasonable when it involves "public 
health. the public safety. the public peace, the public comfort. or the public 
convenience"). 
54. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 72. at 568. The line 
between a public and private right Is often bluny. and some have severely criticized 
public nuisance's sloppy inclusion of what are essentially personal injury negligence 
cases under its broad sweep. See Newark. supra note 24. at 489 (arguing personal 
injury cases should not be "converted" into public nuisance suits); FLEMING. supra 
note 8, at 380 (allowing personal injury claims under nuisance "blur(s! the 
boundaries"); Spencer. Critical Examination. supra note 26. at 82-83 (criticizing 
overlap between negligence and nuisance); Gilbert Kodilinye. Standing to Sue in 
Private Nuisance. 9 LEG. STUD. 284. 289-90 (1989) (noting that English courts 
disallow such blurred claims but Canadian courts do not). While I agree with Newark 
that allowing purely personal injury claims to masquerade as public nuisance claims 
is inappropriate. a more sound basis for the objection is that personal injury does not 
reflect injury to the community (see infra Part IVl. rather than that public nuisance is 
concerned only With the protection of land values. which is not true. The current 
special injury rule encourages the overlap. while the actual community injury rule 
proposed in this Article would better separate these distinct torts. 
55. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 557. 
56. Id. at 558; see Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 1002 (stating that 
interference must be "a substantial one. objectionable to the ordinary reasonable 
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nuisance must affect "the ordinary comfort of human existence 
as understood by the American people in their present state of 
enlightenment."57 The term excludes "trifles," "petty annoyances," 
and "disturbances of everyday life. "58 
The second important judicial limitation on nuisance is that 
the defendant's interference with the public right must be 
unreasonable. This element requires balancing clashing 
individual and societal interests, using "the familiar process of 
weighing the gravity and probability of the risk against the 
utility" of the activity. 59 Unlike most torts, where a key issue is 
the nature of defendant's mental state, the core issue in many, if 
not most, public or private nuisance cases is the substantiality 
of the interference caused by the invasion of plaintiffs interest. 60 
which naturally involves the "ultimate question of 'reasonable 
use. "'61 This element is often highly contested and the subject of 
much "scholarly discourse."62 Ultimately, the reasonableness test 
allows more extensive judicial control over the otherwise very 
broad reach of nuisance lawsuits and "reduce[s] the scope of the 
nuisance doctrine, enabling courts to find that certain 
man"). But see RODGERS. AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 49-50 (severely 
criticizing the objective standard for failing to protect the "elderly. isolated, and 
physically vulnerable"). 
57. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 71, at 558; see also 
HILLIARD, supra note 50, at 631 ("Is the inconvenience more than fanciful. or one of 
mere delicacy or fastidiousness; as an inconvenience materially interfering with the 
ordinary comfort physically of human existence. not merely according to elegant or 
dainty modes and habits of living, but according to the plain, sober. and simple 
notions among the English people?"). To determine "substantial interference." courts 
may also consider whether the nuisance is repetitious or permanent. or only 
temporary. Newark, supra note 24. at 488 ("there are plenty of dicta ... to support 
the view that true nuisance must have some permanence about it"); PROSSER. 
HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 561 (stating that the consideration of 
continuous or recurrent objectionable behavior is a factor. though not determinative). 
58. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8. § 71, at 558. Courts seem 
to have had little trouble weeding out cases involving trivial injuries. Prosser. Private 
Action. supra note 8. at 1007 (courts' "rejection of the trivial has been especially 
marked in the decisions"); 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAw OF 
TORTS WITH NOTES, AND A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES 712 n.l (3d ed. 1912) (citing English 
cases where courts weeded out "sentimental. speculative. trivial discomfort or 
annoyance"). 
59. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 561-62. See also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON TORTS, § 826 (1939) (stating the utility test). The utility test 
represents a judicial attempt to control the potentially "disproportionate 
consequences of injunctive relief." See Jeff L. Lewin. Compensated Injunctions and the 
Evolution oJNuisance Law. 71 IOWA L. REv. 775.780 (1986). 
60. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1004; see FLEMING. supra note 8. at 
383-84. 
6l. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8. § 71. at 562; see Prosser. 
Private Action, supra note 8. at 1003 (discussing the reasonableness requirement). 
62. Abrams & Washington, supra note 4, at 375 & n.lOO. 
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interferences with the use and enjoyment of land [are) not 
actionable. "63 
Thirdly, nuisance is also unusual among the common law 
torts other than trespass because of the potential for broad 
judicial discretion and control over remedies, which include 
money damages and potent equitable relief, such as injunctions 
and abatement. Damages recovered in nuisance cases include 
the typical range of losses recognized in tort, such as the lost 
value attached to use or enjoyment of the land, actual crop loss, 
and injury to health.64 Damages may also include economic 
loss.65 What makes nuisance perhaps most distinctive in tort 
law, however, is the availability of equitable relief as a long-
standing remedy for both private and public nuisance.66 Once 
63. Lewin. supra note 59. at 780. But see RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 
2.6. at 62-64. Some activities have. traditionally. been considered nuisances "per se" 
because the activity is harmful regardless of operational. location. or other defenses. 
Id.. § 2.5. at 59. Contra PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 563-
65 (rejecting concept of "absolute" or "per se" nuisance as a "half-developed notion" 
With "little modem justification"). 
64. See PROSSER. HANDBOOK. supra note 8. § 74. at 588 (discussing the range of 
damages available). 
65. See Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1013 (noting that the "earliest 
recognition that pecuniary loss to plaintiff might be particular damage" was Hart v. 
Bassett. discussed infra Part II.B); see also Spencer. Critical Exwnination. supra note 
26. at 74 (noting that in "most" of the earliest public nuisance cases brought by 
private plaintiffs. the damages sought were for purely economic loss); FLEMING. 
TORTS. supra note 8. at 381 n.20 (noting that economic losses are recoverable in 
public nuisance in contrast to negligence rule barring such recovery); RODGERS. AIR & 
WATER. supra note 8. at 588 (noting potential recovery of business income). The 
nuisance exception to the economic loss rule may be a perverse early product of the 
special injury rule-that is. economic losses provide a convenient and compelling 
way to show "unique" and substantial injury (see infra Part 11.8). The exception. 
however. has prompted criticism. See Spencer. Critical Exwnination. supra note 26. at 
74 (recognizing that this unique advantage public nuisance offers to private 
plaintiffs-alloWing the recovery of purely economic loss. when this type of damages 
is not allowed to be recovered for other torts. provides another reason for the 
abolition of this cause of action). To add to the doctrinal complexity. subjecting this 
exception to the economic loss rule to the different-in-kind test has prompted courts 
to disallow recovery of otherWise cognizable economic losses where the economic 
injury is Widespread. see supra Part I.B.3 (Nebraska Innkeepers case). The unfairness 
of that result has prompted California and some federal circuits to carve out the 
"commercial fishers" exception to the exception. See Part LB. 1 (discussing Exxon 
Valdez cases). 
66. See PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 74. at 589 (explaining 
that the equitable remedy was established in eighteenth century English cases). See 
also Spencer. Critical Exwnination. supra note 26. at 66 ("It seems that people first 
began to seek injunctions in cases of public (as against private) nuisance in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century."); Lewin. supra note 59. at 779 n.23 (equity 
jurisdiction to abate private nuisance in America 'was well established long before 
Declaration of Independence"). 
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they determine injunctive relief is appropriate,67 courts expressly 
engage in a balancing of the parties' and the public's interests to 
determine the equitable remedies.66 Because damages are rarely 
adequate to remedy the often irreparable injuries to private 
property or to the public commons posed by a substantial and 
unreasonable nuisances, nuisance cases are particularly well-
suited for equitable relief. 69 Not surprisingly, according to 
Prosser, "the great majority of nuisance suits have been in 
equity, and concerned primarily with the prevention of future 
damage. "70 Public nuisance also allows the unique remedy of 
self-help or "abatement. "71 
3. The Uniqueness oj the Public Nuisance Cause oj Action 
Public nuisance offers plaintiffs several important strategic 
advantages. Its primary advantage is a more direct focus on the 
merits-the existence of the nuisance, the injury, and the 
appropriate remedy-than is available in many statutory cases, 
where the focus is often on procedure or violations of permits or 
standards.72 Moreover, public nuisance gives plaintiffs the 
67. The usual prerequisite to finding that injunctive relief is appropriate is that 
the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. that is. that money damages are 
inadequate. See Maloney. supra note 6. at 147. 
68. RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.6. at 65. 
69. See PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 74. at 589; see also 
RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8, § 2.6, at 67. For a thorough critique of the 
economic perspective on the effiCiency of relief in nuisance actions. see Lewin. supra 
note 59, at 785-801. For a law and economics analysis comparing damages and 
injunctive remedies for nuisance, see A Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance 
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies. 32 STAN. L. REv. 
1075. 1111 (1980). 
70. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 71, at 555. See also 
RODGERS, AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.5. at 56-57 (discussing "anticipatory 
nUisance"). The importance of equitable relief in public nuisance cases underscores 
Its close relationship to public law. discussed further in Part V.B.2, infra. 
71. Abatement is a historical remedy for nuisance. See McRae. supra note 26, at 
33; Lewin, supra note 59. at 779 (1986) (assize of nuisance allowed for abatement); 
FIFoar. supra note 32. at 9 ("The period of self-help ... was limited to four days."); 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8. § 74. at 592 (stating that self help 
must be reasonable force used in a reasonable manner). The remedy is still 
recognized today. Rothstein. supra note 8. at 455. 
72. A successful lawsuit under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). for example. results in an appropriate Environmental 
Assessment or Impact Statement and injunctive relief to maintain the status quo 
until the process is completed. Once the proper document is done. NEPA provides an 
unhappy citizen little leverage for challenging the agency's substantive decision. See 
Lawlor, supra note 5, at 668 (unlike NEPA, public nuisance allows attack on the 
merits). 
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opportunity to obtain damages73 and injunctive relief. 74 lacks 
laches and other common tort defenses. is immune to 
administrative law defenses such as exhaustion.75 avoids the 
private nuisance requirement that the plaintiff be a 
landowner / occupier of affected land. eliminates a fault 
requirement, and circumvents any pre-suit notice requirement. 76 
Given that federal and state environmental statutes are 
never likely to form a seamless web of environmental protection 
and that national political shifts can poke huge holes in the web. 
there will always be an important practical role for public 
nuisance. 77 Public nuisance also plays an important social role 
in vindicating community values by protecting "the basics of 
human existence (health, abode. the right to be left alone)."78 
Moreover, public nuisance is the judicial tool designed to 
reconcile conflicts created by the social and environmental 
externalities of land use. Thus, by "enforcing reciprocity ... 
nuisance law expresses deeply held preferences of the human 
species."79 Public nuisance can also enhance economic efficiency 
by forcing cost-internalization.8o As a remedy particularly well 
73. Money damages are always available in tort cases but are not allowed in 
environmental citizens suits. Maloney, supra note 6, at 145; Wyche, supra note 40, at 
338 n.15 ("Although many [environmental] statutes allow 'citizen suits' against 
violators, the citizens who prevail will secure monetary relief only for their attorneys 
and the government."). 
74. See, e.g., Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Rebirth of Conunon Law Actions for 
Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination. 15 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 187,221-23 (1996) 
(describing advantages, including greater prospects of damages and access to 
injunctive relief, of public nuisance cases over CERCLA for private landowner 
plaintiffs in hazardous waste contamination cases). 
75. RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.2. at 33 ("the defenses of 
prescriptive rights, estoppel, laches, and the like are unavailable if the conduct at 
issue is a public nuisance"); Comment, Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 527 ("while 
federal citizens suits have statutes of limitations of five years. public nuisances have 
no such limitations since laches and prescriptive easements do not run against the 
public"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. e, at 34 (Tentative 
Draft No. 15, 1969) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 15] ("One important advantage of 
the action grounded on the public nuisance is that prescriptive rights. the statute of 
limitations, and laches do not run against the public right, even when the action is 
brought by a private person for particular harm."). 
76. The typical notice requirement in federal citizen suit litigation is sixty days. 
See, e.g .. Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994). 
77. Maloney, supra note 6, at 163. 
78. RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 30-31. 
79. [d. § 1.1, at 4. 
80. Note, Public Watchdog, supra note 4, at 1745 (explaining that damages not 
only compensate and deter, but force industries to bear the external costs of their 
polluting activities). 
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suited for "localized" problems, it has "contributed consistently to 
the just resolution of neighborhood environmental conflict. "81 
In short. the public nuisance cause of action brought by a 
private plaintiff is a bizarre hybrid tort-it combines a collection 
of characteristics unique among torts. including substantiality. 
fault-free liability. balancing/unreasonableness. economic loss 
recovery, and injunctive relief. with some strategic advantages 
over statutory environmental law remedies. Although public 
nuisance is a broad and flexible cause of action with great 
promise as a remedy for community injury. the following 
illustrations show that American courts have used the strict 
different-in-kind test as an unduly rigid gatekeeper to control 
broad access to this powerful tort. 
B. The High Barrier Posed By the Special Iryury Rule: Three 
illustrations 
This section illustrates the special injury rule's high barrier 
to judicial access. Subsection One reviews how courts applied 
the rule to bar Alaska Natives' claims for damage to their 
subsistence fishing practices caused by the 1989 Exxon-Valdez 
oil spill. Subsection Two evaluates the contrasting results in two 
1970s beach access cases that turned on the special injury rule 
-one in Florida and another in Hawai'i. In subsection Three, 
the use of the rule by defendants to fend off two communities' 
claims of perceived threats to their welfare in the 1980s -one 
from widespread business losses and another from a large 
homeless shelter-demonstrates the limits on the continuing 
utility of the tort imposed by the special injury rule. These three 
illustrations suggest that the special injury rule remains alive 
and well and that the judiciary is continuing to bar plaintiffs' 
access in a broad range of cases. even where the courts 
acknowledge that injury exists and that the application of the 
rule may be unjust. 
1. The Exxon -Valdez Oil Spill: Differential Treatment oj 
Recreational. Cultural. and Commercial Fishing Claims 
The massive eleven-million gallon Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989 contaminated thousands 
of miles of Alaskan waters and beaches, causing untold 
environmental. economic. and cultural damage to Alaska 
81. RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.1. at 33. 
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residents. 82 The largest oil spill in North American history 
prompted a similarly large number of lawsuits,83 including civil 
litigation by the State of Alaska and the federal government that 
resulted in a complex consent decree for natural resources 
damages that totaled over $1 billion.84 Injuries to sports fishers 
(for damage to their recreational activities), to Alaska Natives (for 
damage to their subsistence fishing), and to commercial fishers 
(for damages to their livelihood), however. were not included 
directly within the government settlement.85 Using public 
nuisance theory and other causes of action. these three groups 
pursued their claims outside of the governmental litigation. 
In the first suit. the Alaska Sports Fishing Association and 
several individuals filed a public nuisance class action 
complaint. alleging injuries totaling $31 million to over 130.000 
persons in the class who used the affected area for sport 
recreation.86 In 1993, the district court overseeing the Exxon 
ValdeZ cases reaffirmed the traditional special injury rule and 
different-in-kind test for damages claims and dismissed the sport 
fishers' claims because they were "common to the general 
82. Comment, Exxon Valdez. supra note 8, at 703. 
83. Comment, Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5. at 511 & n.l (noting over 1300 
claims against Exxon). Numerous groups and individuals also sued Exxon. Captain 
Hazelwood. and others for a variety of injuries. See Comment, EXxon Valdez, supra 
note 8, at 727 n.4 (listing cases) & 703 (by 1989. Exxon faced over 153 lawsuits, 
including 58 class actions. had already paid more than $91 million to fishers and 
others who lost income and had spent more than $1 billion on cleanup, an amount 
expected to double). 
84. See In re Exxon Valdez, 1993 WL 735037, at *2-*3 (D. Alaska July 8, 1993) 
(discussing related cases brought by governments under federal environmental 
statutes); In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at *4 (D. Alaska. Mar. 23, 1994) 
(describing $1 billion trust). 
85. A variety of environmental groups filed related actions alleging both common 
law claims and statutory violations. A lawsuit filed in 1989 by environmental groups 
the National Wildlife Federation, the Wildlife Federation of Alaska, and Natural 
Resources Defense Council included a mixture of common law and statutory claims 
for injuries to the rights of the groups and their members to use and enjoy the 
affected areas for camping. hunting. fishing. and conservation purposes. See 
Comment. Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5. at 511-19 (predicting the groups' lawsuit 
would fail because of the special injury rule, unless the plaintiffs could convtnce the 
court to adopt the Restatemenfs modified rule for equitable actions). The Sierra Club 
and other national environmental groups filed a parallel statutory lawsuit under the 
federal Clean Water Act. Section 505(a). and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act. Section 7002(a). Id. at 521. However. these statutory claims could result only in 
civil penalties and injunctive relief. not damages, and suffered from other procedural 
vulnerabilities. even if they could show federal standing. Id. at 521-26. 
86. In re Exxon Valdez. 1993 WL 735037. at *1. ajJ'd on other grounds. Alaska 
Sports Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp .. 34 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that U.S. 
and Alaska were proper trustees for recovery of natural resources damages under 
federal statutes and that the consent decree barred private claims for lost 
recreational use under res judIcata). 
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public. "87 Concerned about the breadth of the class and the 
potential for duplication of claims already paid by Exxon to the 
government,88 the court hinged its decision on a classic 
application of the special injury rule for public nuisance. The 
court ruled that the "only losses the governments did not settle 
and receive damage for are those that accrued to individuals that 
are different in kind and not just degree from those suffered by 
the public."89 The sport fishers had not alleged unique damage, 
such as soiled fishing gear, and, therefore. the court barred their 
claims. 90 
One year later, the same court rendered a similar decision 
applying the traditional special injury rule and strict different-in-
kind test to a claim by Alaska Natives for loss of cultural and 
subsistence rights that the governments' civil suits also did not 
cover. In the "Alaska Natives" case, the plaintiffs brought a class 
action lawsuit on behalf of 3,455 Alaska Natives for injury to 
their non-economic "subsistence way of life" caused by the oil 
Spill.9J The court granted judgment in their favor on certain 
claims for the commercial value of their fishing 10sses,92 but the 
plaintiffs sought additional compensation for their distinct 
cultural losses.93 The Alaska Natives' subsistence claims. based 
on federal maritime law, faltered not on whether the Alaska 
Natives had cognizable subsistence fishing and gathering 
rights.94 but rather on the technical standing barrier posed by 
87. Id. at ·2. 
88. See id. at ·2 & nn. 20 & 24. 
89. Id. at ·4. 
90. While the court itself declined to use the term "unique," see id. at ·4 n.21, its 
strict application of the different-in-kind rule amounted to such a requirement. and 
the same court later used the term "unique" in dismissing the subsistence claims by 
the Alaska Natives. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at ·2 (D. Alaska, Mar. 23, 
1994). 
91. Alaska Natives Class v. Exxon Corp.. 104 F.3d 1196, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 
1997). The class in the case, based on maritime public nuisance law, was ultimately 
defined to include 3,455 individual Alaska Natives and excluded Native villages and 
government entities. Id. 
92. Id. at 1197-98 (fmding the natives' economic claims satisfied the special 
injury rule, leading to settlement of the harvest claims). 
93. The "subsistence" claim was based on the Alaska Natives' dependence upon 
natural resources, which "reflects a personal, economic, psychological, social, 
cultural, communal, and religiOUS form of daily living." Id. The Alaska Natives could 
not bring a private nuisance lawsuit because they had no possessory interest in the 
lands affected, which were either governmental or Native cOIporations' lands. In re 
Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at *3. 
94. Although on appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals doubted whether the 
subsistence claims constituted "compensable injury," Alaska Natives Class, 104 F.3d 
at 1198, the issue was not before the appellate court, and the district court had 
expressed no difficulty with recognizing the rights at issue, observing that they were 
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the traditional doctrine. 95 Even Exxon acknowledged that the 
plaintiffs' subsistence lifestyle rights were legally recognized. but 
argued that "all Alaskans have the same right. "96 and. therefore. 
under the special injury rule. the injury was (paradoxically) too 
widespread. defeating the Alaska Natives' claim. The district 
court granted summary judgment to Exxon. finding that. despite 
cultural differences between Alaska Natives and other rural 
Alaskans. "both had suffered injury of the same kind."97 
In 1997. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of the Alaska Natives' claims. Although admitting that 
"the oil spill affected the communal life of Alaska Natives. "98 
acknowledging that "the oil spill may have affected Alaska 
Natives more severely than other members of the public. "99 and 
even agreeing that the injury was "potentially different in degree 
than that suffered by other Alaskans." the court nonetheless 
found it "was not different in kind. "100 The appellate court agreed 
with the court below that subsistence rights were "shared by all 
Alaskans" and therefore that damage to those rights did not 
constitute a "special injury."101 
In contrast to its dismissal of the sports fishers' recreational 
claims and the Alaska Natives' subsistence claims. the district 
court allowed a similar third set of claims by commercial fishers. 
despite widespread shared injury. by applying the Ninth Circuit's 
based. in part. on the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. which 
expressly recognized that subsistence use "is essential to Native physical. economic. 
traditional. and cultural existence." In re Exxon Valdez. 1994 WL 182856. at ·2. Yet. 
the district court doubted that the cultural deprivation claim was individually 
cOgnizable. [d. at ·5. Rather than address the merits of the claim. however. the 
district court relied on the special injury rule to cut short the case. fmding that the 
rule essentially required "unique" injury. id.. and therefore the Act's parallel 
recognition of subsistence rights of all rural Alaskans. including non-Natives. 
defeated the Natives' claims. ld. at ·2. 
95. Plaintiffs in the Alaska Natives case apparently conceded that the special 
injury rule applied to their claims. See In Re Exxon Valdez. 1994 WL 182856. at .1. 
They had little choice because the same court had earlier applied the rule to the 
claims of the sports fishers. see supra notes 86 - 90 and accompanying text. the rule 
is firmly entrenched in the United States. see infra Part III. and because even the 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TORrS' modification of the rule in Section 821C(2j(c). see 
infra notes 471 - 475 and accompanying text. does not apply to claims for damages. 
only to injunctive relief cases. Alaska Natives Class. 104 F. 3d at 1198 (holding that 
the Restatement rule for damages precludes the plaintiffs' claim). 
96. In re Exxon Valdez. 1994 WL 182856. at ·2. 
97. ld. at ·4. 
98. Alaska Natives Class. 104 F.3d at 1198. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. For a discussion of the substantive merits of the Alaska Natives' claims. 
see Comment. Exxon Valdez. supra note 8. at 719-27. 
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"narrow and limited"102 "commercial fishers' exception"103 to the 
economic loss rule. I04 The court allowed the commercial fishers 
to proceed to the jury on claims for lost profits due to sockeye 
losses in the Kenai River, price diminishment due to perceived 
lack of quality, and for losses due to actually oiled or closed 
fishing areas, but denied claims for reduced permit and vessel 
values and for losses in areas not contaminated or closed. 105 
The unequal application of the traditional special injury rule 
and the different-in-kind test in these three related Exxon Valdez 
fishing cases illustrates the inconsistency with which modern 
courts apply the doctrine to bar claims of community injury. The 
court barred the recreational fishers and Native Alaskan 
plaintiffs-who represented actually injured communities-from 
ever getting to the merits of their claims for the ironic reason 
that the broader community was also similarly injured. In both 
cases, the district court gave substantial credence to the merits 
of the plaintiffs' claims, and the court's strict ruling on the public 
nuisance special injury rule diverged substantially from Alaska's 
"very generous standing rules" under its own state law. 106 
102. In re Exxon Valdez. 1994 WL 182856. at *6. 
103. See id. at "5 -"10. The district court based its ruling on Union Oil v. Oppen. 
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). which allowed claims of commercial fishers whose 
fisheries were contaminated and closed by the Santa Barbara oil spill. carving out a 
specific exception to the traditional economic loss rule in federal maritime cases that 
was established in the seminal case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint. 275 U.S. 
303 (1927) (an injured person must have suffered direct physical harm to recover 
economic losses). The Fourth. Fifth. Ninth. and Eleventh Circuits recognize the 
"commercial fishers' exception." Shay S. Scott. Combining Environmental Citizens 
Suits and Other Private Theories of Recovery. 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369. 393-94 
(1993); see also id. at 393 (explaining that the reason for the "anomaly. according to 
the courts. is that fishermen were traditional favorites of the court sitting in 
admiralty" and are therefore "entitled to the full protection of the law, including the 
right to recover economic losses. despite not having a proprietary interest in 
uncaught wildlife"). 
The Exxon Valdez district court was so bothered by the doctrinal 
inconsistency of the commercial fishers' exception that it certified the issue for an 
appeal. which was never taken. In re Exxon Valdez. 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 
1991). In response to the Exxon Valdez spill. Congress enacted the Oil Pollution and 
Prevention Act of 1990 ("OPA"). 33 U.S.C, §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. II 1990). OPA 
"abrogates the rule in Robins Dry Dock and the special injury requirement for 
standing under the common law tort of public nuisance by providing a private right 
of action for damages against parties responSible for spilling oil in United States 
waters or on the shoreline: Scott. supra, at 397 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)). 
104. See supra note 65. 
105. In re Exxon Valdez. 1994 WL 182856. at "6. "7 & *9. 
106. Comment. Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5. at 518 (discussing Alaska 
decisions that hold a litigant could satisty the basic adversity requirement by meeting 
the lesser of either interest-injury standing or citizen-taxpayer standing. and the 
injury need not be great). 
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Moreover, the court itself was concerned by the injustice that 
resulted in carving out an exception to the rule for commercial 
fishers but not for others suffering similar losses. 107 
The Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the denial of the Alaska 
Natives' claim sparked renewed scholarly criticism of the special 
injury rule as "outmoded,,108 and "arcane. "109 Yet, even this most 
recent criticism of the rule-though bringing to light the lack of 
judicial access for all of those admittedly injured by one of the 
largest environmental disasters of the twentieth century-will 
most likely again fall on deaf ears. The recency of the decision, 
and the Ninth Circuit's strong endorsement of the traditional 
common law rule, serves fresh notice to observers and 
practitioners that the special injury rule and the strict different-
in-kind test are today still deeply entrenched in American 
jurisprudence, will continue to restrict the use of public 
nuisance by injured communities, and may even be gaining new 
"vitality. "110 
2. Public Beach Access: Contrasting Results in Florida and 
Hawai'i 
Few public nuisance cases arise from disasters as large as 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. II I Almost all public nuisance cases 
107. See supra note 103 (discussing court's certification of the issue for appeal). 
108. See RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, at v (Preface, Supp. 1998) ("A 
decision of the Ninth Circuit has kept alive the outmoded 'special injury' requirement 
to deny Alaska Native 'subsistence lifestyle' claims arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill. "I. 
109. Comment. Exxon Valdez, supra note 8, at 726 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's 
decision as "a lost opportunity to aid the evolution of public nuisance law by 
eliminating the arguably arcane special injury rule"). 
110. See RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, at 8 (Supp. 1998). Since the Ninth 
Circuit's Exxon Valdez decision, apprOximately twenty state and federal decisions 
have involved applications of the special injury rule, although none directly rely on 
that federal decision. See infra note 153. 
Ill. The October 2000 "Coldwater Creek" spill of 250 million gallons of coal 
sludge from a storage lagoon in Kentucky, which devastated a close-knit mountain 
community and polluted over 100 miles of rivers, is a pOignant reminder that large-
scale environmental disasters can still occur despite modem environmental 
regulations. See Peter T. Kilborn, Coal sludge inundates struggling mountain 
community, S.J. MERe. NEWS, Dec. 25, 2000, at 14A (noting that the coal sludge spill 
was 20 times the volume of Exxon-Valdez). A small local law firm recently fIled a state 
class action lawsuit against the coal company for personal and property damages to 
over 200 homeowners. including a public nuisance allegation. Telephone Interview 
with Christy Smith, Law Offices of John Kirk (Pikeville, Kentucky) (May 21, 2001). Oil 
and chemical spills have often prompted public nuisance claims under federal 
maritime law. See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), 
aJj'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (lst Cir. 1977) (public nuisance claim by fishers. clammers, 
businesses, and recreational users arising from 100.000 gallon oil spill by tanker in 
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arise from much smaller, community-based problems that rarely 
make a blip on the national litigation radar screen. For those 
individuals and communities involved, however, these cases are 
vitally important. Public nuisance provides a potential litigation 
tool that (unlike most statutory remedies) is uniquely able to 
address smaller-scale community issues that are usually out of 
reach of federal and state statutes. 1\vo cases from the far-flung 
coastal reaches of the United States-Florida and Hawai'i-that 
were brought to preserve public access to community beaches 
provide dramatically different illustrations of judicial approaches 
to the special injury rule and help to define the parameters of the 
debate over modernizing the doctrine. 
In the earlier case, Save Sand Key v. United States Steel 
Corporation,112 decided in 1973, the Florida intermediate court of 
appeals rejected the strict different-in-kind test and allowed 
community groups' public nuisance claim challenging a private 
corporation's plans to build condominiums on a sand island. 
Save Sand Key alleged that U.S. Steel had commenced 
construction of rental and high-rise apartments as part of a 
development plan for the island of Sand Key and fenced portions 
of the area, interfering with the public's rights to use the beach, 
constituting a purpresture.1I3 U.S. Steel moved to dismiss on the 
basis that Save Sand Key had no right to sue because it did not 
allege a "special injury differing in kind from injury to the general 
public." 1 14 
The trial court agreed and dismissed Save Sand Key's 
claim,1I5 but the intermediate court of appeals reversed, 116 boldly 
rebuffmg the special injury rule's different-in-kind test. The 
Casco Bay. Maine): Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp .. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) 
(public nuisance claims by fishers, seafood businesses, and related businesses 
arising from massive chemical spill of Kepone into James River and Chesapeake Bay): 
Louisiana ex ret Guste v. M!V Testabank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied. 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (public nuisance claims brought by fishers and related 
plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the collision of two ships in the Mississippi River, 
which caused toxic chemical spill and river closure). As explained above, however, 
some of these cases fall under the commercial fishers' exception to the rule and, 
although some have argued that they indicate a new trend toward reformulation of 
the rule based on an "injury in fact" test and prOximate cause prinCiples. see Hodas, 
supra note 5, at 896: Scott, supra note 103, at 398, maritime claims have a distinct 
history from the typical state common law nuisance claim and may not be 
generalizable. 
112. Save Sand Key v. United States Steel Corp .. 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. App. 1973). 
rev'd on appeal. 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). 
113. Save Sand Key, 303 So. 2d at 9-10. 
114. ld. at 10. 
115. leI. 
116. Save Sand Key, 281 So. 2d at 572. 
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intermediate court held that the community non-profit 
organization was entitled to bring a public nuisance action 
against the corporation for its plans to develop a condominium 
along Sand Key beach if it had directly and personally suffered 
an injury, whether or not the right or injury was special to its 
members or was shared in common with the public generally. 117 
Forging into new legal territory, the intermediate court first 
found that the special injury rule "serves no valid purpose in the 
structure of the law and should no longer be a viable expedient 
to the disposition of these cases. "118 Second, it embraced the 
then-emerging concept of organizational standing in federal 
administrative law cases 1 19 and rejected the defendant's 
arguments about potential multiplicity of claims, concluding that 
the increasing use of the class action mechanism would limit 
duplicative litigation. 120 
Scholars hailed the decision as the death knell of the 
traditional doctrine and a welcome alignment of public nuisance 
law with major new developments in federal standing law. 121 The 
enthusiasm was short-lived. however. One year later, on appeal, 
a deeply divided Florida Supreme Courtl22 "quashed" the 
117. Id. 
118. Save Sand Key, 303 So. 2d at 11. 
119. [d. ("a bona fide non-profit organization may sue for and on behalf of some or 
all of its members who have been or will be directly and personally aggrieved irI some 
manner relating to and withirI the scope of the irIterests represented and advanced by 
such organization."); see Part lV.A (describirIg the development of federal standing 
law). 
120. By the time of the irItermedlate court's deciSion (July 19. 1973), the 
American Law Institute had adopted. but not yet published as part of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), the modified special injury rule for public nuisance cases 
seeking injunctive relief. See infra Part lV.B. The court did not mention the proposed 
new rule, which would have directly bolstered its novel pOSition. 
121. See Rothstein, supra note 8. at 458. 459 (calling it the "first American 
jurisdiction to repudiate the special injury rule"); Comment. Public as Plaintiff, supra 
note 5, at 516 ("FlOrida was the first state to apply the Supreme Court's interest-in-
fact test to public nuisance [irI Save Sand Key)," but noting it was later reversed); 
Note. Public Nuisance, supra note 8, at 366 ("By refusing to apply irIflexible and 
outdated standards that prevent. rather than promote, an efficient administration of 
justice. the instant court has demonstrated Florida's expandirIg judicial desire to 
allow citizen participation in the resolution of problems that directly affect them, 
whether individually or in common with the community."); Boger. supra note 8. at 
379 (commenting that. if the intermediate opinion held up. Florida "would become 
the first to sanction private action for public nuisance without a showing of special 
injury"). 
122. Despite the majority's strong rhetoric. the vote irI the Florida Supreme Court 
was a close 4-3. reflecting the intenSity of views over this issue. In his dissent. Judge 
Ervin strongly supported the concept that citizens should be able to step in when 
"there is neglect or refusal on the part of public officials ... to protect ... rights" for 
the use and enjoyment of navigable waters. tidelands. and sovereign areas for 
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intermediate court's decision and chastised it for straying from 
precedent. 123 The majority called the abandonment of the special 
injury rule "a significant change in the law with which we cannot 
agree."124 Moreover, it forcefully and deliberately retrenched the 
traditional doctrine: "We adhere resolutely to our [prior] 
holding[s] relative to the concept of special injury in determining 
standing. "125 
Due to the Florida Supreme Court's iron-fisted interpretation 
of the special injury rule and different-in-kind test, Save Sand 
Key never had the chance to have a hearing on the merits of its 
claims, right or wrong, that U.S. Steel Co.'s development 
interfered With community access rights to the beach. Hopes for 
sparking a revolution in public nuisance doctrine were forcefully 
dashed, and the traditional doctrine remains the law in Florida 
today. 126 
Eight years later, the Hawai'i Supreme Court reached the 
opposite result in a similar beach access case, Akau v. 
Olohana. 127 In Akau, private landowners between Spencer Beach 
Park and Hapuna Beach Park on the Kona coast of the island of 
Hawai'i had, since 1954, closed to the public a two-and-a-half 
mile stretch of beach With ancient trails. 128 Native Hawaiian 
William Akau, Jr. spearheaded a class action suit for a variety of 
bathing. boating. fishing. and other recreational uses based on "inalienable trust 
doctrine" principles. Save Sand Key. 303 So. 2d at 14. Ervin called the majority's 
decision "pretexts of one sort or another to favor the private sector. whether on 
standing to sue or otherwise. over the general public in disputes concerning the 
general public's traditional rights to enjoy public lands." Id. 
123. Save Sand Key. 303 So. 2d at 13 (citing Sarasota County Anglers Club. Inc. 
v. Burns. 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla. App.). cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967) 
(rejecting the public nuisance claim of an anglers' club seeking to stop fill operations 
at a Florida key. and holding by way of denying certification that the plaintiffs had 
failed to satisfy the different-in-kind test)). 
124. Save Sand Key. 303 So. 2d at 13. 
125. rd. 
126. See Shawn M. Willson. Comment. Exacting Public Beach Access: The Viability 
oj Pennit Conditions and FYorida's State Beach Access Laws After Dolan v. City oj 
TIgard. 12 J. LAND USE & ENVfL. L. 303. 338-39 (1997) (noting FlOrida Supreme 
Court's strict application of special injury rule). 
127. Akau v. Olohana. 65 Haw. 383 (Haw. 1982). 
128. Id- at 384. Another important difference between Save Sand Key and Akau 
was the position the States took in each lawsuit. In Save Sand Key. the State of 
Florida dropped out after the local government reached a settlement. Note. Public 
Nuisance. supra note 8. at 365. In Akau. the State of Hawai·i. though named as a 
nominal defendant. actually supported the plaintiffs position. "welcom[ingl private 
actions to complement the State's activities in securing public beach access because 
the State lacks the resources to pursue vigorously all possible claims." Akau. 65 
Haw. at 391. The position of the State in each case likely affected the courts' 
decisions. 
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state constitutional, statutory, and common law claims, 
including public nuisance, seeking two classes: a narrower one 
composed of nearby landowners and residents who sought to use 
the beach trail and a broader one composed of all other Hawai'i 
residents who used or were deterred from using the trail. 129 The 
trial court certified the class action, and the Hawai'i Supreme 
Court granted defendants' request for an interlocutory appeal. 130 
The appeal to the Hawai'i Supreme Court focused on the 
application of the traditional special injury rule to the public 
nuisance claim. The court recited the traditional formulation of 
the rule, the strict different-in-kind test, and the oft-repeated 
tripartite rationale for the rule. 131 Unlike the Florida Supreme 
Court, however, the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided to follow the 
"trend in the law ... away from focusing on whether the injury is 
shared by the public, to whether the plaintiff was in fact 
injured."132 The court noted that the American Law Institute had 
just published a rule (Section 821C(2)(c)) that rejected the 
traditional doctrine in injunctive relief cases where the plaintiff 
brought either a class action or a citizens suit, in line with 
developments in federal standing law. 133 The court pointed to its 
own cases that "broadly construed standing in other 
administrative law cases,"134 mentioned the growing recognition 
of the public trust doctrine,135 and concluded "it is unjust to 
deny members of the public the ability to enforce the public's 
rights when they are injured."136 Any danger from a multipliCity 
of suits was "greatly alleviated by a proper class action," as a 
129. [d. at 384-85; see also id. at 391-93 (discussing class certification). 
130. [d. at 385. 
131. [d. at 386. 
132. [d. The court specifically cited the United States Supreme Court's 
liberalization of federal taxpayer standing in Plast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), one 
of the key cases that spawned the modem federal standing doctrine. See infra Part 
IV.A (discussing Flast and subsequent cases). 
133. Akau. 65 Haw. at 387 n.3. The court also cited the 1974 casenote on the 
Save Sand Key decision (Note, Public Nuisance, supra note 8), but did not mention 
the FlOrida case or its reversal. 
134. [d. at 387. A year before Akau, the Hawai'i Supreme Court had decided what 
has became the leading Hawai'i case recognizing broad organizational standing, UJe 
oJ the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166 (1981) (adopting a "personal stake" 
standard). Like many other states, Hawai'i's state administrative law standing 
doctrine is nwre liberal than federal standing deciSions constrained by Article 111. 
Akau is also considered a leading case in Hawai'i that "lowerled) standing barriers in 
cases of public interest." Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 592 (1992) (citing 
Akau). 
135. Akau, 65 Haw. at 388; see infra Part IV.A (discussing Professor Sax's public 
trust work). 
136. Akau, 65 Haw. at 388. 
786 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:755 
judgment would bind "the members who are all those allowed to 
sue," thus preventing "inconsistent judgments."137 Therefore, 
following the Restatement test, the court held that "a member of 
the public has standing to sue to enforce the rights of the public 
even though his injury is not different in kind from the public's 
generally, if he can show that he has suffered an injury in fact, 
and that the concerns of a multiplicity of suits are satisfied by 
any means, including a class action."I38 The new liberal "injury in 
fact" test for public nuisance adopted by the court was derived, 
as the new Restatement Second test encouraged, from federal 
standing law: "a plaintiff has standing if he can demonstrate 
some injury to a recognized interest such as economic or 
aesthetic, and is himself among the injured and not merely 
airing a political or intellectual grievance. "139 
Unlike the Florida Supreme Court in Save Sand Key, the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court in Akau allowed the plaintiffs to proceed 
to a hearing on the merits of their claim.140 The Florida case 
represents the rule, however, and Akau still stands alone almost 
twenty years later as the only state court decision expressly to 
abandon the traditional special injury rule and to adopt the 
Restatement modification. The contrast in judicial philosophies 
about the proper role of the courts and the adaptability of the 
common law to changing social needs could not be starker, and 
these decisions describe well the parameters of the debate over 
the rule. 
3. Community Welfare: Economic Losses and Threats to the Social 
Fabric 
Although commentators' attention has focused on public 
nuisance in an environmental context, most public nuisance 
cases arise from situations involving threats to social welfare and 
business loss. Two contemporary cases, one involving economic 
losses to a business community and another involving a 
perceived threat to neighborhood social fabric, demonstrate that, 
even in cases where a conservative court may be more 
sympathetic to these types of plaintiffs, courts have applied the 
traditional doctrine strictly across-the-board to bar claims 
without regard to the plaintiffs social stripes or the 
environmental context. 
137. ld. 
138. ld. at 388-89. 
139. ld. at 390. 
140. ld. 
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In Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines 
COrp.,141 businesses in South Sioux City, Nebraska, sustained 
millions of dollars in economic losses142 when the Siouxland 
Veteran's Memorial Bridge spanning the Missouri River between 
Iowa and Nebraska was closed because of construction defects. 
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the businesses could not 
sustain a public nuisance claim 143 against the contractor 
because they had not suffered "special" damages-the economic 
losses were widespread within the entire community affected by 
the bridge closure. l44 Although the court acknowledged that the 
question "is admittedly one of policy," that "recovery may be 
warranted in some cases," and that "[slevere pecuniary loss is 
usually a special type of harm," it held fast to the traditional rule 
and found that "if a whole community suffers such loss, then it 
becomes a public wrong and the plaintiff cannot recover."145 
Pointing out the paradox of the different-in-kind test, the court 
noted that, by characterizing their case as a class action on 
behalf of themselves and "all other owners, operators, and 
employees" of similarly situated restaurants, bars, motels, and 
other retail establishments in the affected communities, the 
plaintiffs directly undermined their ability to argue their 
damages were "special," thus defeating the public nuisance 
claim.146 Ironically, if the plaintiffs had ignored the broader 
economic losses to the community, they would have had a better 
chance of success. 
In the second social welfare case, a New York community 
Civic association's attempt to obtain a hearing on its public 
nuisance claims against a newly-opened homeless shelter in its 
neighborhood was also denied based on the alleged lack of 
special injury. In Spring-Gar Community Civic Association, Inc. v. 
141. Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 
(Iowa 1984). 
142. The Nebraska Innkeepers Association alleged a total economic loss to the 
business community of $65 million, including its motel and restaurant complex 
called the Marina Inn, and sued on behalf of all other persons in Sioux City and 
South Sioux City "connected with restaurants, bars. motels and other retail 
establishments." Id. at 125. 
143. The plaintiffs apparently alleged the public nuisance theory for the fIrst time 
on appeal. id. at 126, having lost in the trial court on a negligence claim under the 
"uniformly" accepted tort rule that economic losses are not generally compensable in 
tort absent physical injury. [d. 
144. Id. at 130. 
145. Id. (emphasis added). 
146. Id. 
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Homes oj the Homeless, Inc., 147 a civic association and nearby 
residents sought to enjoin a building owner and the City of New 
York from continuing to use a building that already housed 125 
families as a homeless shelter. The court rejected the claim, 
citing the New York courts' firm adoption of the special injury 
rule l48 and finding that "plaintiffs have not shown how they 
would be damaged in a way that is different from the rest of the 
community. "149 Despite the court's concerns about the social 
impacts of the large facility in that community,I50 the court 
declined to hear the civic association's claim. 151 
Although these are two· disparate factual situations, 
Nebraska Innkeepers and Spring-Gar both illustrate state courts' 
continuing reluctance to allow even businesses and civic groups 
to use public nuisance to redress acknowledged economic and 
social problems that have or threaten to have widespread 
adverse impact on local communities. 152 Ironically, in both cases, 
if the injury had been more limited and isolated, the plaintiffs' 
chances of success on the public nuisance claim would have 
147. Spring-Gar Community Civic Ass·n. Inc. v. Homes of the Homeless. Inc .. 516 
N.Y.S.2d 399 (Sup. Ct .. Queens County 1987). 
148. [d. at 403. The court relied on the leading case in New York. Bums. Jackson. 
Miller. Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner. 59 N.Y.2d 314 (App. Div. 1983). a perfect 
illustration of the kind of public nuisance case that makes courts hesitant to loosen 
up the traditional doctrine. In Bums. two New York City law firms sued on behalf of 
all professional and business entities in the City against the Transport Workers 
Union and union officials to recover business losses sustained during an illegal 
transit strike in 1980. Based on the special injury rule. the Bums court denied the 
claim. fmding that the injury was not peculiar but was so general and widespread as 
to defeat the claim. [d. at 334-35. Such claims are problematic because the facts 
involve a diffuse economic dispute and its infmite ripples. unlike typical nuisance 
cases that are based on a defendant's localized land-based threat to the health. 
welfare. or safety of an identifiable community. Although such claims may seem to be 
bases for objecting to a special injury rule. including this Article's actual community 
injury proposal. such cases can be appropriately barred by rmding that a strike is 
simply not a nuisance or under the traditional prOximate cause analysis. See Hodas. 
supra note 5 (analyzing prOximate cause limitations in public nuisance cases). 
149. Spring-Gar Community Civic Ass·n. 516 N'y.S.2d at 403. 
150. [d. at 400-02. 
151. See also Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts. Inc. v. Bell. 677 
N.E.2d 204 (Mass. 1997) (allowing an abortion clinic. as a representational plaintiff. 
to use public nuisance theory to obtain an injunction against anti-abortion 
protestors). Cf Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Services. 
712 P.2d 914. 918 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that a neighborhood residents' association 
had standing to sue a shelter that served meals to the indigent under a public 
nuisance theory because the damage to the use and enjoyment of its members' 
properties. such as clients trespassing and urinating on lawns. was different-in-kind 
from harm to the general public). 
152. See also Sears v. Hull. 961 P.2d 1013. 1018 (Ariz. 1998) (rejecting. under the 
special injury rule. nearby residents' public nuisance claim against a proposed 
gaming operation because of the commonality of complaints). 
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been significantly greater. Thus. the most unrepresentative 
plaintiffs have the best chance of making a "representative" 
public nuisance claim. This is particularly problematic 
considering that the claim at issue 1s a public (not private) 
nuisance claim - that is. the plaintiffs have a cause of action 
only because of the actual or threatened injury to public (not 
private) values. 
Plaintiffs similar to recreational fishers. Native Alaskans. 
beach users in Florida. businesses in Nebraska. and community 
groups in New York continue to feel the draconian impact of the 
ancient special injury rule and different-in-kind test. So far. the 
only plaintiffs to convince courts to void the rule are beach users 
in Hawai'i and commercial fishers in some federal circuits. 153 
Even in cases where courts acknowledge the underlying merits of 
the plaintiffs' claims. the rule acts as an unfair. technical 
threshold restriction on court access. For defendants, the rule 
provides a clean and simple defense to substantial potential 
liability for widespread community injury. Indeed. as Judge 
Appleton suggested in 1859. the greater the injury. "the better is 
the defence. "154 To better understand the doctrinal context for 
this unfortunate paradox, this Article next examines the 
historical bases for courts' strict application of the rule. 
suggesting that the conventional understanding that the strict 
wording of the rule is justified by ancient case law may well be 
mistaken. 
153. The post-Exxon Valdez case law on the special injury rule continues to 
demonstrate courts' conservative approach to the doctrine. See, e.g., Bologna v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying New York's strict 
interpretation of the doctrine but finding response costs for hazardous waste clean-
up to be sufficient injury); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servo 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (Cal. 
App. 1999) (emphasizing that California law requires appl!cation of the different-in-
kirId test. "not merely different in degree"); Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Prod .. Inc .. 
740 So. 2d 301 (MiSS. 1999) (rejecting a public nuisance claim against a pulp mill for 
lack of special injury); Lewis v. General Elec. Co .. 37 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(fmding that the plaintiffs decreased land value was suffiCiently different "than that 
borne by the general public"); Sears. 961 P.2d 1013; K.C. 1986 Ltd. Part. v. Reade 
Mfrg .. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (W.O. Mo. 1998) (applying Missouri's strict special injury 
rule to bar a public nuisance claim in a groundwater contamination case); Liddle v. 
Corps of Engineers. U.S. Army. 981 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (dismissing 
neighbors' lawsuit against a YMCA camp for lack of "unique" injury); Planned 
Parenthood. 677 N.E.2d 204. For a summary of special injury case law from 1970 
until the 1997 Exxon Valdez decision. see infra note 535. 
154. Brown v. Watson. 47 Me. 161. 164 (1859). 
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II 
EXAMINING THE "ANCIENT' SPECIAL INJURY RULE: THE lWISTED HISTORY OF THE 
DIFFERENT-IN-KIND AND DIFFERENT-IN-DEGREE TESTS 
The modem judicial and scholarly view of the special injury 
rule and different-in-kind test is heavily saddled with the 
baggage of the supposedly long history of the rule, which is 
usually traced to sixteenth century English cases. Courts and 
commentators refer to the origin of the rule and the test as 
though their age made them truisms beyond discussion. This 
Article seeks to reinvigorate the modem promise of the public 
nuisance cause of action by re-examining the twisted history of 
the different-in-kind and different-in-degree tests. This 
excavation suggests that not only has the oft-cited seminal "1535 
case" been misconstrued, but that it and the cases that followed 
for the next three hundred years articulated a different-in-degree 
test imd not the more restrictive modem different-in-kind test. 
Moreover, the different-in-kind test arose not from public 
nuisance cases but from a line of railroad compensation cases 
involving different law and policy considerations. If this new 
interpretation can be brought to light, perhaps judicial minds 
may be less inclined to adhere to tradition merely for tradition's 
sake and be more open to a reformulation that solves the 
paradox of the special injury rule. As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
commented on the development of the common law: "It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry N. It is still more revolting if 
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply perSists from blind imitation of the 
past. "155 
A. Reinterpreting the Anonymous 1535 Case: Fitzherbert's 
Hypothetical Horse 
Scholarly articles. treatises. and the Restatement (Second) oj 
Torts uniformly point to an "anonymous" King's Bench decision 
in 1535156 as the seminal case supporting the special injury rule. 
the different-in-kind test, and the familiar rationale. 157 A close 
155. Holmes, supra note 23, at 469. 
156. Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8. Mich., f. 26, pI. 10 (1535). 
157. See, e.g .. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 26. at ·220 (using the 
facts and dicta of the 1535 case, without citation); FLEMING, supra note 8, at 380 n.8 
(citing the 1535 case); 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORfH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 424 (2d ed. 
1937) (using the erroneous date of 1536 for the case); FiFOOT, supra note 32, at 98; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7. § 821C cmt. a ("The first recorded 
case permitting a private action in tort was decided in 1536."); PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
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examination of that case suggests, however, that it may have 
been misinterpreted in two important ways. First, the famous 
"holding" of the case is dictum, based on a hypothetical posited 
by a dissenting judge. Second, even this dictum was later 
misconstrued as supporting the more restrictive different-in-kind 
test instead of the different-in-degree test, arguably setting legal 
doctrine on the wrong path for the past 450 years. 158 
The reported facts of the 1535 case decided by the King's 
Bench are sparse, and the opinion itself is only three paragraphs 
long. 159 The unnamed plaintiff seeking the writ sur son cas (on 
his case) alleged that the defendant had obstructed the King's 
highway, in an undisclosed manner, so as to prevent the plaintiff 
from traveling from his house to his fields. Only two justices' 
opinions are reported: Chief Justice Baldwin's majority opinion 
and Justice Fitzherbert's dissent. Baldwin concluded, in a one-
sentence opinion that appears to be the hoiding,I60 that the 
(1st ed. 1941), supra note 8. § 72, at 569-70 ("Tort liability for public nuisance seems 
to have originated in 1536. when it was first held that the action would lie if the 
plaintiff could show that he had suffered special damage over and above the ordinary 
damage caused to the public at large by the nuisance. This qualification has 
perSisted. and it is uniformly held .... "). Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 
1005 ("The break away from [the position that public nuisance could only be 
remediated by the King] came in an anonymous case in the yearbooks of 1536."); 
Presentation oJRestatement oJthe Law. Second. Torts. Tentative Draft No. 15.46 A.L.I. 
PROC. 267. 284-85 (1969) (citing case); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL •• PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAw OF TORrS. § 90. at 646 & n.37 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] 
("Tort liability for public nuisance originated in an anonymous case in 1536 ... ."). 
C] Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 142. 142-43 & n.65 (stating that the 1535 
case was "not . .. entitled to great weight" (emphasis added)). 
158. See Newark. supra note 24. at 483-85 (calling the 1535 case "the case which 
set the law of nuisance on the wrong track." because it allowed a personal injury 
action under the guise of nuisance. which he called "heresy: a different criticism 
than the one raised in this Article). 
159. The translation history of this case creates some interpretational difficulties. 
The Yearbook version is written in fractured French and Latin. See Y.B. Mich. 27 
Hen. 8. Mich .. f. 26. pI. 10 (1535). The earliest translation in America appears to be 
in Jeremiah Smith·s 1915 article. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 142 n.65. 
William Holdsworth then published a partial translation in his 1925 treatise HistorY 
oj English Law. 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 424 & n.6 (Methuen 
& Co. Ltd .. n.d.) (1" ed. 1925). Two other translations appeared in 1949: C.H.S. Fifoot 
(Hertford College. Oxford). in his History and Sources oj the Common Law: Tort and 
Contract. originally published in 1949. supra note 32. at 98; and F.H. Newark in his 
article. The Boundaries oj Nuisance, supra note 24. at 483 (providing partial 
translation). Prosser's 1966 article. Private Action. recites only one passage of the 
case Without attributing the source of the translation. but the passage is verbatim. 
the 1949 Newark translation. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1005. Compare 
id. With Newark. supra note 24. at 483. 
160. See F1FOOT. supra note 32. at 98 (translating Chief Justice BaldWin's holding 
as recited in accompanying text). The Chief Justice's opinion appears to be the 
"majority: even though only two opinions are reported. As discussed below. however. 
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plaintiff had no cause of action, reasoning that the only available 
remedy for such a public nuisance was a criminal writ by the 
Crown and justifying the restriction based on concern for 
multiplicity of legal action: 
It seems to me that this action does not lie to the plaintiff for 
the stopping of the highway; for the King has the punishment 
of that, and he has his plaint in the Leet161 and there he has 
his redress, because it is a common nuisance to all the King's 
lieges,162 and so there is no reason for a particular person to 
have an accion sur son cas; for if one person shall have an 
action by this, by the same reason every person shall have an 
action, and so he will be punished a hundred times on the 
same case. 163 
Dissenting, Justice Fitzherbert found, "to the contrary," that 
the plaintiff should have a cause of action, and his explanation 
emphasized that this was so because the plaintiff had "more" 
and "greater" of an injury than others-that is, I argue, a 
difference-in-degree- not that the ffiJUry was "particular," 
"peculiar," "distinct," "unique," or "different in kind": 
I agree well that each nuisance done in the King's highway is 
punishable in the Leet and not by an action, unless it be 
where one man has suffered greater hurt or inconvenience 
than the generality have; but he who has suffered such 
greater 64 displeasure or hurt can have an action to recover 
the damage which he has by reason of his special hurt. 165 
Then, Fitzherbert launched into a hypothetical and 
"incautious obiter dictum"166 that would become the legendary 
hypothetical horse symbolizing the special injury rule doctrine: 
If one makes a ditch across the highway, and I come riding 
along the way in the night and I and my horse are thrown 
into the ditch so that I have great damage and displeasure 
thereby, I shall have an action here against him who made 
history has discarded Baldwin's view and either adopted the opinion of the apparent 
dissenter. Justice Fitzherbert, as though it were the opinion of the court. or 
suggested that Baldwin agreed with Fitzherbert, even though the text of the case 
supports neither interpretation. 
161. The "leet" was the early English criminal court. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 901 
(7th ed. 1999). 
162. "Lieges" describes the King's subjects. Id. at 831. 
163. This translation is from FIFOOT, supra note 32, at 98. 
164. [d. Fifoot translates the modifier of "displeasure or hurt" as "greater," see id .. 
and Newark's translation instead uses "more.· Newark. supra note 24. at 483. The 
original fractured French text is "pluis grander hurt ou incommoditie [sic)" and "pluis 
displeasur ou hurt [sic)." Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, Mich., f. 26. pI. 10 (1535). 
165. FIFOOT. supra note 32, at 98 (emphasis added). 
166. Newark. supra note 24. at 482; see also Spencer. Critical Exwnination. supra 
note 26. at 74 (noting "Fitzherbert's dictum"). 
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this ditch across the highway, because I have suffered more 
damage than any other person. So here the plaintiff had more 
convenience by this highway than any other person had, and 
so when he is stopped he suffers more damage because he 
has to go to his close. Wherefore it seems to me that he shall 
have this action pour ce special matiere; but if he had not 
suffered greater damage than all other suffered, then he 
would not have the action. 167 
793 
Fitzherbert's dicta supports the rule that the plaintiff must 
show some damage or inconvenience to establish the new cause 
of action, but the test he articulates is a flexible one and does 
not support the prevailing interpretation that his opinion 
established the strict different-in-kind test. Although it is true 
that the hypothetical personal injury and downed horse would 
constitute a different-in-kind injury, Fitzherbert uses language 
that expresses the different-in-degree standard: he consistently 
uses the words "greater" (four times) and "more" (three times). 
Nowhere in his opinion does Fitzherbert use words indicating 
that he would require a different in kind damage-he uses the 
term "special" only once ("special hurt"). 168 and he does not use 
the words "different," "peculiar," or "particular." Although the 
meaning of Fitzherbert's example is ambiguous because he has 
mixed together an inconvenience with a personal injury and 
property damage, the language he uses facially supports a less 
restrictive test for the plaintiff. 
Subsequent scholarly descriptions of the 1535 case 
suggesting that it was the genesis for the rule requiring "peculiar 
damage or an inconvenience other than that endured by the 
public at large"169 are not well grounded in the text. Indeed, 
Fitzherbert's language suggesting a different-in-degree test has 
been buried in history and, instead, Fitzherbert's hypothetical 
horse has become the "stock example" of the different-in-kind 
rule for the past 465 years. l7O Two of England's early treatise 
167. FIFOOT. supra note 32. at 98 (emphasis added to English words). 
168. Id. Fitzherbert uses the tenn "special" one other time ("ce special matiere" or 
"this special matter/subject"). but it is an apparent reference to the lawsuit generally. 
not the injury rule. Id. 
169. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
170. Newark. supra note 24. at 483-84 (explaining the reason this "choice tid-bit" 
about the "horseman who fell into the newly dug ditch" eventually became "the stock 
example of particular damage grounding an action of nuisance" in England was 
because it was in the Abridgements and "could hardly escape being cited by the 
court"). See also 1 JOHN SMITH. A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON VARIOUS BRANCHES 
OF THE LAw: WITH NOTES 320 (Richard H. Comns & Robert Arbuthnot eds .. 9 th ed. 
1903) [hereinafter 1 SMITH. LEADING CASES] (describing the "familiar instance put by 
the textwriters. if A digs a trench across the highway. this is the subject of an 
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writers appear to have sparked the historical misinterpretation of 
the 1535 case, and their great influence likely infected the 
development of American scholarship and jurisprudence at its 
earliest stage. Lord Edward Coke's Commentary Upon Littleton, 
appearing in 1628, was apparently the first to interpret and to 
focus scholarly attention on the 1535 case. l7l In his commentary, 
Coke used Fitzherbert's dictum to explain the special injury rule, 
and Coke adopted the now-entrenched terminology "particular" 
and "special" injury, as well as the restrictive concept that 
commonality of injury prevented a legitimate claim: 
But the law for this common nuisance hath provided an apt 
remedy, and that is by presentment in the leet or in the torn, 
. unless any man hath a particular damage; as if he and his 
horse fall into the ditch, whereby he received hurt and loss, 
there for this special damage, which is not common to others, 
he shall have an action upon his case; and all this was 
resolved by the court in the king's bench. 172 
Unlike Fitzherbert, whose dissent would require only 
"greater" injury, Coke's interpretation suggested that the injury 
must be "special" or "particular," i.e. distinct and "not common" 
or shared, such as personal injury or property damage. 
A later influential interpretation by William Blackstone in 
1 768 cites Coke on Littleton and repeats the same misleading 
interpretation of Fitzherbert's dicta, phrasing the test even more 
strictly than Coke: "Yet this [general) rule [barring private 
plaintiffs from public nuisance actions) admits of one exception; 
where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage, 
beyond the rest of the king's subjects, by a public nuisance; in 
indictment; but if B falls into it. then the particular damage thus sustained by him 
will support an action"). The 1535 case and Fitzherbert's horse were also cited with 
varying accuracy in many subsequent public nuisance cases. See. e.g .• Williams' 
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163, 164 (1592) (slightly mis-quoting Justice Fitzherbert's view as 
"T7Wre particular damage"); Fowler v. Sanders, 79 Eng. Rep. 382 (1614) (upholding 
plaintiffs action for personal injury when his horse stumbled due to defendant's 
obstruction of highway, citing the 1535 case and Williams' Case, stating the rule as 
"special damage"). 
171. See 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PARr OF THE INSfITUTES OF THE LAw OF ENGLAND 
§ 56a (1832 ed., 1979) [hereinafter 1 COKE, INSTITUTES (1832 ed.)) (Coke's treatise 
Institutes of the Laws of England, or a Corronentary Upon Littleton is popularly cited as 
Coke's Institutes or Coke on Littleton); see also FIFO(Yf, supra note 32, at 96 ("The 
position was summarised by Coke and by him transmitted to future generations. "I; 
1918 Note, supra note 8, at 211 (noting that Coke's statement of a "particular 
damage" requirement has been the basis of nearly all actions for damages sustained 
by private parties for public nuisance). 
172. 1 COKE, INSTITUTES (1832 ed.), supra note 171, § 56a, n.(c). 
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which case he shall have a private satisfaction by action."173 
Thus. Blackstone suggested the test required virtually unique 
damage. again substantially restricting the type and number of 
potential plaintiffs more than Justice Fitzherbert's opinion 
suggested. 
Although one is naturally hesitant to challenge the 
scholarship of legal legends like Coke and Blackstone. the text of 
the 1535 case does not. in fact. appear to support their 
interpretation or their introduction of restrictive terms to the 
rule. Support for this criticism comes from English legal 
historian H.S. Fifoot. who severely criticized the accuracy of their 
scholarship. In 1949. Fifoot commented: "neither Coke nor 
Blackstone were remarkable for historical scholarship. Coke was 
skeptical or credulous as might serve his turn and did not 
scruple to tamper with his sources: Blackstone, though with 
more interest in legal history, was capable of ludicrous errors."174 
Yet, despite his misgivings, Fifoot reiterated Coke and 
Blackstone's (mis)interpretation of the 1535 case. 175 
Early twentieth century commentary perpetuated the error. 
William Searle Holdsworth's A History of English Law, published 
in 1924, stated: "It had been laid down by Fitzherbert in 1536 
that an action would lie for a public nuisance, if the plaintiff 
could show that he had suffered special damage over and above 
the ordinary damage caused to the public at large by the 
nuisance. "176 Holdsworth too miscast the rule of the case as 
requiring "special" damage "over and above" that "ordinary" or 
common to others, instead of using Fitzherbert's "greater hurt or 
inconvenience" test.177 Holdsworth's commentary is particularly 
173. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, at 220 (emphasis added); see 
also id (citing Co. Litt. 56. 5 Rep. 73). 
174. F1FOOT, supra note 32, at 73; see also Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to Book I, 
in 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, at iii-v (U. Chicago Press ed. 1979) 
(describing Blackstone's unsuccessful attempt to practice law, and his judicial career, 
which was "as undistinguished and uninteresting as his progress at the bar: adding 
he was "a notably poor trial judge, more frequently reversed on appeal than any of his 
peers"); see also John H. Langbein, Introduction, in 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 26, at iv (Blackstone's "reasoning was, we think, sometimes mistaken" 
and "untrustworthy" on historical narrative); see also id. at viii (noting Blackstone's 
creation of a "falsehood" in stating history of equity). 
175. FIFOOT, supra note 32, at 96 (reiterating the rule requiring "peculiar damage 
or an inconvenience other than that endured by the public at large") (emphasis 
added). 
176. HOLDSWORfH, supra note 157, at 424 (emphasis added). 
177. Compare id with F1FOOT, supra note 32, at 98. Holdsworth's discussion of 
the case also incorrectly suggested that the Fitzherbert opinion was the holding 
(instead of dissent and dicta). HOLDSWORfH. supra note 157. at 424. He further 
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important because it appears to be the sole source for the 
interpretation of the 1535 case by William L. Prosser, whose 
Torts Handbook singularly crafted American tort law on this 
issue. 178 Thus, it appears that Coke in the seventeenth century, 
Blackstone in the eighteenth century, Holdsworth in the early 
twentieth century, and Prosser, whose influence continues to 
this century, all misconstrued the seminal special injury rule 
case. Whether their interpretations were deliberate, unwitting, or 
sloppy is both difficult to judge and ultimately unimportant. 
They have cumulatively shaped the conservative tradition of the 
rule. Examination of the next three hundred years of English 
cases reinforces the conclusion that the rule's legal origins have 
been misunderstood. 
B. Reexamining the English Decisions: Substantial Supportjor the 
Different-in-Degree Test 
1. The Orthodox Line oj English Public Nuisance Cases 
A review of the "orthodox line"179 of English cases in the three 
hundred years that followed the 1535 decision provide some 
insight into how courts simultaneously embraced Justice 
Fitzherbert's dictum proposing to allow private parties to sue for 
public nuisance, yet struggled to develop jurisprudential 
parameters for the type of injury required of the new plaintiff, 
mischaracterized the opinion of Chief Justice Baldwin as "dissent: id., ultimately 
inverting the proper legal weight of the two opinions in the case. 
178. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 72, at 569 & n.41 
(citing the 1535 case, Williams' Case, and Holdsworth). Prosser's sole reliance on 
Holdsworth is also indicated by the fact that Prosser used Holdworth's apparently 
erroneous date of 1536 for the case. Id. at 569. Modern scholarship has relied almost 
exclusively on Prosser's characterization of this case. See, e.g., L. Mark Walker & Dale 
E. Cottingham, An Abridged Primer on the Law of Public Nuisance, TuLSA L.J. 355, 
356 (1994) ("In an anonymous case in 1536, it was fIrst held that a public nuisance 
can also give rise to a private tort claim if the plaintiff can show that, as a result of 
the public nuisance, he sustained injuries different in kind from those suffered by the 
public in general.") (emphasis added) (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 157, at 
646 & n.37); Comment, Public as Plaintiff. supra note 5, at 513 n.8 ('The [distinct 
injury] rule itself dates to an anonymous case in the yearbooks of 1536," citing 
Prosser, Private Action. supra note 8, at 1005 n.73). 
179. Newark, supra note 24, at 484 (emphaSiS added) (stating he had "no 
complaint" about the "orthodox line" of cases that stood for a "greater hurt or 
inconvenience" rule); id. at 484 n.24 (citing as "principal cases' Hart, Paine, Iveson, 
Chichester. Hubert, Rose, and Greasly. discussed herein); see also Smith. Private 
Action. supra note 8, at 143-44 (citing Hart, Pain, Iveson. Chichester, Rose, and 
Greasly); FLEMING, supra note 8, at 382 & nn. 22-23 (citing Hart and Rose); Hughes v. 
Heiser, I Bin. 463, 467-68 (Penn. 1808) (citing Hart, Paine, Iveson, and Chichester!. 
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chiefly because of concerns about multiplicity of actions. ISO This 
re-examination further supports the conclusion that. contrary to 
the common scholarly understanding. the different-in-kind test 
was not universally adopted in the early English cases and many 
of the decisions used a more liberal test that can be interpreted 
as either a different-in-degree test or an "actual damages" test. lSI 
Indeed. the dominance of the different-in-kind test over the 
different-in-degree test appears to be a fairly recent invention. 
and. even then. inappropriately borrowed from a line of railroad 
compensation cases that expressly noted that the liberal 
different-in-degree test was the rule in public nuisance cases. 
In 1681. in Hart v. Basset. the King's Bench closely followed 
Chief Justice Fitzherbert's language and articulated a different-
in-degree test.IS2 In Hart, the defendant had illegally obstructed 
the way to plaintiffs barn with a ditch and a gate. so that 
plaintiff was forced to "carty [goods] by a longer and more 
difficult way. "IS3 The court rejected the defendant's multiplicity 
argument. IS4 holding that the plaintiff had shown "particular 
damage. for the labour and pains he was forced to take with his 
180. The multiplicity concern, however. was not universally accepted. Chief 
Justice Holt's opinion in the oft-cited 1703 voting rights case Ashby v. White, strongly 
rejected the other justices' concerns about multiplicity and formulated the rule in 
terms that equated to "actual" injury: "it is no objection to say, that it will occasion 
multiplicity of actions: for if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied 
too, for every man that is injured ought to have his recompense. Suppose the 
defendant had beat forty or fifty men, the damage done to each one is peculiar to 
himself, and he shall have an action. So if many persons received a private injury by 
a public nuisance, every man shall have his action .... " Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. 
Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), reprinted in SMITH, LEADING CASES, supra note 170, at 268, 296. 
181. See Smith, Private Action, supra note 8. at 143 (suggesting that several of the 
English cases were best interpreted as supporting an "actual damages" rule, not a 
different-in-degree test, citing Hart. lveson. Chichester, Rose, and Greas/y); see also 
id. at 144 n.69 (calling Pain defective in its pleadings, not inconsistent with his actual 
damages rule). 
182. T. Jones 156. 84 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B. 1681). 
183. Id.. 
184. Id.. at 1194-95. The defendant cited WUliams' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (1592), 
which was not a nuisance case but nonetheless is often cited in older public 
nuisance cases for the multiplicity rationale. The case involved a claim by a lord of a 
manor that the local vicar had failed to celebrate "divine service" in the manor's 
chapel and to administer him the sacraments. The court rejected the claim and 
expressed concern about "multiplicity" - "so infinite actions for one default: id. at 
164-words often repeated in later public nuisance cases. See, e.g., Paine v. Patrich, 
90 Eng. Rep. 715 (K.B. 1692) (The plaintiff brought a public nuisance action against 
a defendant who had built a bridge that hindered the plaintiffs river passage. The 
court rejected this claim. fmding that no "particular damage" was alleged, and that 
"therefore this action will not lie; and chiefly to avoid mUltiplicity of actions; for by the 
same reason that it may be brought by the plaintiff, it may be maintainable by every 
person passing that way."). 
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cattle and servants, by reason of the obstruction. "185 Hart 
recognized that greater inconvenience was of sufficient weight to 
sustain the plaintiffs public nuisance claim. 
In 1699, Iveson v. Moorel86 approved a plaintiffs claim for 
obstruction of a passage used for his coal hauling business. 
Justice Gould recited the special injury rule as requiring damage 
"more peculiar to [the plaintifil than any other of the King's 
subjects," based on the rationale of avoiding multiplicity of 
suits. 187 He concluded that the "stoppage of the way" was such a 
"special damage. "188 The court was split. 189 but after referral, the 
plaintiff prevailed. 190 
Reminiscent of Hart, in Chichester v. Lethbridge, decided in 
1738, the King's Bench found for a different-in-degree plaintiff 
whose carriages had been blocked by defendant's obstruction of 
the highway.191 Chief Justice Willes concluded, based on Hart, 
that the plaintiff had sufficiently shown his particular injury 
because he "was attempting to travel this road several times with 
his coach, but could not by reason of these obstructions. "192 
The editor's notes to the Chichester case confirm that, as of 
1738, the injury exception to the general ban was in flux:, and 
the "general rule" that a private party did not have an action for 
a common nuisance (i.e. Chief Justice Baldwin's majority view) 
"seems to have been admitted by all the cases on the subject."193 
However, "a question has frequently arisen whether the damage 
stated in each particular case were sufficient to bring it within 
the exception to the general rule; and this question has received 
185. Hart. 84 Eng. Rep. at 1195. 
186. 1 Ld. Raym. 486.91 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1697). 
187. ld. at 1226. 
188. leI. 
189. See Hubert v. Groves. 1 Esp. 148. 150. 170 Eng. Rep. 308. 309 (N.P. 1794) 
(noting that the court in Iveson was "divided" 2-2 on the interpretation of the special 
injury rule). 
190. Iveson. 91 Eng. Rep. at 1230. See Smith. Private Action. supra note 8, at 143 
n.66 (noting that Iveson held for the plaintiff after reargument before the Court of 
Common Pleas and barons of the Exchequer). 
191. Willes. 71, 125 Eng. Rep. 1061 (C.P. 1738). 
192. Id. at 1062 ("we admit the general rule. but think that in this case there are 
particular damages assigned sufficient to support the action. The rule is laid down in 
[Coke on Littleton 56). that no one can have an action for a nuisance or obstruction in 
a common highway. without assigning some particular damage; and this to prevent 
multiplicity of suits; for otherwise every subject of England might maintain an action 
for the same obstruction."). 
193. Id. at 1063 & n.(all (Citing the 1535 case; Feneux; Paine; Fowler, and Iveson). 
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various determinations according to the circumstances of each 
case."194 
In 1815, the King's Bench decided Rose v. Miles,I95 one of the 
most often-cited English cases on the special injury rule. Rose 
supports the conclusion that the English courts allowed 
plaintiffs with different-in-degree injuries to come within the 
special injury rule exception. 196 In Rose, the defendant's barge 
had obstructed the plaintiffs use of his barges on a creek for 
goods, wares, and "merchandizes," forcing the plaintiff to use a 
more expensive overland route for his business. 197 Chief Justice 
Ellenborough found that the plaintiff satisfied the special injury 
rule because his damage "is something different!.) for the plaintiff 
was in an occupation, if I may so say, of the navigation" and 
"[s)urely this goes one step farther, this is something 
substantially more injurious to this person than to the public at 
large, who might only have it in contemplation to use it . . . . If a 
man's time or his money are of any value, it seems to me that 
this plaintiff has shewn a particular damage."198 Rose, therefore, 
like Hart and Chichester, suggests that a plaintiff could satisfy 
the special injury rule by showing "more injury" -that is, more 
inconvenience, even though an alternative route was available-
and not necessarily a distinct or unique one. 199 
194. Id. Fifty years later, in Hubert v. Groves, 1 Esp. 148, 170 Eng. Rep. 308 (N.P. 
1794), the court took a more conservative view, finding that a merchant forced to 
take a "circuitous and inconvenient" way for his personal and business use could not 
sustain a public nuisance action, fmding the remedy was "by indictment only." Id. at 
308. The court later refused to change its decision even after plaintiffs counsel 
brought the Hart case to its attention. Id. at 309. At least one American court held, 
however, that Hubert was "not authority here" because it contradicted the pre-
revolutionary war decision in Chichester. Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463, 468 (Penn. 
1808) (noting that not all English cases can be reconciled). See also Heer Dry-Goods 
v. Citizens Rwy. Co., 41 Mo. App. 63, 78-79 (1890) (criticizing Hubert as a "doubtful 
decision"). 
195. 4 M. & S. 101, 105 Eng. Rep. 773 (K.B. 1815). 
196. See 1918 Note, supra note 8, at 216 (citing Rose's interpretation the rule as: 
"consequential damages are particular and special although the immediate damage is 
not different in kin.d") (emphasis added). 
197. Rose, 105 Eng. Rep. 773. 
198. Id. at 774 (emphasis added). 
199. Contrary interpretations are possible, however. Perhaps Ellenborough 
allowed the cause of action only because the plaintiff could show a pecuniary 
injury-lost business profits. See supra note 186-188 (in Ivesan, lost profits were 
recognized as sufficient injury); see also supra note 65 (discussing an exception to 
the economic loss rule in public nuisance cases). He did, however, use the term 
"more," as well as "different" in deScribing what he found to be "particular damage" 
and emphasized that the rule does not include trivial or theoretical wrongs. In the 
last of the noted line of early English cases, Winterbottom v. Derby, 2 L. R. Ex. 316 
(1867), the court rejected the plaintiffs claim of unspecified expense and 
inconvenience caused by the defendant's repeated blockage of a public footway, but 
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Implicit judicial acceptance of some different-in-degree 
plaintiffs continued in Greasly v. Codling, decided in 1824.200 The 
plaintiff sued for common nuisance because the defendant had 
shut and kept closed a gate across a public highway, causing the 
plaintiff a four-hour delay in his coal-hauling operations. Chief 
Justice Best held for the plaintiff. concluding "even in a case of 
public nuisance, if anyone has been distinguished in injury, he 
may sue the offender. ,,201 Best then concluded that the case 
before the court was indistinguishable from Rose, where the 
court seemed to accept loss of "additional income" as special 
injury. 202 Greasly can be read to support a rule that pecuniary 
loss is always special injury, but it would overstate the case to 
suggest that the loss must be different-in-kind. 
Overall, the English cases do not present a unified view of 
the special injury rule and its application. Hart, Iveson, 
Chichester, and Rose strongly suggest a "greater inconvenience" 
rule, grounded in Justice Fitzherbert's dissent in the 1535 case. 
A few other cases seem to require a higher showing of injury and 
strongly express the courts' concern about multiplicity. Indeed, 
the English courts still have not resolved this issue.203 
2. The English Railroad Compensation Cases 
As of the late 1800s, the English courts had not formulated 
the different-in-kind rule that is now so entrenched. What then 
is the source of the different-in-kind rule if not "ancient" case 
law? The origins of the different-in-kind test appear to be 
traceable to a line of English railroad compensation cases in the 
late 1800s that are, upon examination. not only inapposite but 
actually support the more liberal interpretation of the earlier 
public nuisance cases. 
The railroad cases did not involve public nuisance claims but 
rather involved judicial interpretation of acts of Parliament that 
allowed compensation for legislatively-authorized railroad 
nonetheless acknowledged that the cases articulated a "greater inconvenience" rule. 
[d. at 320. Given the insubstantial nature of the injury alleged and the lack of 
pecuniary damage. the court's concerns focused on the multiplicity problem. Chief 
Baron Kelly concluded that the injury was "common to all who might wish it" and 
articulated a restrictive version of the rule as requiring "some damage peculiar to 
himself. his trade, or calling: [d. at 322. 
200. 2 Bing. 263, 130 Eng. Rep. 307 (C.P. 1824). 
201. Id. at 307-08. 
202. Id. at 308; see also id. (opinion of Justice Park. distinguishing Paine and 
finding Rose indistinguishable). 
203. Spencer, Critical Examination, supra note 26, at 74-75. 
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companies' expansion projects that ~injuriously affected" private 
lands.204 The litigants and the House of Lords looked to the 
injury rule in public nuisance to gUide their determination of 
compensable injuries under the acts. Even though the Lords 
acknowledged that the rule of public nuisance was a different-in-
degree test, the more conservative different-ill-kind rule that 
emerged from these railroad cases ultimately bounced back into 
public nuisance law and, ironically, became the foundation for 
the modem different-in-kind test. 
The two seminal railroad compensatioFl cases are Caledonian 
Railway Co. v. Ogilvy,205 a Scottish case decided by the House of 
Lords in 1856, and Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy,206 
decided by the House of Lords eighteen years later in 1874. In 
Ogilvy, the plaintiff landowner claimed that a new Caledonian 
Railway line crossed so close to his lodge and gate that it greatly 
interfered with his access to the main road, rendering it 
"dangerous and alarming" to ladies and horses.207 The railroad 
argued against any compensation on the basis that the 
inconvenience was so widespread that "all the King's subjects" 
were affected, and it was "the necessary consequence of a lawful 
act done by the Company."208 Although Ogilvy ultimately denied 
the plaintiffs' claim and rejected a different-in-degree test for the 
railroad cases, the case is important because it suggests that, 
even as of 1856, a leading jurist interpretated the public 
nuisance cases as supporting the different-in-degree test. 
Moreover, the case demonstrates that the different-in-kind test 
from the railroad cases was a response to distinct policy issues, 
such as the spectre of Widespread litigation, the legislative 
authorization for the expansion, and the social need for the new 
transportation systems. 
In Ogilvy, the Lords were concerned about the implications 
of allowing a railroad compensation claim based on 
204. The Land Clauses Consolidations Act and the Railway Clauses Consolidation 
Act provided compensation for private landowners "injuriously affected" by the 
railroad projects, and to interpret this provision the English courts looked to the 
Similar legal issues raised in public nuisance cases. See, e.g .. Caledonian RaHway Co. 
v. Ogilvy, 2 L.R. SRD. App. 229 (1857) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 JOHN F. MACQUEEN, 
REpORTS OF ScarCH APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR, TOGETHER WITH PEERAGE, DIVORCE, 
AND PRACTICE CASES, IN THE HOUSE OF loRDS 229 (1857) [hereinafter OgilvyJ. 
205. Ogilvy, 2 L.R. SRD. App.at 229. 
206. Metropolitan Bd. of Works v. McCarthy, 7 L.R. E. & I. App. 243 (1874) (Eng.), 
reprinted in CHARLES CLARK, VB THE LAw REpORTS, ENGLISH AND IRISH APPEAL CASES 
243 (1875) [hereinafter McCarthy). 
207. Ogilvy, 2 L.R. SRD. App. at 230. 
208. ld. at 232. 
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inconvenience.209 Lord Chancellor Cranworth argued against 
compensation, and cautioned that the analogous rule from 
public nuisance cases was much more liberal and should not be 
applied to the railroad cases. Cranworth emphasized that the 
public nuisance test of that era, which he characterized as 
different-in-degree, was the correct test in its proper context.210 
Cranworth distinguished the public nuisance cases from the 
issue before the House, that is, compensation for the railroad's 
encroachments, because Parliament had deliberately sought to 
relieve the railroads of such liability to individuals.211 If it had 
been a private defendant, the plaintiff could have recovered for 
"more frequent repetition of the same damage,"212 but such a 
rule, Cranworth concluded, would not be appropriate under the 
railway compensation acts, which required actual damage to 
land.213 
The House of Lords later relied on Ogilvy in Metropolitan 
Board oj Works v. McCarthy.214 The vigorous debate among the 
Lords in McCarthy also confirms that the "ancient" special injury 
doctrine was more liberal than believed today. In McCarthy, the 
municipal defendant had built a government-authorized 
embankment on the Thames River that destroyed the plaintiffs 
access to Whitefriars Dock, a public dock, which he used for his 
adjacent building supply business.215 Like Ogilvy, the primary 
issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to compensation 
under the railroad act's "injuriously affected" provision. In 
arguing for judgment for the plaintiff, Lord Chelmsford offered 
209. See id. at 233 (Lord St. Leonards stating: "There is a level crossing by a 
railway near my house in the country. This is an inconvenience, no doubt; but no one 
affected by it has ever thought of seeking compensation. "I. 
210. [d. at 235 (stating that if the Greasly case were applied to the railroad acts 
context, it ·would certainly entitle everybody who is stopped for a minute while the 
gates are shut to an action for damages; because it would be said, under the 
authority of that case, which I think is a very correct decision, that where an act is 
done, such as shutting gates across a public road, without the authority of 
Parliament, that gives the parties a right of action.") (emphasis added). St. Leonards 
shared Cranworth's concern about compensating Ogilvy for the interference with the 
access to his lodge. He found the inconvenience to the plaintiff just part of the 
·unavoidable consequence" of railroad expansion and distinguishable from that 
suffered by ·the rest of the Queen's subjects" only by degree. [d. at 250-51. 
211. [d. at 236 ("if there were not an Act of Parliament, [the facts of this casel 
would entitle them to bring an action against the Railway Company") (emphasis 
added). 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 236-37; id. at 238 [citing railway cases where compensation was 
allowed for ·personal and private injury to the land"). 
214. McCarthy, 7 L.R. E. & I. App. at 243. 
215. [d. 
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what is apparently the first recorded statement of the modem 
different-ill-kind rule. purportedly. but mistakenly. based on 
Ogilvy.216 
Although Lord Penzance agreed that the railroads should 
compensate the plaintiff. he suggested that Chelmsford'S 
different-ill-kind test was much too strict and favored the 
different-ill-degree rule that he believed was actually used in the 
public nuisance cases.217 Lord Penzance acknowledged the 
clouded history of the rule and stated: "It is well, therefore, to 
look back at the older cases in which this exception was first 
established to ascertain the exact terms in which it is 
expressed."218 He emphasized that the language of Iveson and 
other cases suggested a "more than" rule. 219 He rebuffed Lord 
Chelmsford's proposal for a different-in-kind rule and concluded 
that "[t]he Judges do not say a damage of a dffferent kind or 
description from that suffered by other subjects, but 'more than' 
and 'beyond' their fellow citizens. "220 Lord Penzance concluded 
that the proper public nuisance test (which he would have 
applied even ill the railroad compensation context) was one of 
"difference ill degree" not "difference in kind," but, regardless, 
found that the plaintiff still satisfied the latter because he 
derived special value from the proximity to the highway that the 
defendant destroyed.221 Requiring the jury or arbitrator to find 
this special value, he suggested, provided a sufficient limitation 
216. Id. at 257 ("[In Ogilvy. tlhis House held that the damage sustained was one 
which, though it might be greater in degree, was not different in kind from that to 
which all her Majesty's subjects were exposed, who were also prevented having free 
and open communication with the high road, their access to it being in the same 
manner liable to interruption and delay .... The question therefore is, whether the 
Respondent, as the owner of premises which were in close proximity to the public 
drawdock, has by its destruction suffered an injury different in kind from that of the 
public in general?") (emphasis added). But see discussion of Ogilvy, supra notes 205-
213 and accompanying text. In Ogilvy, Lord Chancellor Cranworth not only did not 
use the "in kind" terminology, but he expressly found that the courts had properly 
used the different-in-degree test for public nuisance cases. Ironically, Lord 
Chelmsford in McCarthy ultimately found the plaintiffs injury to be different "in kind" 
because the plaintiffs property value was diminished by his loss of access to the 
dock. McCarthy, 7 L.R. E. & 1. App. at 257. 
217. Id. at 261-64. 
218. Id. at 263. 
219. Id. Lord Penzance even interrupted the argument of counsel for the plaintiff 
to emphasize the "more than" rule. Id. at 251 (after counsel mentioned that his client 
had suffered "particular damage: Lord Penzance stated: "More than the rest of the 
subjects. "). 
220. Id. 
221. Lord Penzance would, however, have limited the injuries allowed in railroad 
cases to "damage or injury to the 'land' of the claimant considered independently of 
any particular trade that the claimant may have carried upon it." Id. at 262. 
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on the breadth of the tort. 222 Lord Penzance also criticized the 
long-accepted multiplicity justification for a strict interpretation 
of the injury rule. He stated: 
If this limit be thought a wide one, and the number of 
claimants under it likely to be numerous. that is only the 
misfortune of the undertaking. for the limit does not exceed 
the range of the injury. On the other hand, all claim for 
compensation will vanish as, receding from the highway, the 
case comes into question of lands of which (though their 
owners may have used the highway and found convenience in 
doing so) it cannot be predicated and proved that the value of 
the lands depends on this position relatively to the highway 
which they occupy.223 
Ultimately. amidst the Lords' debate on the special injury 
rule and the appropriate test, the Exchequer Chamber's 
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. In short, McCarthy, the 
case that invented the different-in-kind rule, is poor-if not 
adverse-authority for proponents of the strict test in public 
nuisance doctrine. The case was decided in a different context 
under the railroad compensation acts, and, when the Lords did 
directly address the public nuisance rule, they characterized it 
as a different-in-degree rule. If anything, the case supports the 
more liberal interpretation of the English cases.224 
By carefully reexaming the recognized line of English cases 
dating from Fitzherbert's "incautious obiter dictum" in the 
anonymous 1535 case until the emergence of the different-in-
kind language in the railroad compensation cases, several 
conclusions about the supposedly "ancient" roots of the special 
injury rule are apparent. First, the 1535 case-or at least the 
dissenting opinion-did launch the hybrid private 
plaintiff/public nuisance cause of action and did express a 
concern about multiplicity of lawsuits, but it articulated a 
different-in-degree. not different-in-kind, test, although it used 
neither of these phrases. Second, many of the subsequent cases 
did not settle on a strict formulation of the rule and can be 
222. Id. at 263-64 (Lord O'Hagan agreed with Lord Penzance that the different-in-
degree test should apply to the plaintiffs claim, stating that "if a person has 
sustained a particular damage beyond that of his fellow citizens, he may maintain an 
action in respect of that particular damage.") (emphasis added). 
223. Id. at 264 
224. In a similar case a few years later, the House of Lords purported to follow 
McCarthy and distinguish Ogilvy in upholding compensation to spinning mill owners 
whose access had been diminished or cut off by a railroad project. See CaledOnian 
Ry. Co. v. Walkers' Trustees, 6 L.R. App. Cas. 259 (1882) (Eng.) (applying the rule of 
"special or peculiar" damage to land, and holding for the plaintiffs). 
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interpreted as supporting different-in-degree or "actual injury" 
tests. Third. the different-in-kind test is not ancient at all; rather 
it is. at most. an invention only about 100 years old. Fourth. its 
roots are bastardized, as it emerged in cases that were not about 
public nuisance. but railroad compensation. which involved 
different law and policy concerns. Ironically. the railroad 
compensation cases confirm that the truly ancient public 
nuisance rule was the more liberal different-in-degree test. 
A skeptical historical look at the roots of the restrictive 
different-in-kind test suggests that modern scholarship and 
jurisprudence should not simply accept the conservative 
formulation of the test as handed down by Coke. Blackstone. 
Holdsworth. or even Prosser. Unfortunately. however, the 
historical misperception about the English cases has unduly 
colored the modern view of the rule and encouraged the judiciary 
to perpetuate it. Once this history is recognized as more fluid. 
complex. and even contrary to prevailing belief. courts. in the 
interests of modernizing this important tort, may be more willing 
to conSider alternatives to the currently strict formulation. 
III 
AMERlCAN ENTRENCHMENT OF THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE AND THE D1FFERENT-IN-
KIND TEST 
More than three centuries after the seminal English case. as 
America adapted English common law for its own use in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, American decisions demonstrated 
variability. flexibility. and confUSion in articulating the speCial 
injury rule and applying the appropriate test. Although a distinct 
trend toward the stricter different-in-kind test began to emerge 
in state decisions in the late 1800s.225 early American decisions 
also exhibited an intriguing divergence of views between state 
and federal courts. While state courts favored the more 
conservative different-in-kind test purportedly adhered to in the 
English cases.226 federal courts tended to follow the different-in-
225. See Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 144 (discussing "the general drift 
of English authorities up to 1867" and noting "more conflict" in the early American 
cases. Le. up to 1915); see also 1918 Note. supra note 8. at 211 (commenting on the 
considerable confusion in the American case law: "much perplexity has arisen [as 
tol ... whether the particular injury must be different in kind from that sustained by 
the public"). 
226. See 1918 Note. supra note 8. at 212. 214 (concluding that the different-in-
kind rule "generally has been accepted" and was then emerging as the "majority 
rule"). The favored rule in the American state courts was supposedly derived from 
Rose. that "in order to maintain an action for a public nuisance. a private individUal 
must prove that he thereby suffers a particular. direct. and substantial injury." [d. at 
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degree test. 227 Overall, American case law exhibited more conflict 
than that of England228 about the meaning of "special" injury and 
the appropriate test, whether different-in-kind or ditIerent-in-
degree, or something else.229 
As the early American state court trend began to tilt strongly 
toward adoption of the restrictive ditIerent-in-kind test, a 
prominent critic - Harvard Law School Dean Jeremiah Smith-
urged courts to liberalize the rule.230 Several decades later, Boalt 
Hall School of Law Dean William L. Prosser revived Smith's 
critique and offered his own intellectual misgivings about the 
rule.23J Despite the weighty criticism, however, the rule became 
considerably more entrenched in the twentieth century. 232 
Ultimately, Prosser's own "post-realist" "Consensus Thought"233 
approach to the issue led him to abandon his own concerns and 
to reinterpret the case law to enshrine the traditional doctrine 
into a now-classic black letter Restatement rule. 234 
A. Early American Views oj the Traditional Special Injury Doctrine: 
Judicial Conservatism, Smith's Criticism, and the Neglected 
"Actual Damages" Test 
An examination of Smith's critique of the special injury rule 
illuminates the jurisprudential journey of the traditional doctrine 
from early England to America. Smith's views also lay the 
212 (emphasis added). This interpretation. however. distorts Rose. See supra notes 
195-199 [noting that Rose allowed damages to bargee for expenses due to route 
change that was different. "more injurious: and therefore "particular damage"). Not 
surprisingly. "[tlhe difficulties under this defInition have been almost as perplexing as 
under the rule laid down by Lord Coke." 1918 Note. supra note 8. at 212. 
227. See 1918 Note. supra note 8. at 213-14 (noting several federal court 
decisions that preferred the different-in-degree rule). See infra notes 252-254 and 
274 (discussing Piscataqua and Carvelj. 
228. Unlike in America. the "modem tendency" in English cases at the time. 
according to noted comparative law Professor John Fleming. was "to reject the elusive 
distinction between difference in kind and in degree. and to allow recovery if the 
obstruction causes more than mere infringement of a theoretical right which the 
plaintiff shares with everyone else." FLEMING. supra note 8. at 382 & nn. 25-28 (citing 
English cases from 1867-1963). 
229. Smith observed that. among American cases. "there has been a strong 
tendency to give exceptional reasons for sustaining the action. instead of attempting 
to evolve and state a general principle," an approach he considered "entirely 
erroneous." Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 144-45. 
230. See infra Part III.A. 
231. See infra Part III.B. 
232. See infra notes 351-365 and accompanying text (discussing Prosser's view of 
the case law); see also infra Part IV.D and notes 153 and 535 (discussing recent 
cases). 
233. See irifra Part IV.B and note 291 and accompanying text. 
234. See irifra Part IV. C. 
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foundation for review of the doctIinal developments in the 
influential Restatement Second project and the distinctive 
imprimatur of Prosser on this issue. 
Although his views on the public nuisance issue may have, 
until recently, disappeared into the dustbin of legal history,235 in 
1915, Jeremiah Smith, one of "the leading torts theorists of the 
late nineteenth century, ,,236 published a pointed indictment of 
what he called the "erroneous"237 different-in-kind rule. 
Ultimately, he rejected both the different-in-kind and different-
in-degree interpretations and instead proposed an alternative 
reading that he believed was better grounded in the case law and 
tort law generally: an actual damages test. Despite Smith's great 
influence in other areas of tort law,238 his pragmatic239 and early 
realist views240 on the different-in-kind rule did not prevail. His 
critique is, nonetheless, worth examination both because it 
235. Although Prosser cites Smith's article in his 1966 article. Prosser. Private 
Action. supra note 8. at 997 n.1 & 1008 n.96. and in Tentative Draft No. 16 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TORTS § 821C (Tentative Draft No. 16. 1970) [hereinafter 
Tentative Draft No. 161. Smith·s article does not otherwise appear to have been 
noticed. let alone discussed, by the modern critics of the rule. But see Bryson & 
Macbeth. supra note 5. at 252 n.48 (citing Smith·s 1915 article. but apparently only 
because Prosser also cited it in his Tentative Draft No. 16). 
236. See G. Edward White. The Integrity oj Holmes' Jurisprudence. 10 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 633. 643 (1982) (noting that Smith. a Harvard Law School graduate. practiced 
law before being appointed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and later to the 
faculty of the Harvard Law School). See also G. Edward White. Revisiting James 
Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48. 61 (1993) (calling Smith a ··highbrow· 
intellectual with a strong interest in public affairs"). 
237. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 157. 
238. In 1917. Smith published a leading article on general nuisance law. Jeremiah 
Smith. Reasonable Use oj One's Own Property As A Justification Jar Damages to a 
Neighbor. 17 COLUM. L. REv. 383 (1917) (discussing conflict between private property 
rights and impOSition on rights of others). Smith was also the pioneer of the modern 
"substantial factor" test for causation. See Jeremiah Smith. Legal Causes in Actions 
in Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103,223.303 (1911). 
239. John F. Wirenius. Helping Hand: The liJe and Legacy oj Learned Hanel. 25 
SETON HALL L. REv. 505, 508 (1994) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER. LEARNED HAND: THE 
MAN AND THE JUDCE (1994)) (calling Smith ·wholly practical"). 
240. The legal realism movement emerged in the early 1900s and matured until 
apprOximately the 1940s. See G. EDWARD WHITE. TORr LAw IN AMERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 64 (1980). Smith·s scholarship. which peaked during the 
transition from formalism (including "legal science") to realism. reflected strains from 
both approaches. Although some of Smith·s scholarship took the "SCientist" 
approach. see id. at 38. Smith also showed realist tendencies. A fonner state judge. 
Smith acknowledged that "judges make law." Louis H. Pollak. Advocating Civil 
Uberties: A Young Lawyer BeJore An Old Court. 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I, 3 
(1982). and he was a prominent critic of legal fonnalism. See Joseph H. Beale. 
Jeremiah Smith. 35 HARv. L. REv. 1. 3-4 (1921) (describing how Smith's appointment 
to Harvard Law School after "thirty years of practical life" affected his teaching and 
scholarship). 
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further confirms that the different-in-kind rule is not 
unassailably grounded in early English and American cases and 
because it provides weighty doctrinal criticism that pre-dates, 
and thereby adds scholarly legitimacy to, the current push for 
liberalization by environmental scholars and advocates. 
Smith took a fresh approach to interpreting the holdings of 
the English and early American cases, finding that the elemental 
rule underlying them was that ~no private action can be 
maintained at common law, unless the plaintiff has sustained 
actual damage."241 In his view, the more restrictive different-in-
kind test was justified neither doctrinally nor on the basis of 
triviality or multiplicity. Smith vigorously attacked the idea that 
the damage to the plaintiff must be exclusive. His concern was 
not only that many cases had been miSinterpreted, but that the 
more restrictive test led to confusion242 and was simply bad 
law.243 With regret. Smith noted that the early views of Coke on 
Littleton, Williams' Case, and the 1535 case had heavily 
influenced courts, causing them to deny recovery to a plaintiff 
who had suffered very substantial damage when that damage did 
not fall within certain exceptional classes. 244 
Smith focused his criticism on two of the common 
justifications for the different-in-kind rule. First, as to triviality, 
he suggested that the danger was "purely imaginary."245 In tort, 
there was already a natural barrier to such frivolous suits 
because a plaintiff can "sue only to recover for actual damage 
which he has individually sustained."246 As to multiplicity, he 
noted the concerns were about hardship on defendants "who 
may be overwhelmed by an infinity of suits" and "[i]ncumbering 
the courts - clogging the dockets with a large number of 'trivial' 
suits, thus hindering the progress of more important 
241. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 2 (emphasis added). 
242. [d. at 7. For an example of the judicial split during the early American period 
over how to apply the doctrine. see Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co .• 101 A. 379 
(N.J. 1917). In Bouquet. the plaintiff owned a resort on the Hackensack River. and the 
defendant installed a plant upstream of the plaintiff. The plant discharged pollution 
that rendered the water in front of the resort unfit for fishing or boating. "111e court 
held that the plaintiff had suffered no particular damage as distinct from the public 
at large and there could be no recovery." 1918 Note. supra note 8. at 215 & n.27. 
Compare Bouquet to Bonner v. Welborn. 7 Ga. 296 (1849). "where the court reaches a 
contrary result from the New Jersey court on almost identical facts." 1918 Note. 
supra note 8. at 215 n.28. 
243. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8, at 7. 
244. [d. at 2-3. 
245. [d. at 4. 
246. [d. 
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litigation."247 Smith, who had over twenty years of experience as 
a judge and practitioner. countered that a large number of 
claims would never result because of the practical impediments 
to plaintiffs bringing such cases, including the rules on costs, 
which "generally fall far short of making the plaintiff whole, "248 
the necessity to pay for counsel, the out-of-pocket costs, the 
reluctance of lawyers to sue when the damages are small, and 
the risk of monetary loss even with a win on the merits.249 Given 
these constraints, he concluded that suits would be brought only 
if there was a reasonable prospect of recovering substantial 
damages, or where a suit was brought to test the legality of an 
action, such as obstruction of a road or erection of some other 
boundary.250 He added that, even if such claims were brought, 
"what special claim have the defendant to pity[?] Ex hypothesi, 
their acts were tortious. "251 Smith quoted a then-recent 1898 
opinion, which he much favored,252 by District of Columbia 
District Court Judge Brown in Piscataqua Navigation Co. v. New 
York, N.H. & H.R.R.253 : "[A]lthough the defendant may be able to 
show that he has violated the theoretical right of every citizen, 
and that he has also inflicted upon several other citizens 
substantial damage and actual loss similar to that alleged by the 
libelants, such defense is without merit."254 Or, as Smith argued, 
if the public is defined as everyone who uses the obstructed way, 
then each individual member of the public should not be denied 
compensation for his actual loss solely because all of the other 
individual members have also suffered actual loss.255 
247. [d. at 5. 
248. [d. at 6. 
249. [d. 
250. [d. 
251. [d. at 5. 
252. Smith called Brown's Piscataqua decision "the better view· and "the most 
valuable extended American opinion. from our point of view" on the subject because 
"[t[he learned judge considers and satisfactorily answers some of the leading 
arguments often urged by defendant against the maintenance of a private action in 
this class of cases." [d. at 11. 145. 
253. 89 F. 362 (D. Mass. 1898). 
254. Smith. Private Action, supra note 8. at 11; see also id. at 5 (citing Judge 
Brown in Piscataqua as suggesting that if denying the remedy "shall become 
necessary, it certainly should be applied only when found necessary for the 
protection of the public and the courts. and should not be given to a wrongdoer to 
defend himself from the natural consequences of his wrong"). 
255. [d. at 15 n.52; Walker's Trustees v. Caledonian RR (l881). 8 Sc. Sess. Cas. 
(4th Series) 405, 420 (Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Moncreiff) ("I do not think it is sound 
to say ... that an injury which is shared by the public cannot support a claim for 
compensation. It is more sound to say that if the injury be specific and proved it is of 
no moment how many other premises are also injured."); see also Page v. Mille Lacs 
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Smith's proposed interpretation of the caselaw, which would 
allow plaintiffs to bring a public nuisance claim if they suffered 
"actual damage," was based on the inherent requirement in torts 
that the plaintiff must prove "real" damage, neither imagined nor 
threatened. 256 The plaintiff could proceed with a public nuisance 
action if he could allege and prove actual damage "consequent 
upon his exercise of a public right being interfered with, and 
distinct from the fact that it is interfered with. "257 Smith 
approved of Judge Brown's formulation in Piscataqua: "Actual 
loss, proved as a matter of fact, is the gist of the private 
action."258 Smith's view of "actual damage," however, reflected the 
times and was not particularly broad-he meant pecuniary 
l055,259 not "delay, inconvenience, or hindrance to plaintiff."260 
Nevertheless, he strongly objected to imposing any limitation 
other than the actual damage requirement. 261 
Smith specifically rejected the different-in-kind 
formulation,262 calling it the "alleged rule, "263 because he 
disagreed with the English commentary on the cases.264 He 
noted, first, that "[a)s to the alleged general rule, there is a 
Lumber Co .. 55 N.W. 608. 610 (Minn. 1893) (stating "It would be highly unjust and 
inequitable to say that he has no right of redress in a private action on the ground 
merely that the injury had resulted from an act which is a public nuisance in itself. 
and because other persons might have been injured and damaged in the same 
manner and to the same extent had they met the obstruction under like 
circumstances. "). 
256. See Smith. Private Action, supra note 8, at 11; PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 
157. § 30. at 165 (explaining actual loss or damage as a required element of 
negligence). 
257. Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 11 (citing POLLOCK. TORTS 612 (6th ed .. 
1892)). 
258. ld. at 13 (citing Piscataqua, 89 F. 362). Smith also pointed to dicta in an even 
earlier American decision, Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9. 25 (N.Y. 1829], where 
Chancellor Walworth opined: "every individual who receives actual damage from a 
nuisance may maintain a private suit for his own injury. although there may be 
many others who have suffered similar injury." Smith. Private Action. supra note 8. at 
146 (citing Walworth). 
259. Smith, Private Action. supra note 8, at 148 (stating that in a public nuisance 
action, plaintiff "also has an interest in having his business undertakings free from 
pecuniarily damaging interference by tortious conduct. "I; id. at 148-49 (arguing that 
prevention of performance of a contract is also sufficient injury); id. at 150-51 
(suggesting that the cost of removing a public obstruction constitutes pecuniary loss 
or injury). As discussed supra note 65. public nuisance is an exception to the general 
tort rule against the recovery of economic losses. 
260. Smith. Private Action, supra note 8. at 12; see also id. (contrasting pecuniary 
loss to an injury to plaintiffs "religious sensibilities,· a reference to WUUams' Case. 
see supra note 170. which would not constitute actual damage). 
261. Smith, Private Action. supra note 8. at 13. 
262. lei at 21. 
263. lei at 15. 
264. ld. at 14-15. 
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serious conflict of authOrity: first, as to whether it should be 
adopted; second. as to what interpretation and application 
should be given to it, in case of its adoption. "265 While many 
American state courts professed to have adopted the rule, he 
argued that most federal courts,266 including the United States 
Supreme Court267 and various jurists, had squarely rejected the 
different-in-kind rule. 268 
Even among the states that "profess to adopt the alleged 
rule," Smith found "a remarkable conflict of authority as to its 
interpretation and application. "269 In his view, this conflict and 
the "practical injustice" of the rule were strong arguments 
against its adoption.27o Smith also noted the particularly 
troubling interpretation by some courts that, if any other 
member of the public had suffered damage "similar in character 
or in kind" to the plaintiff. then no pubUc nuisance remedy was 
available, even if the plaintiff had sustained "actual damage. ,,271 
He believed that this notion that the injury had to be "exclusive" 
was overly restrictive.272 Smith concluded that the most honest, 
practical doctrinal approach was for courts to apply the "single 
and simple test of actual damage. "273 
265. Id. at 15-16. 
266. Id. at 16; see also id. ("It is fIrmly established by a long line of federal 
deciSions that an obstruction to navigable water may be enjoined by a private person 
who is injured thereby differently from the general public, either in degree or in lcind") 
(quoting Wellborn, J., in Carver v. San Pedro, etc., R.R., 151 F. 334, 335 (C.C. Cal. 
1906)) (emphasis added)). 
267. See id. (quoting Wellborn, J., endorSing different-in-degree rule as 
"unquestionably the doctrine of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 
14 L. Ed. 249 (U.S. 1851-1852), where the Supreme Court stated that the restraint of 
a public nuisance may be obtained when the injury complained of is common to the 
public at large, and only greater in degree to the complainants."). 
268. Id. at 17 (quoting at length Lord Penzance's opinion in McCarthy, see supra 
notes 214-224 and accompanying text, and two early American cases). 
269. Id. See also HILLIARD, supra note 50, at 637 & n.1 (citing a series of cases 
that, he claims. stand for the proposition that inconvenience from the obstruction of 
a highway. which is a difference in degree not kind. "is a sufficient injury to maintain 
an action against the obstructor."). 
270. Smith, Private Action, supra note 8. at 17. 
271. Cd. at 18. Worse yet. in his view, some courts implied that if any other 
member of the public might have incurred sinIilar injury. the remedy was unavailable. 
Id. at 18-19. 
272. Id. at 19-20. 
273. ld. at 21. Part V offers this Article's proposal that Smith's rule be 
modernized. Although Smith's interpretation is more eloquent and accurate than 
those of prior scholars, his proposed rule of actual damages seems archaic today in 
light of modem standing law that generously dermes injury as including injuries 
beyond economic and personal harm. See irifra Part IV.A. Smith expressly did not 
support public nuisance action under a "pure" private attorney general theory, i.e. 
where there is no personal stake. See id. at 151 ("It is not enough that the plaintiff, 
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Smith's pOinted criticism and attempt to move the judiciary 
toward a more liberal rule did not prevail. Over the next several 
years, the state cases generally moved more toward the 
conservative different-in-kind test. 274 An 1890 intermediate court 
opinion in Missouri is indicative of the trend at that point in 
time. In Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Citizens Railway CO .• 275 Judge 
Thompson reluctantly applied the different-in-kind test in 
denying a public nuisance claim by private individuals and 
businesses to enjoin a railway company from laying a sidetrack 
on a busy street in Springfield. Missouri. Despite finding that the 
Missouri Supreme Court had firmly adopted the strict test.276 
Judge Thompson concluded that it was "not supported by the 
weight of authority" and that there was "a great contraiety [sic) of 
decisions" on the rule. which courts had found difficult to 
apply.277 His review of the English cases led him to conclude that 
the proper rule was that the "action may be maintained. where. 
by reason of the peculiar situation of the plaintiff, the 
obstruction cuts off his access to and egress from his premises 
or place of business."278 Nonetheless. Judge Thompson felt 
having no interest except as a member of the general public. desires to test the 
legality of the obstruction. He cannot constitute himself a champion of the public for 
that purpose. "I. 
274. See Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8, at 1005-06 & nn. 77-86 (concluding 
that, from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, courts had conSistently denied standing 
to private plaintiffs in public nuisance cases, including cases involving gaming 
houses, nOise, highway obstruction, blockage of navigable streams, water pollution, 
and beach access); see also Wade. Environmental Protection, supra note 4, at 169 
("With essential unanimity [the courts) held that a plaintiff must suffer damage 
different in kind in order to maintain a tort action."). 
For cases between 1845 and 1951 that articulated a strict different-in-kind 
test. see O'Brien v. Norwich & Worcester RR Co., 17 Conn. 372, 375-76 (1845); 
Dougherty v. Bunting, 1 Sandf. 1 (N.Y. 1847); Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209 (N.Y. 
1852); Willard v. City of Cambridge, 85 Mass. 574 (1862); Prosser v. City of Ottumwa. 
42 Iowa 509 (1876); Innis v. Cedar Rapids I.F. & N.W. Ry. Co .. 40 N.W. 701 (Iowa 
1888); Anthony Wilkinson Livestock Co. v. McIlquam, 83 P. 364 (Wyo. 1905); Walls v. 
Smith, 52 So. 320 (Ala. 1910); McKay v. City of Enid, 109 P. 520 (Okla. 1910); 
Livingston v. Cunningham, 175 N.W. 980 (Iowa 1920); and ScWirf v. Loosen, 232 
P.2d 928 (Okla. 1951). 
For cases that followed a more flexible different·in-degree or actual damages 
approach, see Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463 (Penn. 1808); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 
89 (N.Y. 1829): First Baptist Church in Schenectady v. Schenectady & Troy RR Co., 
5 Barb. 79 (N.Y. 1848): Brown v. Watson. 47 Me. 161 (1859): Piscataqua Nav. Co. v. 
N.Y., N.H. & H.R Co., 89 F. 362, 365 (D.C. Mass 1898); and Carver v. San Pedro. 
L.A. & S.L.R Co., 151 F. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1906). 
275. 41 Mo. App. 63. 77 (1890). 
276. ld. at 77-78. 
277. ld; see also id. at 80 (noting contradictory American decisions). 
278. ld. (emphasis added). 
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bound by Missouri's adoption of the conservative test and 
rejected the plaintiffs claim. 
The conservative American Judicial trend and Smith's 
criticism set the stage for the next major doctrinal development, 
Prosser's entIy into the special injury rule thicket. 
B. William L. Prosser and "The Great Dispute"279 
Without doubt, William L. Prosser has been the dominant 
figure in the development of black letter tort law in the United 
States from the 1940s until the present, despite his death in 
1972.280 A close examination of Prosser's writings on the speCial 
injury rule-a topic of particular fascination for him-is critical 
to understanding how the different-in-kind test and its flaws 
became so entrenched in American law. Prosser's strong 
scholarly views on the issue of the special injUIy rule and the 
different-in-kind test evolved from skepticism to resigned 
orthodoxy. Despite his earlier misgivings about the strict test 
and his own critical treatment of the issue in drafting the 
Restatement (Second), Prosser's work ultimately enshrined the 
strict black letter test. 
Prosser's Handbook on Torts, first published in 1941,281 
single-handedly revised for four editions until his death 1972, 
and still alive through his posthumous co-editors,282 remains the 
279. Prosser, Private Action. supra note 8. at 1008. 
280. See Laurence H. Eldredge, William Uoyd Prosser. 60 CAL. L. REv. 1245. 1251 
(1972) [hereinafter Eldredge. Prosser1 (calling Prosser "a great Master of Torts"); Craig 
Joyce, Keepers oJthe Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law oJTorts (Fifth Edition) and 
the Prosser Legacy, 39 VAND. L. REv. 851. 852 (1986) (book review) [hereinafter Joyce. 
Keepers) ("Rarely in the history of American legal education has one author's name 
been so clearly identified with his subject as the name of William L. Prosser is with 
the law of torts .... His articles remain landmarks in the development both of the 
literature of torts and the law itself."); Wade. Environmental Protection. supra note 4. 
at 166 (calling Prosser "Mr. Torts in any lawyer's lexicon"); WHITE, supra note 240. at 
156 (providing biographical information on Prosser). Prosser practiced law in 
Minneapolis. taught at the University of Minnesota School of Law. returned to private 
practice. and then taught at Harvard Law School for one year (1947). id.. before being 
lured away to become Dean of the Law School at the University of California at 
Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Eldredge, Prosser. supra, at 1247. He served as Dean until 
1961 and stayed at Boalt until 1963. In 1963. he joined the "over 65" club at 
Hastings College of Law. teaching there until his death in 1972. Joyce. Keepers. 
supra, at 852 n.5. 
281. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. 
282. After Prosser's death. new editors significantly reworked the treatment of 
public nuisance in the Handbook with a deliberately conservative slant. now 
providing modern courts and practitioners a truly distorted view of the doctrine that 
would undoubtedly not please the old master. See PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 
157. discussed infra Part IV.D. 
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definitive treatise of the modern tort law era.283 Shortly after the 
relatively unknown Prosser, then in his eleventh year of teaching 
at the University of Minnesota Law School, published the 
handbook,284 the praise was resounding.285 Prosser's work 
represented an intellectual bridge between early American 
Formalism286 and the Realism movement that exploded during 
his tenure at the University of Minnesota Law Schoo1.287 Legal 
historian G.E. White called him a "post-realist conceptualist."288 
Prosser did not merely summarize the law in a descriptive way 
but commented on and cleverly "clarified" areas of the law that 
were confusing, ill conceived, or underdeveloped. He 
"disassembled, inventoried, and recombined [cases) to illustrate 
the common values that. taken as a whole, [the cases) sought to 
283. Prosser's Handbook soon became the most "widely adopted" treatise in tort 
law. Joyce. Keepers. supra note 280. at 852. See also John w. Wade. William L. 
Prosser: Some Impressions and Recollections. 60 CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1255 (1972) 
[hereinafter Wade. Impressions] ("Prosser on Torts! It has a completed sound. a 
belonging sound, a natural sound. a sound to be remembered for years to come. "I. 
284. See Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283, at 1255 (noting he had not 
"even heard of [Prosser)" when the Handbook appeared in 1941). 
285. Prosser's text received high praise and critical reviews that were not. in fact. 
critical. See, e.g., Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 854, 862; see also id. at n.ll 
(listing reviews). The most critical review was actually by Prosser himself in a 
"whimsical" article reporting the proceedings of the National Union of Torts Scholars 
("NUTS"). See William L. Prosser, Handbook oj the Law oj Torts, 4 LA. L. REv. 156 
(1941) (book review). Prosser satirically relayed the story of a meeting of his 
imaginary critics, all torts luminaries, called together to lambast his new book. 
Prosser had his critics poke fun at himself and every aspect of the Handbook, from 
the name to the price and the content. Id. at 157. The critics' meeting was even 
interspersed with disturbances, uproars, a fight, the ejection of a critic, cries of 
treason, and the arrival of the police. lei. at 158-60. The satire concludes with Prosser 
himself rising and stating that "he was very sorry, that he greatly regretted the whole 
matter. and that he would never do it again." Id. at 164. 
286. WHITE, supra note 240. at Chapter 2 (discussing the impact of legal science 
on the law, 1880-1910); id. at 21 (describing legal science as "a mode-widely 
labeled scientific-that assumed knowledge to be complex and infinite but capable of 
orderly classification and analysis through the use of proper methodological 
techniques") . 
287. lei. at Chapter 3 (discussing the impact of realism on tort law, 1910-1945). 
"In its extreme form, Realism maintained that ·the partiCipants in a case, the 
atmosphere it created, and the interests at stake were what determined [the case's] 
outcome, quite independent of rules or principles.' Indeed. militant Realists had 
scorned certainty and predictability as legitimate ends of the legal system, arguing 
that maturity and wisdom came with the recognition that legal issues were endlessly 
diverse, complex, and fluid." Joyce, Keepers. supra note 280, at 856 (citing WHITE, 
supra note 240. at 85). 
288. WHITE, supra note 240, at 157 (Prosser's approach fused realism and 
"doctrinally Oriented theories of tort law"), 163 (describing Prosser as a 
"conceptualist"). 
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vindicate, (or, in Prosser's view, ought to vindicate)."289 Prosser's 
ability to categorize tort law with unusual fluidity, chann, and 
clarity, but also to be critical and advocate for new 
developments, may explain why the Handbook was so successful 
when it came out in the post-Realism 1940s, a time when the 
legal profession seemed to be searching anew for cohesive 
approaches to the scattered remnants of law left after the 
Realists' storm.290 In the context of this great theoretical debate, 
"Prosser had the good fortune to be the right person in the right 
place at the right time. "291 As the legal community reviewed and 
digested Prosser's new Handbook, it realized that the new 
"'Master of Torts' was appearing on the horizon to carry on the 
task of reforming the law of torts to serve 'the felt necessities of 
the times. '"292 
In the introductory section to the Nuisance chapter of the 
Handbook's first edition in 1941, Prosser described the historical 
origins of the special damages rule as follows: ''The remedy 
289. Joyce, Keepers. supra note 280, at 855 & 876 n.75. Prosser "sponsored" the 
birth of a number of modern torts over the years. Well-known examples of Prosser's 
ability to shape tort law include: the development of the law on infliction of emotional 
distress, see William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 
37 MrcH. L. REv. 874 (1939); the privacy torts, see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960); and strict product liability law, see William L. Prosser, The 
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Uability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
According to Joyce, "Prosser's genius was to acknowledge and identifY the various 
interests to be balanced, while relentlessly asserting (and, by copious citations and 
deceptively simple illustrations, seeming to prove) that the results of the cases, on 
proper analYSiS, were but multiple, somewhat varied yet ultimately consistent 
examples of Prosser's own general rules." Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 858. 
Prosser's influence was often self-perpetuating. Id. at 867 n.75 (noting how the 
Handbook "revisers now can justify the propositions advanced in their text by 
reference to the cases that invoke the Handbook as authority!"). His method was not, 
however, without Criticism. One scholar called Prosser's influence on strict products 
liability "clever exhortation built on a blurred interpretation of then-current legal 
developments." Joyce, Keepers, supra, at 861 n.52 (citing Priest. The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 416, 465 (1985)); see also Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 5, 
at 242-48 (criticizing Prosser's self-serving and careless citations regarding the 
special injury rule). 
290. Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 856 (discussing the 1940s criticism of the 
rise of "exuberant Realism" for its lack of "any comprehensive analytical framework"). 
291. Id. at 857. Prosser's approach helped to derme what G. Edward White calls 
·Consensus Thought." Id. Consensus Thought "sought to reestablish a theoretical 
predictability in the law by drawing usable generalizations from the study of large 
numbers of cases with similar or overlapping fact patterns. Although exemplars of 
this school never reasserted the Scientists· claim that the prinCiples so discovered 
should be accorded the status of eternal verities, neither did they accept the apparent 
view of many Realists that predictability was a goal not only beyond attainment, but 
also vaguely illegitimate." Id. at 857 n.31. 
292. Eldredge, Prosser, supra note 280, at 1245. 
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remained exclusively a criminal one until the sixteenth century. 
when it was recognized that a private individual who had 
suffered special damage might have a civil action for the invasion 
of the public right. "293 Then. in a subsection entitled "Special 
Damage" (later changed to "Particular Damage. "294 the term 
Prosser preferred). Prosser addressed what he later called "the 
great dispute. "295 Prosser stated. "[tJhe great dispute over 
particular damage has been whether it must be different in kind 
from that sustained by members of the public in general. or 
whether it is enough that it is substantially greater in degree. "296 
In this section of the Handbook. Prosser laid out the special 
injury rule in detail. pointing out its problems and voicing 
considerable discomfort with judicial adoption of the traditional 
rule and the different-in-kind test. Prosser noted the origin of the 
"special damage" rule in the 1535 case. adding that a 
"qualification" had persisted: "it is uniformly held that a private 
individual has no action for the invasion of the purely public 
right. unless his damage is in some way to be distinguished from 
that sustained by other members of the general public. "297 The 
courts' rationale. according to Prosser. was three-fold: "appointed 
representatives" were better suited to redress community 
wrongs; the rule protected defendants from a "multiplicity of 
actions" that might result from a more liberal rule;298 and it 
deterred cases that involved only minor interference with public 
values.299 
293. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 71. at 551 (emphasis 
added). The cases Prosser cited for authority are discussed supra Part II.B. See also 
id., § 72, at 566 (stating, in the black letter introduction for Section 72: "A private 
individual may maintain an action for a public nuisance only if he suffers special 
damage. distinct from that common to the public.") (emphasis added). 
294. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 997 ("Since 'special damage' has 
connotations as to the kind of damage in connection with the pleading and proof of 
other types of actions, notably in defamation, 'particular' is obviously a better word, 
and it will be used hereafter."). 
295. Id. at 1008. 
296. Id; see also 46 A.L.1. PRoc., supra note 157, at 286 (Prosser remarking that 
he presented "seven solid pages of cases" and "elaborate case law built up, which is 
gone into at some length here, because the problem is, I believe. a rather important 
one, and calls for a pretty complete analysis."). 
297. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (I"' ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 72, at 569-70 (footnote 
omitted). 
298. let § 72, at 570 (footnote omitted). Prosser called this second rationale the 
"best reason." 
299. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8. at 1007. Prosser emphasized that "(tJhis 
insistence upon the rejection of the trivial has been especially marked in the 
decision," yet he pointed out the interference in those cases would also not meet the 
"substantiality" standard. let 
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Having restated the rule and the rationale given by early 
courts, Prosser then proceeded, in his characteristic fashion, to 
look critically at how the courts had applied the rule. Like Smith, 
Prosser acknowledged that judicial application was often 
inconsistent and illogical,300 suggesting a fundamental flaw in 
courts' interpretation of the rule or, perhaps, in the rule itself. 
Courts had recognized that "special damages" could range from 
obstruction of public access301 to personal injuif02 or injury to 
property, and perhaps even to interference with contract and 
pecuniary 10ss.303 While noting these cases represented U[tJhe 
weight of authority," Prosser pOinted out the existence of 
numerous conflicting decisions.304 Prosser also expressed his 
concern that courts were struggling with the split in the tests. To 
point out the paradox of the traditional different-in-kind test, 
Prosser used an example of a public nuisance creating 
widespread community losses from an obstructed public way: if 
300. In the fIrst and second editions. Prosser politely suggests "there is little 
consistency in the decisions." PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 72. 
at 570. In the Third Edition. he changed his comment to: "there is not always very 
great consistency in the decisions." WILLIAM L. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF 
TORTS. § 89. at 608 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER. HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1964)). By 
the Fourth Edition. he stated wryly: "some rather fme lines have been drawn in the 
decisions." WILLIAM L. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS. § 88. at 587 (4th ed. 
1971) [hereinafter PROSSER. HANDBOOK (4thed. 1971)). 
301. Delay and inconvenience satisfIed the requirement. according to Prosser. if 
the plaintiff could prove that "by reason of the delay he has been put to special 
expense of a different kind, and if he does so he establishes particular damage." even 
though "everyone else [in the community) encounters a similar loss." Prosser. Private 
Action. supra note 8. at 1016 (emphasis added). Prosser notes that the English courts 
and a few American courts "have gone to considerable lengths to equate loss of time 
with particular fmancial loss." to the point where pecuniary damage is virtually 
presumed for a business that loses time. Id. at 1017. 
302. "[T)here can now be no doubt that the nuisance action can be maintained 
where a public nuisance causes physical injury." Id. at 1011-12. Prosser comments 
"[a)ll such cases present no problem." Id. at 1013. But see supra note 54 (discussing 
Criticisms of using public nuisance for what should be negligence actions). 
303. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941l. supra note 8. § 72. at 570-71 (footnotes 
omitted). According to Prosser. pecuniary losses "have received special protection." 
Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1013. Prosser uses the paradoxical example 
of commercial fIshers making a "localized use of public waters" being allowed to 
recover. Id. The distinction between the commercial fishery and the "ordinary citizen 
deprived of his occasional Sunday piscatorial pleasure." according to Prosser. is that 
in the former case. even "where the business itself is not founded on the exercise of a 
public right: the type of pecuniary loss is "particular to the plaintiff. or to a limited 
group to which he is included" rather than "so general and widespread as to affect a 
whole community. or a very wide area within it: to the "common misfortune" and 
thus incognizable. Id. at 1014-15. 
304. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. §72. at 570 (footnotes 
omitted). Mter citing seventeen cases in support of the general trend. Prosser cites 
eight cases "contra." Id. at nn. 46-49. 
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a defendant wrongfully obstructed a navigable stream, the 
owners of a steamboat line could not recover under a difference-
in-kind theory because the entire community had also suffered 
the lost use of the river, a similar-in-kind injury.305 
Prosser stated that one additional justification for the 
different-in-kind test was judicial convenience: it was easier to 
distinguish injuries by kind rather than degree. Judicial inquiry 
into degrees of injury would, the argument went, pose greater 
difficulty and perhaps result in more arbitrary line-drawing by 
courts. Courts faced this line-drawing problem in inconvenience 
and annoyance cases. The ends of the spectrum -a complete 
blockage of highway access or a remote obstruction that was 
only slightly inconvenient-were easy to spot.306 The cases in the 
middle, however-where the obstruction was relatively close and 
the detour long, or the obstruction far and the detour short-
tested courts' ability to draw legitimate lines.307 At least on the 
surface, judicial decisionmaking was simpler under the different-
in-kind test: "The fact that the plaintiff has occasion to use a 
highway or a navigable stream five times as often as anyone else 
gives him no private right of action when it is obstructed. "308 
This "ease of judicial decisionmaking" justification failed to 
convince Prosser. According to Prosser, "the whole matter" of 
distinguishing "kind" from "degree" was surrounded by 
confusion309 and hypocrisy.310 Ultimately, he suggested that the 
doctrinal entanglement could be solved simply by "allowing 
recovery to anyone who suffers actual damage,"311 the proposal 
305. Id. § 72, at 571 (footnote omitted); see also PROSSER, HANDBOOK (3d ed. 
1965), supra note 300, § 89, at 611 (modifying the example and citing four American 
cases from the late 1800s and one decided in 1952); PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed. 
1971), supra note 300, § 89, at 591 (citing the same example of widespread 
community loss). 
306. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1965), supra note 300, § 89, at 610. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted). 
309. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (1st ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 72, at 571; see also id. § 
72, at 571-72 & n.52; PROSSER, HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1965), supra note 300, § 89, at 
609 n.71 (citing Kaje v. Chicago, St. P., M. & o. R. Co .. 57 Minn. 422, 424 (1894), as 
observing: "Where to draw the line between cases where the injury is more general or 
more equally distributed, and cases where it is not, where, by reason of local 
situation, the damage is comparatively much greater to the special few, is often a 
difficult task."). 
310. Prosser noted the "obvious tendency of the courts which adopt the distinction 
to fmd a difference in kind where only one in degree is apparent.· PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941), supra note 8, § 72, at 572 (footnote omitted, citing four 
illustrative cases from 1924-1927). 
311. Id. § 72, at 572 (emphasis added) (stating that court's confusion about the 
rule Is, "If anything, an argument in favor of allowing recovery to anyone who suffers 
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offered twenty-three years earlier by Dean Smith.312 He observed 
that a "strong minority of the courts have rejected 'kind' and 
'degree' as an artificial distinction, and have held that it is 
sufficient that the damage is materially greater than that of the 
ordinary person entitled to exercise the same public right, 
although it may be of the same kind."313 Like Smith, he was 
confident that the risk of a flood of trivial cases was minimized 
by the fundamental rule of nuisance law that the harm be 
"substantial."314 
By the time of the Handbook's third edition in 1965, 
however, Prosser observed with some frustration, that, despite 
his "standing criticism" over the past two decades, "the 
distinction between kind and degree is firmly embedded in the 
court decisions."315 Additionally, he had witnessed a further 
judicial shift toward the more restrictive different-in-kind test.316 
Nonetheless, Prosser continued to find the issue troubling and 
worthy of further scholarly debate. After publishing the second 
edition of the Handbook, Prosser began to air and to refine his 
views about the special injury rule while serving as the Reporter 
for the Restatement (Second) of Torts and contemporaneously 
publishing a law review article on the topic. 
C. The Drafting of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Prosser 
Surrenders and Enshrines the Strict Test 
In 1955, the American Law Institute ("ALI") selected Prosser 
as Reporter for the massive Restatement (Second) of Torts 
actual damage. The plaintiff should of course have no action for the infringement of a 
theoretical right which he shares With the public at large, but when that infringement 
causes his substantial harm. there is no good reason for denying him relief," citing 
Jeremiah Smith and the dictum of Chancellor Walworth in Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 
9. 25 (N.Y. 1829)). 
312. See supra Part III.A. Prosser called Smith "the pioneer in this area as he was 
in so much else in the law of torts: Prosser. Private Action, supra note 8, at 1008. 
See also David Morris Phillips. The Commercial Culpability Scale. 92 YALE L.J. 228. 
290 n.138 & 290 n.237 (1982) (stating that Smith was a strong "realist" influence on 
Prosser in many areas of tort law). 
313. PROSSER, HANDBOOK (lst ed. 1941). supra note 8. § 72. at 572. 
314. Id (footnote omitted). Prosser expanded his rebuttal in Private Action. supra 
note 8, at 1007 & nn. 90-92 (pointing out that courts have readily rejected trivial 
complaints such as the minor inconvenience of opening and dosing cattle gates, 
driving up a steep grade, or passing a wall protruding ten inches into the public way). 
315. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1964). supra note 300, § 89. at 609 (dismissing 
his own criticism with the words "However this may be. the distinction between kind 
and degree is firmly embedded in the court decisions."). 
316. [d. § 89. at 608. 
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project.317 Having already written extensively on public nuisance 
in the first two editions of the Handbook,31B Prosser naturally 
took to the topic of nuisance, and public nuisance in particular, 
with substantially more enthusiasm than his predecessors on 
the first Restatement project, who had simply omitted the topic 
entirely.3lg 
Six years after his appointment, Prosser's attempt to capture 
the law of public nuisance for the new Restatement appeared in 
his Preliminary Draft No. 16 for the Advisory Committee meeting 
in June 1961.320 Prosser revamped the entire structure of the 
Chapter, making the most substantial changes to the sections on 
public nuisance and substantial harm.321 After attempting to 
incorporate all of public nuisance into the existing private 
nuisance chapter, Prosser "finally gave up" and suggested it be 
317. As the fIrst step in the Restatement process. the ALI selects a Reporter who 
then selects a committee of "AdVisers.' consisting of the leading scholars. judges, and 
practitioners in the field. Then. the Reporter prepares a "Preliminary Draft" of the 
sections for the AdVisory Committee. After reVisions, the draft is then forwarded as a 
"Council Draft" to the larger ALl Council. consisting of fIfty "leaders" of the ALI. 
Thereafter, normally the draft undergoes more reVisions by the Reporter and emerges 
as a "Tentative Draft: which is then sent to each member of ALl in anticipation of the 
Annual Meeting traditionally held every May in Washington, D.C. After floor 
discussion and votes, the draft may be either accepted or "recommitted" to the 
Reporter. More reVisions and tentative drafts may follow for subsequent Annual 
Meeting decisionmaking. See John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to 
its Increasingly Advantageous Quality. and an Encouragement To Continue the Trend, 
13 PEPP. L. REv. 59, 60-64 (1985) [hereinafter Wade, Restatement: Tribute). Prosser's 
AdVisers included the "top torts men in the country." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
second page (Preliminary Draft No. 16, 1961) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 16). 
318. Prosser also published an article speCifIcally on Texas nuisance law shortly 
after his Handbook fIrst appeared. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, supra note 43. 
319. Chapter 40 of the first Restatement ultimately "deals entirely with private 
nuisance, and ignores the existence of tort liability for public nuisance, except for two 
paragraphs in the Scope Note, which only distinguishes it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS Ch. 40 n. to council at 1 (Council Draft No. 24, 1967) [hereinafter Council 
Draft No. 24). Prosser observed: "The explanation lies in the fact that the Chapter was 
assigned originally to the Restatement of Property, and was worked out by a Property 
drafting group. . .. The only Torts man included among the AdVisers was Mr. 
Eldredge. ... Regarding the Chapter as part of the Restatement of Property, the 
drafting group had no interest in public nuisance, and in general perhaps had little 
encounter with it. The result was that when the Chapter was transferred to the 
Restatement of Torts, public nuisance was entirely omitted from this Restatement.' 
[d. See also 46 A.L.1. PROC., supra note 157, at 279 (remarks of Prosser, discussing 
the mysterious treatment of public nuisance in the first Restatement). 
320. Preliminary Draft No. 16, supra note 317. 
321. Compared to Sections 821A (Types of Nuisance), B (Public Nuisance), and C 
(Who Can Recover for Public Nuisance), which sprang directly from Prosser's hand, 
Section 8210 (Private Nuisance) already had a home in the first Restatement and 
required little reworking. 
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inserted as a separate topic. 322 So. in 1961. for the first time. 
public nuisance found its own home in the Restatement. 
In Preliminary Draft No. 16. Prosser took particular care 
presenting his analysis of the special injury rule. He drafted 
lengthy explanatory notes. completely new comments. and seven 
illustrations. Prosser added a new specific section on the special 
injury rule, Section 821C: "Who can recover for public nuisance." 
The new section started with a black letter statement of the 
special injury rule that enshrined the different-ill-kind test: "For 
a public nuisance there is liability in tort only to those who have 
suffered special harm. of a kind different from that suffered by 
other members of the public exercising the public right. "323 In a 
lengthy note to his Advisers. Prosser explained that he had 
reviewed the case law thoroughly and concluded that it followed 
the different-in-kind test. 324 
In Preliminary Draft No. 16. Prosser explained that Smith 
had argued ill his 1915 article that "anyone who suffers actual 
harm of any kind should have a cause of action in tort. "325 Then. 
however. Prosser signaled that. contrary to his previous 
positions,326 he was almost ready to abandon Smith's view. 
Prosser either disingenuously or carelessly stated. "only one 
court has ever said this ... [and) it is definitely not the law."327 
He noted wryly, "[a) good many writers, including an 
incompetent named Prosser, have argued that a substantial 
difference in degree should be enough,"328 but he then set aside 
his misgivings and concluded that the cases weighed heavily 
against the different-in-degree test.329 Prosser expressed no 
322. Preliminary Draft No. 16, supra note 317. at Ch. 40 n. to advisers. 
323. [d. § 821C; see also ill. § 821C cmt. b. 
324. [d.. § 821C n. to advisers; see also ill. § 821C cmt. b. (explaining the 
traditional rationale). 
325. [d. § 821C n. to advisers (1). 
326. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
327. Preliminary Draft No. 16. supra note 317. § 821C n. to advisers (1). The lone 
decision was. according to Prosser. Brown v. Watson. 47 Me. 161 (1859) (holding that 
the plaintiff could sustain a public nuisance claim based on the "greater than" rule 
after he was forced to take a more circuitous route home with a loaded wagon team 
because the defendant had obstructed the road with felled trees). The court awarded 
nominal damages for "trouble and loss of time." [d.. Elsewhere. however. Prosser 
indicated that Brown was not the "lone decision." See supra note 309 (noting that in 
his Handbook. Prosser cited Kcye v. Chicago. St. P .• M. & O. R. Ca .• 57 Minn. 422. 424 
(1894)). 
328. Preliminary Draft No. 16. supra note 317. § 821C. Prosser was likely referring 
to Smith·s critique and the 1918 Note. supra Part IlI.A. as well as Fleming's 1957 
comparative tort law treatise. See supra note 8. 
329. Preliminary Draft No. 16. supra note 317. § 821C n. to advisers (2). Prosser 
cites Winterbottom v. Derby. see supra note 199. and 18 American cases (dating from 
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concern with the breadth of the case law that recognized a wide 
range of injuries as sufficient under the rule. 
1. Prosser's Private Action Article 
Despite the confident tone of Prosser's Preliminary Draft No. 
16. he had lingering doubts about the proper formulation of the 
special injury rule. He re-doubled his research on the issue and 
wrote a law review article called Private Action for Public 
NUisance.33o His article used much the same framework and 
prose of the public nuisance sections in his Handbook and the 
Preliminary Draft, but he focused in detail on the thorny public 
nuisance issues and the great dispute over the proper special 
injury test. 
In the article, Prosser again expressed his support for a 
version of the "actual harm" proposal offered by Smith, whose 
pioneering interpretation was now supported by Prosser's new 
Boalt colleague Professor John Fleming,331 that any plaintiff who 
suffered substantial harm had an Injury that, by itself, 
distinguished him from the general public.332 Prosser, however. 
disagreed with the restrictive qualification, suggested by Smith 
and Fleming. that the substantial harm must be pecuniary in 
nature.333 Prosser quipped. "[wlith deference. it may be suggested 
that this qualification goes far to give the game away before the 
first ball is pitched."334 He pointed out that there are many types 
of cognizable injuries, such as inconvenience, that are non-
pecuniary.335 Moreover. Prosser rejected the notion that the 
1867-1953) for support. [d.. A few pages later. Prosser suggests that "we should follow 
the overwhelming majority [of the courts that\ have rejected difference in degree and 
insisted on different in kind.· [d.. § 821 C n. to advisers. His characterization seems 
overzealous. See supra note 313. 
330. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. See 46 A.L.1. PROC .• supra note 157. at 
287 (Prosser mentioned that he "actually went to the unprecedented length of writing 
a law review article to deal with [the special injury rule\ issue in the Virginia Law 
Review. and I wrote the article rust. and then corrected the errors in this particular 
draft. instead of the contrary process. which is. I believe. usual among writers. 
[Laughter\. "). 
331. See FLEMING. supra note 8 (Fleming. who published his comparative law torts 
treatise in 1957. joined Boalt's faculty in 1958, while Prosser was Dean). PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1971). supra note 300. at 587-88 & n.73 (referring to writers who 
proposed the substantial harm theory. adding a citation to Fleming). 
332. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1008 (emphasis added). 
333. [d.. 
334. [d.. 
335. [d.. (noting inconvenience "is a species of harm. and even substantial harm 
when the detour is long and onerous, but it normally includes nothing in the way of 
pecuniary loss."). Prosser accepted the breadth in the caselaw recognizing a wide 
range of injuries under the doctrine. See Preliminary Draft No. 16. supra note 317. § 
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injury must somehow be unique to the plaintiff: 
"Notwithstanding some aberrations in a few early cases, 
particular damage certainly does not mean damage peculiar, 
exclusive or unique to the plaintiff. "336 Prosser's discomfort with 
the strict rule and its questionable history was obvious. 
Despite his statements to the contrary in Preliminary Draft 
No. 16, Prosser then, as he had in his Handbook, suggested in 
Private Action that the different-in-degree cases had a substantial 
following: "It has often been held that the fact that other 
individuals suffer the same kind of damage, and even in greater 
degree, does not prevent any of them from recovering for it. "337 
Yet, Prosser then retreated, contradicting himself by describing 
these decisions as "occasional" and not explicit rulings, adding, 
with little authority, that "[wlhen the issue has been squarely 
presented, it has almost invariably been said that degree is not 
enough."338 In short, Prosser was unwilling to relax the test 
completely. For instance, Prosser stated that a private suit would 
fail if the "class becomes so large and general as to include all 
members of the public who come in contact with the 
nuisance."339 Although his analysis was less than clear, he 
appeared to want only to maintain the floor "substantiality" 
reqUirement. In other words, he suggested that at least several 
decisions support the substantially greater in degree 
Smith/Fleming position, but that no one advanced the more 
extreme any difference-in-degree concept. 
Prosser concluded his argument for 
Smith/Fleming rule by pinpointing one of the 
the modified 
most troubling 
821C. at 15 ("Physical injuIies to person or property are of course treated as a 
different kind of harm. "I. Commonly accepted qualifying injuIies included: a pIivate 
nuisance (e.g., fumes interfertng with a pIivate dwelling), id.; full obstruction of 
immediate ingress and egress to pIivate property, whether the access was a private or 
public highway, id.; loss of contract or a pecuniary loss "to an established business" 
unless the public nuisance "affected a whole area of the community, and the 
plaintiff's los[sl of customers was common in the area." [d. § 821C, at 19. 
336, Prosser, Private Action, supra note 8, at 1008 (emphasis added). This is, 
unfortunately, how many courts have come to view and apply the different-in-kind 
test-if the injury can be construed as common or shared, the plaintiff is 
disqualified, 
337. [d. at 1008-09 (emphasis added). For his authority, Prosser cites thirteen 
cases-two federal cases (including Smith's favoIite Piscataqua, see supra notes 252-
254 and accompanying discussion) and eleven state cases beginning in 1869 and 
ending in 1962. [d. at 1009 n.99. Compare with Tentative Draft No. 16, supra note 
235, § 8218 cmt. g. 
338. Prosser, Private Action. supra note 8. at 1009. Prosser cited two federal cases, 
including Piscataqua, three American state court cases, one Australian case, and one 
lIish case. [d. at 1009 n.100. 
339. [d. at 1009. 
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problems created by the different-in-kind test: "[w)hat if there is 
pecuniary loss [a cognizable injury under public nuisance's 
longstanding exception to the economic loss rule) and it is 
common to the whole community?"340 For example, what if the 
blocking of a river forces an entire town to import coal and other 
supplies by a more expensive route, resulting in significant costs 
to businesses and individuals?341 Even though the loss is both 
pecuniary and substantial. Prosser observed that, in these types 
of cases. courts ignored the degree to which the plaintiff was 
affected and "insisted upon some distinct kind of damage. "342 
But, said Prosser, this stark choice between different-in-kind 
and different-in-degree is inappropriate.343 Rather, the 
justification for recognizing an injury based on degree as 
"particular damage" was that degree was actually an indicator of 
some special interest of the plaintiff not common to the 
community as a whole.344 Thus, "the degree can never be ignored 
when it bears legitimately upon the issue of kind. "345 Ultimately. 
however, Prosser concluded that, despite courts' difficulties in 
applying the different-in-kind test and his own critiCism, it was 
the prevailing view.346 
2. Prosser Presents His Views to the AU 
Shortly after publishing Private Action,347 Prosser sent his 
revised draft of Chapter 40 and other portions of the Restatement 
(Second) to the full American Law Institute ("ALI") Council, with 
minimal revisions.348 Prosser seemed well aware, however, that 
he had a new audience to persuade and was both 
straightforward about the challenging issues and ready to re-
argue his position that the different-in-kind test predominated.349 
In his list of questions for the Council, he noted that 821 C was a 
new section where "[t)he pOSition is taken ... that there must be 
particular harm differing in kind from that suffered by the 
general public," and then queried whether the Council agreed.350 
340. Id. at 1010; see supra note 65 (discussing economic loss exception). 
341. Prosser. Private Action. supra note 8. at 1009; see. e.g., irl. nn. 107-112. 
342. Id. at 10 1O-1l. 
343. Id. at 1011 ("This. however. is not the whole story."). 
344. Id. 
345. Id. 
346. Id. at n.113. 
347. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
348. Council Draft No. 24. supra note 319. 
349. Id. at 1 (noting Advisers' approval of his general new treatment of public 
nuisance). 
350. Id. at "Suggested Questions for the Council." 
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In presenting that section. he bolstered his restatement of the 
different-in-kind rule by highlighting the debate over this topic 
among torts writers. the evolution of his own views. and his 
exhaustive search of the case law.351 
Except for some notable challenges to his pOSition on the 
exclusive criminal nature of public nuisance,352 Prosser's draft on 
public nuisance issues emerged almost unscathed from the 
meeting of the Council in December 1967 and was re-issued as 
Tentative Draft No. 15 without Significant changes to Section 
821C.353 At the beginning. however, Prosser continued to suggest 
to the membership that Section 821 C was new and "runs to 
considerable length, because of the variety of fact situations," 
then prophetically asked, "Is it approved?,,354 Because there was 
351. Instead of reciting the cases, he cited his then newly published Private Action 
article. Ed. § 821C. at 16; see also RODGERS. AIR & WATER, supra note 8, § 2.2, at 36 
("A debate has raged on whether a difference in kind is often in reality only one in 
degree, with no less a luminary than Dean Prosser shifting to the 'different in kind' 
school after careful study of the reported cases."). Prosser's draft "set out the 
particular damage rule in its harshest form." Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 5, at 
251. For a reporter to "restate" a rule despite his own misgivings was a delicate task. 
See W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal 
for Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 23, 26 (1985) (quoting Professor W. Barton 
Leach that a drafter of the restatements "must either state a good rule which he 
knows perfectly well is not the law; or he must state a bad rule and by his very 
restatement entrench it./url:her") (emphasis added). 
Prosser did manage to inject back into his draft a watered-down version of 
his earlier argument for the less strict different-in-degree standard. Prosser 
suggested, as he had stated in his 1966 article, that the two concepts could be 
blurred: "[dlifference in degree of interference cannot, however, entirely be 
disregarded in determining whether there has been difference in kind." Council Draft 
No. 24, supra note 319, § 821C, at 18. For example, if a person travels a road a 
dozens times a day, "he nearly always has some special reason to do so, and that 
reasons will almost invariably be based upon some special interest of his own, not 
common to the community. [Therefore slubstantialinterference with that interest will 
be particular damage, sufficient to support the tort action." Id. He concluded that the 
degree of interference should continue to be "a factor of importance, which must be 
considered." [d. 
352. As to the criminal character of public nuisance, Prosser noted that "[sleveral 
members of the Council have challenged the propOSition that a public nuisance is 
always a crime." Tentative Draft No. 15, supra note 75, § 821B, n. to institute, at 16. 
But, "[a]fter rather intensive search, the Reporter sticks to his guns. First of all. all 
the text writers have so declared. . .. Second, there are broad general statements in 
a large number of cases that any public nuisance is a crime. . .. Finally, intensive 
search by the Reporter has failed to uncover a single case in which it has been held 
that there was a public nuisance although there was not a crime." [d. at 16-18. 
Despite his fIrm resolution, Prosser's position would later be rejected by the ALI 
membership. See irifra note 467 and accompanying text. 
353. Tentative Draft No. 15, supra note 75, § 821B, n. to institute, at 16. 
354. [d. at xi. 
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no room on the agenda of the 1968 meeting,355 the Council 
bumped the issue to the May 1969 Annual Meeting. Troubled 
waters were ahead. 
After fourteen years of work on the issue, 71-year-old 
Prosser finally had the opportunity at the 1969 Annual Meeting 
to present his Tentative Draft No. 15 in person to the broader 
legal community. ALI Director Herbert Wechsler's introductory 
comments presaged the public-law rebellion against the black 
letter special injury rule that would occur at the following year's 
annual meeting. Wechsler characterized Prosser's expansion of 
the nuisance chapter as "a matter of substantial import in a 
legislative age-an aspect, indeed, of the larger problem of how 
far the law of torts adds to the public sanctions that may be 
prescribed by statute the further sanction of a private action. 
There also is the question of whether the common law of 
nuisance really retains the vitality it had of 0Id."356 Wechsler 
promised, "Dean Prosser's return to the rostrum of the Institute 
should thus provide an interesting day."357 
When Prosser did return, he began his presentation by 
noting that "[tJhe nuisance chapter offers a peculiar drafting 
difficulty because of the history of this particular chapter in the 
Torts Restatement."358 Prosser then jumped directly into the 
rationale for a new major emphasis on public nuisance, saying 
"[o)ne of the mysteries of the First Restatement of Torts to me is: 
What happened to public nuisance, and why isn't it in here? 
Obviously it has to go in. "359 Prosser's presentation then 
combined the best of his drafts and his 1966 article. In 
addressing the definition of public nuisance, Prosser again 
defended the conservative view that "[a) public nuisance is a 
criminal interference with a right common to all members of the 
public, "360 to which he felt driven by the case law and statutes. 
355. Report of the Director, 46 A.L.1. ?Roc., supra note 157, at 469 (stating "Last 
year's agenda left no room for a submission in torts .... n). 
356. IcL 
357. IcL 
358. IcL at 277; see supra note 319 (discussing omission of the topiC from flI'st 
Restatement). 
359. 46 A.L.I. ?Roc .. supra note 157. at 279. 
360. IcL at 282. Acknowledging that, on this issue, "the Reporter has again been 
challenged by members of the Council," Prosser then displayed some irritation, 
relaying how this particular debate "cost the Reporter a month out of his life trying to 
run down such [contrary) cases. and he found nothing whatever to support the 
position taken by the members of the Council. No case has been discovered in which 
there has been a public nuisance which was not a crime." IcL at 283. Prosser called 
the challenge of defining nuisance "exceptionally difficult," see Council Draft No. 24, 
supra note 319. § 821B. n. to council, at 9, and his defInition was a very conservative 
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He was not "very happy about this particular situation and this 
problem." but. according to his extensive review. public nuisance 
was fundamentally criminal in character.36l Upon hearing no 
objections from the floor. Prosser then proceeded to the next 
section 821 C in the short time remaining for the nuisance 
discussion. 
Prosser began explaining the special injury rule by referring 
to "the 1536" case. He erroneously explained that a man who 
was injured by riding his horse into a trench dug across a public 
highway by the defendant was allowed to sue "upon the ground 
that he had suffered special damage peculiar to him. and not 
shared in any way by other members of the public. "362 That case. 
he claimed. formed the foundation of the "special damages" or 
"peculiar damages" rule developed to require injury "of a kind 
different from the damages suffered by other members of the 
public who are exercising the same public right. "363 Prosser then 
noted that this "opens up quite a door." and that there had been 
"a great deal of argument in the past about whether the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff have to be different in kind. or whether it 
is enough that he suffers damages differing in degree. "364 But. he 
concluded that his review of the cases did not support a 
departure from the different-in-kind rule. He again articulated 
"[tJhe chief explanation of the rule": that it prevents multiplicity 
of suits that might "harass defendants." creating "a rather 
intolerable situation. "365 Then, noting that only five minutes 
remained in the time allotted. Prosser asked for comments. No 
substantive questions arose. and the section was "tentatively 
approved. "366 
one. Prosser explained: "This is the best I can do with this one. I have combed the law 
dictionaries, and Words and Phrases, and have not come up with anything better. ... 
Can anyone [sic] do better?" Preliminary Draft No. 16. supra note 317. § 821B. n. to 
advisers. 
361. 46 A.L.1. PRoc .• supra note 157. at 283. 
362. [d. at 285. Prosser's narrative further suggests that he never read the case. 
as the "facts" were only a hypothetical. See supra Part 11.B. 
363. 46 A.L.1. PROC., supra note 157, at 285. But see supra Part I1.B (arguing that 
the different-in-kind rule was not characterized as such until the late 1800s, 300 
years later). 
364. 46 A.L.1. PROC .. supra note 157. at 285. 
365. [d. at 286. 
366. When Tentative Draft No. 17 was issued. ALI Director Herbert Wechsler 
noted that Prosser's Chapter 40 on Nuisance was rushed and had been "barely 
reached in the discussion" due to the volume of other topics. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS vii (Tentative Draft No. 17. 1971) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 17] . 
Perhaps if more leisurely debate had been allowed. a fmal vote would have been 
taken and the 1970 rebellion. see infra Part IV. might never have happened. 
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Unfortunately for Prosser, the 1969 meeting would not be his 
anticipated curtain call. Because the discussion of the Chapter 
40 on nuisance had been incomplete, the ALI "republished" the 
prior draft (No. 15) virtually in its entirety as new Tentative Draft 
No. 16 in April of 1970.367 Prosser and the ALI leadership 
assumed, however, that debate on the draft through Section 
821 C was over. They were mistaken. 
IV 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) REBELLION: THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO INFUSE FEDERAL 
STANDING LAW DEVELOPMENTS INTO PUBLIC NUISANCE 
Little did Prosser know that, at the 1970 Annual Meeting, an 
unprecedented "legal drama"368 would unfold that would 
significantly alter his carefully crafted special injury rule. The 
events would prove to be the final straw prompting his 
resignation. Mter an emotional debate, the ALI membership 
voted to override Prosser's draft statement of the special injury 
rule in order to infuse into public nuisance the prinCiples of 
standing rapidly developing in new federal administrative law 
cases. The rebellion would mark a doctrinal watershed -the 
pinnacle of the attempt to harmonize private plaintiffs' access to 
public nuisance with emerging public law principles. The 
rebellion also represented an unprecedented grassroots 
challenge to Prosser's authority, reflecting the social upheaval of 
the times. 
This "moment so terribly burning in history"369 
represented the convergence of dramatic social and legal events 
unfolding in the United States in the late 1960s: the social 
justice and environmental movements, and the parallel creation 
of modern federal standing law in administrative law cases.370 
The major shift in the Restatemenfs position on public 
nuisance371 was greeted with great enthusiasm by observers, 
particularly the new Reporter John W. Wade and the new 
generation of environmental law scholars and practitioners.372 
Ultimately, however, the great rebellion did not ignite a 
367. Tentative Draft No. 16. supra note 235, at vii (Foreword by Director Wechsler) 
("Tentative Draft No. 16 resubmits Chapter 40 on 'Nuisance,' which was before the 
Annual Meeting last year. Because time then did not permit discussion beyond 
Section 821C, the entire Chapter is being republished in this draft."). 
368. Wade, Environmental Protection, supra note 4, at 165. 
369. Presentation of Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 16,47 
A.L.L PROC. 287, 300 (1970) (remarks of John P. Frank). 
370. See irifra Section A. 
37l. See infra Section B. 
372. See irifra Section C. 
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revolution.373 Only one court ever adopted the new Restatement 
position. For a variety of theoretical, doctrinal, and practical 
reasons,374 the Restatemenfs progressive view, as it is now 
fonnulated, is unlikely to ever take hold in the courts. By 
examining this modem doctrinal history, however, we can 
perhaps better clear the path toward an approach more palatable 
to courts and commentators alike. 
A. The Emergence oj Federal Standing Law 
By the time of the ALI's annual meeting in May 1970, 
dramatic new developments in the federal375 law of standing had 
emerged and had begun to carve an entirely new landscape for 
national public law litigation. To understand the context for the 
ALI's rebellion against the special injury rule, it is important to 
explore briefly the explosive emergence of federal standing law in 
the late 1960s. These changes directly affected the debate over 
the special injury rule. 
From 1939 until 1968, the well-established federal standing 
doctrine was based on the narrow "legal interest test. ~376 During 
this time, the private attorney general concept was not yet 
recognized, and the avenue for average citizens seeking redress 
on major policy disputes in federal courts was largely closed. 
Starting in 1968, four major Supreme Court cases "drastically 
liberalized the federal law of standing, giving it a new baSic 
373. See infra Section D. 
374. See infra Part V. 
375. Davis, supra note 2, at 468-69. Many states take a Simpler approach to 
standing, avoiding the overly complex federal doctrine. "By and large, the state courts 
follow the common law attitudes in goveITIing judicial review of administrative action, 
so that the judicial doors are widely open to anyone who asserts a legitimate interest; 
one who is hurt in fact has standing unless a statute or a 'public policy' requires 
otherwise." Id. at 468. State courts' more flexible approach to state standing law 
provides some optimism for the prospects of a liberalized special injury rule. See infra 
Partv. 
376. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-
38 (1939) ("one is without standing unless 'the right invaded is a legal right-one of 
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one 
founded on a statute which confers a privilege'"). Pre-Tennessee, during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. the federal courts had followed "the natural 
[common lawl system," Davis, supra note 2, at 469, which more generously allowed 
standing. See also Chayes, supra note 1, at 8-9 ("[iln the classical lawsuit, the 
standing problem could hardly arise. The issue was whether the particular plaintiff 
was entitled to the (usually compensatory) relief demanded from the particular 
defendant. when both plaintiff and defendant were private persons. The question of 
plaintiffs standing to sue merged with the question of whether plaintiff had stated a 
cause of action on the merit."). The proposal suggested by this Article (Part V, inJra) is 
Similar to this merits approach. 
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orientation."377 In these cases.378 the Court granted expansive 
new standing rights to economic interests. taxpayers. and tenant 
farmers. sparking a revolution379 in standing law. 380 
377. Davis. supra note 2. at 450. 
378. In Hardin v. Kentucky Uti!. Co .• 390 U.S. 1 (1968). a private utility sought to 
enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority (lVA") from supplying power to towns served 
by the plaintiff. In a unanimous decision. the Supreme Court held that a 1959 
statute. which forbade the lVA from selling power from outside the area where it was 
a primary power source. was designed to protect private utilities from lVA 
competition and allowed the competing private utility standing to challenge the 
proposal. From Hardin emerged the bedrock standing principle that parties with 
statutorily protected interests have standing for judicial review. 
A few months after Hardin. the Court decided Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 
(1968). holding that federal taxpayers can. under certain circumstances. demonstrate 
standing to challenge the validity of governmental expenditures. i.e. textbooks and 
other educational materials for use in parochial schools. 
Two years later. the Court's decision in Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations. Inc. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). involved data processing service 
organizations seeking standing to challenge a rule of the Comptroller of the Currency 
that also allowed banks to provide such services. The Court rejected the Tennessee 
"legal interest" test, id. at 153. and adopted a new prudential "zone of interest" test. 
apart from the Article III case and controversy requirement. Id. at 153-54. In 
Simultaneously decided Barlow v. Collins. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). the Court allowed 
standing to tenant fanners who sought to challenge a regulation that allowed 
landlords to charge them high interest rates for financing fann needs. The Court held 
that the tenant farmers had "personal stake and interest that impact the concrete 
adverseness required by Article III" and were clearly "within the zone of interest 
protected by the Act." Id at 164. 
Data Processing and Barlow thus introduced the now-familiar two-step 
framework for federal standing: first. the Article III test of "injury in fact. economic or 
otherwise." and second. the prudential "zone of interest" test. Davis. supra note 2. at 
452-56. The Article III requirement has evolved into a three-part test: first. that the 
plaintiff allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that 
concrete adverseness that sharpens the presentation of the issues (injury in fact); 
second. that the injury be fairly traceable to the injury or conduct (traceability); and 
third. that the remedy sought be suitable to redress the alleged injury (redressability). 
Id. Although this test arises from the distinct federal context. doctrinally it could be 
imported into the torts context without much difficulty - "actual injury" would 
constitute injury-in-fact. causation principles address traceability. and broad 
nuisance remedies would be available for redress. 
379. See Bryson & Macbeth. supra note 5. at 253 (calling the cases a "near-
revolution"); Eva H. Hanks & John L. Hanks. An Environmental Bill of Rights: TIle 
Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 
230. 231 (1969-70) (arguing that Barlow and Data Processing removed the barriers 
for citizen groups). 
380. The United States Supreme Court's new approach had at least four primary 
sources. which also set the stage for the push to liberalize the special injury rule at 
the 1970 ALI Annual Meeting. see infra Section IV.B. First. it was prompted by new 
congressional authorizations of greater citizen participation in enforcement of the 
federal laws. Congress had enacted the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in 1946. 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), which authorized lawsuits against agenCies by any person 
"suffering legal wrong" or "adversely affected or aggrieved." 
Second. in 1940. the Supreme Court had issued FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio 
Station. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). its "watershed case in the law of standing." Louis L. 
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Alongside these dramatic developments in the role of the 
judiciary in public law litigation. by the late 1960s. the 
awareness of environmental issues had exploded and was 
dominating the American consciousness. Media attention to 
ecology was constant.38J grassroots pressure from groups like the 
Sierra Club had intensified.382 the "public consciousness [was] 
rapidly being awakened particularly because dramatic and 
visible experiences of environmental deterioration [were) igniting 
previously only smoldering fires of discontent. n383 and 
congressional interest in "ecology issues" was strong. presaging a 
wave of new federal environmental statutes. 384 
Jaffe. Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255. 257 
(1961) [hereinafter Jaffe, Private Actions]. which "generated a strong current toward 
the broader concept of standing." Id. at 258. Subsequently. lower courts began to 
relax standing in some cases. See Hanks & Hanks. supra note 379. at 242. 
Third. by the late 1960s. "public law" litigation (see infra Part V.B.2.) had 
made its big debut on the national litigation stage. Major federal laWSUits involving 
public housing. civil rights, and labor issues (often brought by the new breed of 
public interest law fIrm) were using statutory and constitutional causes of action to 
challenge major policy actions by government. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law. 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988). 
Fourth. two prominent law review articles published in 1961 by Harvard's 
Louis L. Jaffe laid the scholarly foundation for the movement and sparked further 
commentary. See Louis L. Jaffe. Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions. 74 
HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961) [hereinafter Jaffe. Public Actions] (arguing for expanded 
judicial review and standing in cases where individuals seek to vindicate the public 
interest) and Jaffe. Private Actions. supra. at 255 (arguing that standing of private 
citizens who assert a "distinct or discriminating impact" should not be "of right" but 
discretionary in administrative law cases). 
381. See Gary Neustadter. Comment. The Role of the Juduciary in the 
Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality. 17 UCLA L. REv. 1070, 
1070 & n.3 (1970) [hereinafter Comment. Role oj Judiciary] (noting constant media 
attention to environmental issues). 
382. Id. at 1070 n.3 (noting the National Environmental Teach-In of April 1970 
and publication of a Sierra Club handbook for "environmental activists" called 
"Ecotactics"). 
383. Id. at 1070; see also David Sive. Some Thoughts oj an Environmental Lawyer 
in the Wilderness of Administrative Law. 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1970) (noting that 
the "explosion of concern for the environment ... is the great political phenomenon 
of the last twelve months."). EcolOgical disasters like the Santa Barbara Oil Spill 
shocked the national consciousness. See Malcolm F. Baldwin. The Santa Barbara Oil 
Spill. in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5-47 (Michael F. Baldwin & James K. Page. Jr. 
eds .. 1970) [hereinafter LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. Time magazine declared 1969 
"the year of ecology." James E. Krier. Environmental Litigation and the Burden of 
Proof, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT. supra. at 106. Even scholarly articles decried the 
"ecological crisis." Comment, Environmental LaWSUit, supra note 6, at 1085 ("No 
reasonable man would deny that we are now living in a time of ecological crisis."). 
384. Comment. Role oj Judiciary. supra note 381. at 1070; see also id. at 1077-79 
(discussing air and water pollution legislation as of 1970); Environmental Law 
Bibliography, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT. supra note 383, at 375. 382-86 (listing 43 
congreSSional hearings on environmental issues from 1967-1969); Note. Public 
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Despite the fact that very few lawsuits were reported under 
the precursors to our modern federal environmental statutes,385 
there was a "growing awareness in the courts of the need for 
environmental controls. "386 The Supreme Court's decisions in the 
new standing cases387 would prove to be "invaluable tool(s)" for 
public law litigators,388 especially environmental lawyers who 
were learning to use the Administrative Procedure Act, enabling 
acts for federal agencies, and the then-recently enacted National 
Environmental Policy Act. 389 Congress was in the mood to give 
citizens a greater role in ensuring that government agenCies 
fulfilled their conservation responsibilities. 390 
These developments in federal administrative standing law 
and the environmental movement converged to ignite the 
revolution in environmental litigation. In early 1970, University 
of Michigan Law Professor Joseph Sax persuaded Michigan to 
pass a novel citizen suit law.391 The Michigan Act prompted 
similar legislation in several other states392 and the modern 
Nuisance, supra note 8, at 397 n.36, 398 & 400 (listing some of the then-recently 
enacted conservation statutes). 
385. Grad & Rockett, supra note 8, at 749-52 (noting the small number of 
lawsuits under pre-1969 versions of environmental laws). 
386. fa at 747-48; see also id.. at 748 ("the courts have expressly Indicated an 
awareness of the dimension of environmental problems and of the public policies that 
reflect the prevailing public Interest"); Sax, Public 1i11st Doctrine, supra note 8, at 473 
("Public concern about environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the 
courtroom. "J. 
387. See supra note 378. 
388. See Comment, Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 1087 & 1093; see 
also Sive, supra note 383, at 614-43 (discussing the emerging paradigm of 
environmental law cases). 
389. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et. 
seq .. 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (signed by President Nixon on January I, 1970); see 
generally Hank & Hanks, supra note 379 (examining the usefulness of the then-
recently enacted NEPA). 
390. See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 379, at 253 (noting Senator Jackson's 
enthusiasm for "action forcing" procedures for federal agencies to protect the 
environment). 
391. The Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 
1970, Mich. Compo Laws Ann. 691.1201-1207 (Supp.1972), allowed "any person" or 
organization to sue for declaratory and Injunctive relief against the government or 
private parties for "the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources and the 
public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction." fa § 2(1). See also 
Joseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A 
Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1972) (discussing experience with the new 
Act). 
392. Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. D1Mento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three 
Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 
(1974) (analyzing Michigan Act as a "harbinger" of state and federal environmental 
litigation); Comment, Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 1130 (noting similar 
Introductions in seven states as of July 1970). 
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concept of citizens suits was soon on its way to Congress,393 
Federal environmental litigation394 was in its nascent stages,395 
The major environmental public interest law fIrms that would 
dominate the scene for decades were taking shape,396 Interest 
among environmental lawyers and law schools in using the 
courts for environmental protection was exploding, 397 "Large 
numbers" of environmental lawsuits, based on a diverse range of 
theories,398 were fIled and beginning to 'be reported as they 
matured to the appellate level. 399 With the standing developments 
came major liberalization in class actions~ and injunctive relief, 
393. Congress passed the fIrst federal citizen suit provision In the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7604, 84 Stat. 1706 (1970). Over the next two decades, Congress enacted 
a dozen new citizen suit provisions in various environmental statutes. See Comment. 
Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 515 nn.17-19 (citing 12 environmental statutes 
enacted from the 1970s-1980s). 
394. See Sive, supra note 383. at 614 n.7 ("No authority has as yet dermed 
'environmental litigation.' Asserting the privilege of the tramper in new snow or new 
fields of law. I mark the bounds of our steps without citation of authority. By 
'environmental litigation' is meant adversary proceedings before courts or 
administrative agencies the results of which determine the use of significant natural 
or other physical resources."). 
395. In September 1969. the Conservation Foundation sponsored the first 
national conference of environmental lawyers and scholars. including names now 
legendary In the field. The conference proceedings were published as LAw AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT. supra note 383. The conference inclUded presentations on the cutting-
edge issues of the day and resulted in the launching of the Environmental Law 
Institute and the Environmental Law Reporter. lcL at vii. Courses In environmental 
law were beginning to be offered, but environmental law texts and casebooks had not 
been published. See Sive. supra note 383. at 614. 
396. See Sive. supra note 383. at 613 & n.6 (noting the emergence of Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NY). Environmental Defense Fund (NY). the Center for 
Law and Social Policy (Washington. D.C.). and the Conservation Law Society of 
America (San Francisco. CAl, precursor of Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now 
EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund)). 
397. Grad & Rockett. supra note 8. at 742 (reporting a "lively enthUSiasm for 
environmental litigation" and "'an explosion' of interest among law students"); Sive, 
supra note 383. at 613 (commenting on the proliferation of environmental law 
courses and societies). 
398. Sax. Public Trust Doctrine. supra note 8, at 474 ("The cases present legal 
theories which are as diverse as lawyers' imaginations are fertile."). 
399. As of January 1970. Professor Sax reported "several dozen such suits ... to 
enforce air and water pollution laws." ld. at 473 & nn. 1-9 (listing cases). This 
enthUSiasm spilled over Into the torts bar. See. e.g .. Can Law Reclaim Man's 
Environment? 5 TRiAL 10-28 (1969) (essays exhorting trial lawyers to rise to the 
defense of the embattled environment using traditional tort tools and embracing the 
new public law techniques). 
400. After Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was "radically restructured" In 1966. 
Comment. Environmental Lawsuit. supra note 6. at 1100. some commentators 
predicted it would be a ·potent weapon for redressing the injuries of large numbers of 
people with small individual claims against polluters"; see id. at 1097-98 ("the class 
action . .. would seem an ideal method of seeking redress In environmental 
litigation"); see also James E. Starrs. The Consumer Class Action-Part II: 
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which encouraged waves of lawsuits in the civil rights. 
consumer. and environmental areas. 
These developments prompted a new stream of scholarship 
by federal administrative and environmental law 
commentators.401 who were eager to address environmental 
problems402 and were re-examining dusty legal tools. from the 
ancient remedy of qui tam to the common law of public 
nuisance.403 All of these profound social and legal developments 
Considerations of Procedure. 49 B.U. L. REv. 407. 408 (1969) (calling class actions 
"the judicial analogue to the mass demonstrations of the streets"). Although 
enthusiasm for Rule 23 was severely dampened by the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Snyder v. Harris. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). which held that claims could not 
be aggregated to meet the $10.000 jurisdictional amount requirement in diversity 
cases. Comment. Environmental Lawsuit. supra note 6. at 1101. this concern would 
not apply to most federal environmental litigation. which is based on federal question 
jurisdiction. It could seriously hamper. however. common law public nuisance class 
actions that seek damages in federal court. see infra Part v. 
401. See Environmental Law Bibliography. supra note 384. at 392-412 (listing 222 
articles on environmental law published in late 1960s). 
402. Many of the now-legendary figures of the environmental law field called for 
pushing the envelope on new and old legal approaches. Professor Joe Sax advocated 
reinvigorating the public tJust doctrine. Sax. Public Trust Doctrine. supra note 8. at 
471. University of Washington Law Professor William S. Rodgers. Jr. argued that the 
newly enacted NEPA ·created a statutory right to a safe and healthy environment." 
Comment. Environmental Lawsuit. supra note 6, at 1130. New York litigator David 
Sive suggested that ·softening of the hard limitations on judicial review of 
administrative detenninations" would provide an effective "balancing force" for 
environmental protection. Sive, supra note 383, at 650-51. Columbia Law Professor 
Frank Grad focused on the growing pains of the new environmental litigation 
movement and called for broad federal statuto!)' remedies. Grad & Rockett, supra 
note 8. at 762. 
403. Louise L. Jaffe, Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAw AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 383, at 123, 131 [hereinafter Jaffe, Conservation Suits] 
("Arguably the concept of representative plaintiffs now being developed in [federal 
standing cases] ... may playa role in a revision of party concepts in nuisance cases. 
It could be urged that representative plaintiffs be allowed to take direction action 
against a public nuisance (after, perhaps, seeking without success to induce the 
public authorities to act) ... :): Comment. Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 
1097 ("it might be argued that the representative-plaintiff concept espoused ... 
should be expanded to permit interest groups to initiate legal proceedings directly 
against a public nuisance."). Nuisance theory and case law was, after all, "the 
common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law." RODGERS, AIR & 
WATER, supra note 8. § 1.1, at 2: Abrams & Washington, supra note 4. at 391-92 
(prior to the enactment of federal environmental statutes in the 1970s and 19805, 
"public nuisance frequently offered the only remedy to secure the cleanup of toxic 
dumps" such as Love Canal. New York). 
At the same time that commentators showed renewed interest in nuisance, 
they also pointed to the inabilities of the common law to address regional and 
national problems as a justification for enacting broad new federal statutory 
remedies. See Grad & Rockett, supra note 8, at 743 (suggesting that common law 
nuisance and trespass may have only "incidental effects on environmental 
protection," in part because of the special injury rule); see also Comment. Role of the 
Judiciary, supra note 381, at 1072-73 (noting the historical role of nuisance 
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converged to create the necessary conditions for a turbulent ALI 
meeting in 1970 and brought particular pressures to bear on the 
public nuisance section of the proposed Restatement (Second). 
B. The Restatement (Second)'s Rebellion 
Arriving at the morning seSSion of the ALI Annual Meeting on 
May 21. 1970, the aging "God of Torts"404 was probably weary.405 
After fifteen years of hard work on the massive four-volume 
project, and some major intellectual battles,406 the 72-year-old 
Prosser was undoubtedly looking forward to putting the 
monumental undertaking to rest. 407 Early that morning, however, 
while dressing for his final presentation, Prosser had badly cut 
his lip while shaving, showing up with less than his usual wit 
and dapper appearance.408 With only a few minutes remaining in 
the morning session, President Darrell introduced Prosser to 
addreSSing localized pollution but dismissing its potential to address broad and 
complex environmental problems); J. Skelly Wright, TIle Federal Courts and the 
Nature and Quality oj State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 331 (1967) ("Poor old 
nuisance has been the common law's meager response to the crowdedness of society. 
The doctrine is pathetically inadequate to deal with the social realities of this haIf-
century, which indisputably call for comprehensive legislative planning."); Comment, 
Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 515 (new statutory protections meant to "address 
the limitations of common law nuisance actions"); Discussion, in LAw AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 383, at 248, 273 (remarks of Ralph Nader, asking "Is torts 
obsoleteT given the "silent," "long-term," "difficult to detect," and numerous sources 
of environmental threats): id. at 274 (remarks of William M. Bennett, suggesting one 
weakness of state common law was that it could not set fIrm precedent for other 
areas of the countIy). 
404. Law students at Prosser's last teaching position, Hastings College of Law, 
compiled a list of the strengths and weaknesses of their various professors, and 
"when they got to Bill Prosser they listed his weakness as: 'He thinks he is God.' They 
listed his strength as: He is probably right. '" Discussion of the Restatement of Law, 
Second, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 18,49 A.L.1. PROC. 188 (1973) (remarks of John W. 
Wade). 
405. About the same time that Prosser was attempting to fInish the Restatement 
drafts, he was also preparing the Fourth Edition of his Handbook and a new edition 
of his casebook. Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283, at 1261. 
406. Prosser called one such famous debate over assumption of the risk and its 
relationship to contributory negligence "The Battle of the Wilderness." ld. at 1258-59. 
On the floor of the 1963 Annual Meeting, Prosser had engaged in an extended debate 
-with "pluck," "Vigor," "counterattacks," and "ruse" -against the dissenters, whom 
he dubbed "the Confederate Army." ld. The debate ultimately spilled over into the 
literature and is still the subject of discussion by courts. ld. 
407. For the 1970 Annual Meeting, Prosser had prepared a 215-page draft, which 
"to provide a complete picture," id. at 1259, included the nuisance topics tentatively 
approved the previous year. See supra Part III.C. 
408. Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283, at 1259. Prosser's bad luck had 
started the day before when he "embarked on the wrong plane from San Francisco," 
arriving in New York instead of Washington, D.C., leading to a poor night's sleep and 
a "nervous" morning. ld. 
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wrap up the torts project. Darrell's opening remarks on Prosser's 
unfortunate personal appearance were inauspIcIOUS and 
indicative of the generation gap at the meeting that would soon 
become evident. 409 
Mter apologizing for his unusual appearance,410 Prosser 
commenced by observing that it had been "an enormous while 
ago" that the ALI had considered the nuisance issue but that "we 
got through Section 821 C .... That was, I think, cleaned up and 
approved. "411 Therefore, Prosser hoped the discussion could 
continue to the next section, 821D, Private Nuisance. Prosser's 
hopes were quickly dashed. 
Prosser asked for comments on private nuisance, and the 
can of worms began to open. Charles A. Bane, an Illinois 
practitioner, asked if he could· reopen the public nuisance 
section.412 Bane then launched an attack on the rule from a 
conservative perspective -seeking to weaken public nuisance as 
a contemporary remedy. Bane argued that recent major statutory 
developments on environmental issues at the state and federal 
level warranted "removing entirely from the concept of nuisance 
those activities that are subject to regulation. "413 Essentially, he 
proposed "transferring the authority and the rule-making power 
from the courts [in nuisance cases) to a legislative or 
administrative agency" because the environmental field was 
"highly skilled [and) highly technical," suitable to administrative 
agencies. 414 Alternatively, he suggested that "compliance with 
administrative regulations should be a complete defense to the 
charges of maintaining a public nuisance ... 415 
Bane's remarks touched off a furor. Rising from the floor, a 
self-described "young cub" private practitioner from Arizona, 
John P. Frank,416 rebuffed Bane's approach417 and asked for a 
409. 47 A.L.I. PRoc., supra note 369. at 287 ("One of the most hazardous activities 
of the male part of mankind is the morning shave. I gather the younger generation, 
noting what the older ones did in the last century, are gradually abandoning it, but 
we of our generation still stick to our custom. This morning, our Reporter had a little 
accident, and I don't want him to feel a bit concerned about this, because he can 
perform no matter what happens to his lip. "). 
410. Prosser remarked "lilt is, perhaps, just as well that my faCial beauty is 
somewhat diminished. Otherwise, the effect of it might be rather overpowering. 
[Laughter)." Id. 
411. Id: see also supra Part III.C.2 
412. 47 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 369, at 288. 
413. Id. at 288-89. 
414. Id. at 289. 
415. Id. at 290. 
416. Telephone Interview with John P. Frank, Partner, Lewis & Roca, LLP 
(Phoenix, Az.) (Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Frank Interview). Though Frank was only 52 
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complete re-examination of the public nuisance section because 
of environmental concerns.41B Noting that he was inspired by the 
pioneering citizen suit work of Professor Sax, Frank plunged 
ahead with his lengthy prepared statement,419 completely 
changing the tone and direction of that morning's agenda. First, 
he expressed his overall concern that Prosser's traditional 
formulation of the rule would "lock the door before the horse gets 
out of the stable."420 Furthermore, he stated: 
at the time, he was neither inexperienced nor a radical inflltrator. Born in Wisconsin, 
Frank received his L.L.B. from the University of Wisconsin in 1940, clerked for 
Justice Hugo Black during the 1942 term, and seIVed as head of the Department of 
Justice's Civil Division in the 1940s. MARrINDALE-HuBBELL LAw DIRECTORY AZ138B 
(1998); Frank Interview, supra. Frank went on to receive his J.S.D. from Yale Law 
School in 1947. teaching law there from 1949-54. MARrINDALE-HUBBELL, supra. At the 
urging of Justice Black, Frank Interview, supra. he moved to Arizona for health 
reasons and entered into private practice with the Phoenix fIrm of Lewis and Roca, 
where he remains an active partner today. Id. Frank became a member of the ALI in 
1962, was a "regular" at ALI meetings. Frank Interview, supra. was appointed to the 
ALI Council in 1973, and recently seIVed as Chair of ALI's 75th Anniversary 
Committee. John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 615, 615 n.al (1998). He has authored numerous law review articles on topics 
ranging from equity, see John P. Frank & John Endicott, Defenses in Equity and 
"Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954), to constitutional law and judiCial 
biography. MARrINDALE-HuBBELL, supra. Perhaps not coincidentally, Frank was also a 
friend, admirer, and colleague of Wade. John P. Frank, John W. Wade, 48 VAND. L. 
REv. 591, 591 (1995) (hereinafter Frank. Wade). 
417. 47 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 369, at 294 (although Bane's remarks gave Frank 
the procedural opening to launch his proposal, Frank vigorously disagreed with 
Bane's suggestion to shrink the utility of common law nuisance. He countered that 
reliance on administrative agenCies was dangerous: "I must say with due regard for 
the problems of life in my State, at least, the chance that the public bodies will ever 
regulate the copper companies that are polluting the air over our State is very, very 
small."). 
418. Frank's interest in the special injury rule was actually in the equitable, not 
the environmental, principles involved. In fact, he had "no experience with 
environmental issues at that point," Frank Interview, supra note 416, but he believed 
that for social policy reasons "we should be able to use equity to address pollution 
problems." Id. When he seIVed as head of the Department of Justice's Civil Division 
in the 1940s, he focused on equity issues, particularly on labor relations during 
World War II. Id. Later. he taught equity subjects at Yale Law School. Id. Charles 
Allen Wright called him "the last equity lawyer in America.' Id. Now one of ALI's most 
senior members, Frank is continuing to urge greater merger of law and equity and 
wants to see "the 1970 project," which he considered "the start of my long campaign 
to merge law and equity,' come "to fruition.' Id. 
419. Frank obviously came prepared. He later commented: "If you are going to 
take on Prosser, you'd better be as ready for a funeral as for a fight." Frank Interview, 
supra note 416. Before the Annual Meeting, Frank had met with federal agenCies and 
Sax, who was then in Washington, D.C. 47 A.L.1. ?Roc., supra note 369, at 292-93. 
Frank recalls that he "worked closely' with Sax, following "his leadership.' Frank 
Interview, supra note 416. 
420. 47 A.L.I. ?Roc., supra note 369, at 291. 
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What is happening at the moment all over America is that the 
people are asking to deal with pollution of air and of water 
and of land, that in this connection a developing body of law 
is beginning to formulate which is breaking the bounds of 
traditional public nuisance. What is happening in our 
portions of this Restatement is that we are clamping a ceiling 
down, and by this restatement of public nuisance we are 
making it impossible to use the courts for the most important 
single social function which at this moment law in its civil 
reach ought to have. And this is so regrettable a thing that it 
does deserve another look in the light of the rising tide.421 
Frank took issue primarily with two aspects of Prosser's 
draft: the characterization of public nuisance as fundamentally a 
criminal violation,422 and the formulation of the special injury, 
different-in-kind rule. Frank attacked the very notion that the 
law should follow the venerable precedent set in the "1536" 
English case so often recited by Prosser,423 by stating, "I say 
respectfully that the fact that there was a limitation in 1536 is 
simply not good enough, and that it ought to be put aside, and 
that it is being put aside right now. "424 Frank further referred to 
recent federal "standing"425 decisions where conservation 
organizations were allowed to bring lawsuits as public 
representatives for "abuses to our environment. "426 According to 
Frank, there was "a new wave of development at the grass-roots 
level" that the ALI must not only recognize but "embrace. "427 
Although aware he was taking up precious floor time, Frank 
continued speaking on this "matter of utterly surpassing gravity 
to the people of this country."428 He quoted Justice Holmes that" 
421. [d. 
422. [d. According to Frank, the criminal characterization would prevent the 
public nuisance doctrine from being applied to modern environmental problems. 
"[Plollution may be a crime against God and its nature, but it is not usually a crime 
against the laws of the state. so that by putting in that defmition we make it 
impossible to reach the problem of the black cloud of filth which hangs in the air over 
my community and. I suspect, yours." [d. 
423. See supra Part II.B. 
424. 47 A.L.1. PROC., supra note 369. at 291-92. 
425. [d. at 292. This appears to be the first suggestion that changes in federal 
standing doctrine be incorporated into public nuisance. (Prosser's 1966 article. 
Private Action, supra note 8. uses the term "standing" but only in the general sense, 
without reference to then-emerging federal developments. [d. at 1007.) To maintain 
the doctrinal clarity and because "standing" has a specific doctrinal meaning in 
federal administrative law. but not tort law. this Article does not use the term in the 
latter context. 
426. [d. at 292. 
427. [d. at 292-93. 
428. [d. at 293. 
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'[a] river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,'" and he urged 
the ALI to approach the relationship between public nuisance 
and the environment "in the spirit of the utmost imagination and 
of the utmost service." stating "we ought not be confined, or even 
limited in any way, by notions of other centuries dealing with 
other problems in this regard ... 429 He concluded that 
the law of nuisance is at this moment just trying to fight its 
way out of the dark ages, and I think we should not lock this 
bam without taking into account the recent developments in 
environmental law, without taking into account the important 
developments in the law of standing of this very year in the 
United States Supreme Court.430 
Frank argued that ALI, "as the leader of the profession in 
America," should allow and encourage "any citizen or any 
responsible group of citizens to ... attack problems of pollution 
of air and water. "431 Amidst "a rather confused babble of 
voices, "432 Frank sat down. Other private practitioners 
immediately rose to support Frank's offensive. 433 
Finally, an agitated Prosse~34 responded to the suggestions 
by Bane and Frank, which he said were "obviously made under 
the considerable emotional stimulus [laughter] of the present 
pollution situation. "435 Rebuffing Bane's move to limit the reach 
of public nuisance, Prosser called Bane's proposal "an emotional 
429. Id. at 293-94. 
430. Id. at 294 (Frank was undoubtedly referring to Data Processing and Barlow. 
deCided by the United States Supreme Court on March 3, 1970, two months prior to 
the Annual Meeting). 
431. Id. 
432. Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283. at 1259. 
433. 47 A.L.I. PRoc., supra note 369, at 294-95. Frank F. Jestrab, a private law 
practitioner from Williston, North Dakota, supported Frank's motion wholeheartedly 
and opposed Bane's suggestion. He noted that "[w]e know that the private action is 
used very often to effectuate public policy" (pointing to antitrust laws as an 
illustration) and that "it would be a great mistake to remove this problem from the 
field of private litigation." Id. California practitioner Herbert I. Lazerow also opposed 
Bane's comments and supported Frank's. He commented that administrative 
agencies in the area of pollution control were not "as well supplied and as well 
motivated as some of the more traditional administrative agenCies." pointing to 
examples of insufficient staff and government prosecution from his home town of San 
Diego. [d. at 295. While it is tempting to ascribe a conspiracy to the group of "rebels," 
Frank neither knew the others well nor organized the events. Frank Interview, supra 
note 416. These were private business law practitioners from the far-flung corners of 
the United States. The lack of a common scheme suggests that Frank's timing and 
persistence were remarkable and that the tide and turmoil of national events were 
more powerful than perhaps we can appreciate today. 
434. Frank Interview, supra note 416 (describing Prosser as "mad" that "some kid 
was walking on [the] grass" of "the number one torts guy in America"). 
435. 47 A.L.I. PROC .. supra note 369, at 296. 
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reaction ... [ilt is certainly not a lawyer's reaction to a specific 
problem. "436 As to Frank's suggestion, Prosser's comments drew 
a sharp distinction between the private tort law world he had 
worked in and on for so long and the public law world that was 
emerging as the dominant litigation paradigm. Prosser conceded 
that his statement of the rule was "very narrow," but stated that 
it was limited to cases involving damages - not injunctive relief 
where a statute or "some court-made rule" permits it.437 He 
pointed out that many states have statutes permitting a private 
citizen to bring an abatement action for certain types of 
nuisances, but the Restatement was not at all concerned about 
those statutory remedies. Instead, it was concerned with 
damages actions only, and he offered that "there is absolutely 
nothing in this Restatement to limit or strangle or lock the stable 
door before the horse gets out .... We are concerned only with 
tort liability, which means liability for damages. "438 He stated 
I do not see the point of all this. As I say, I think it is a sort of 
emotional binge. It strikes me that these gentlemen are 
getting velY much disturbed about the pollution Situation, 
and that disturbance I share. I am as much worked up about 
it as anybody. I might even bring an action, if I could fmd one 
to bring. against some of the conditions in the miserable city 
of Berkeley where I live. I am suffiCiently steamed up about it 
to be mad and want to do something. I'm entirely in 
sympathy with them. But I do not think that the way to take 
care of that is to change a section which provides what action 
I can bring for my own damages. 439 
With evident exasperation, he concluded,440 "[cJonsequently 
with humble submission, I don't think any of this is relevant. I 
don't think that any of it is a good idea. In short, I have 
practically nothing to say in favor of it. [Laughter and 
applauseJ."441 
Yet, the debate continued. Prosser's long-time friend and 
adviser Laurence Eldredge felt the Restatement should be more 
flexible. 442 Vanderbilt Law School Dean John W. Wade, who was 
destined to soon replace Prosser as the Reporter, picked up on 
436. Id. 
437. Id. 
438. Id. at 297. 
439. Id. at 297-98. 
440. See Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283, at 1259 ("Those of us who 
knew Bill well could sense that he was definitely upset, but it was not apparent to the 
audience as a whole.") 
441. 47 A.L.1. ?ROC., supra note 369, at 298. 
442. [d. 
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Prosser's caution that Section 821C addressed damages only and 
suggested that the comments to 821 C be modified to indicate 
that it did not address injunctive actions.443 Prosser parleyed, 
suggesting caveats to clarifY that the sections were not intended 
to limit injunctive actions.444 In an attempt to conclude the 
discussion, President Darrell called on Prosser to give the last 
word, but Frank impetuously inteIjected, urging once again a 
complete reconsideration of the public nuisance section and 
requesting a deep reexamination that would "affirmatively 
authorize injunction[s] for public nuisance cases," in order "to 
meet the problem at this moment in history when it is so terribly 
bUrning."445 ALI Director Herbert Wechsler ventured to propose a 
different compromise, siding with Prosser that the new public 
law standing revolution had no role in private law torts but also 
suggesting that courts could consider regulatory prohibitions in 
nuisance cases.446 Rather than quieting the debate, Wechsler's 
comments prompted another run of speakers to rise on both 
sides of the spectrum.447 Prosser spoke again, acknowledging 
that "lilt is unquestionably the general rule that the only people 
who can enjoin a nuisance - a public nuisance - are those who 
have suffered some kind of particular special damage from it. "448 
He did not, however, believe the section should address statutory 
actions afforded to private citizens or the class action procedure. 
He added: "We are not stating procedure here. We are not stating 
class actions, or anything of that sort, and if we attempt to do so, 
that way madness lies."449 He emphasized: "We're not restating 
443. [d. at 298-99. 
444. [d. at 299. He mused that "this situation would have been very much 
improved if those had been inserted to start with, and we could have saved a good 
deal of time." [d. 
445. [d. at 299-300. 
446. [d. at 300. 
447. John G. Buchanan of Pennsylvania complained that the definition in Section 
821B was too broad. [d. at 30 l. Charles D. Breitel of New York agreed with Wade and 
Wechsler's suggestion for caveats lliat "would take care of everything that the 
pending motion legitimately is entitled to treat with.' Id, at 302. He chastised the 
leaders of the rebellion for straying from the philosophical foundation of the 
Restatements and being distracted by pollution issues. [d. C. Dickerman Williams 
from New York supported Frank's motion. Although he assumed that Section 821C 
"correctly stated existing law: he wanted to see discussion of a broader rule. 
particularly given the developments of the class action. He proposed a complete 
rejection of the different-in-kind rule, so that "[fJor a public nuisance liability in tort 
is not limited to those who have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered 
by other members of the public." [d. at 302-03. 
448. [d. at 304. 
449. [d. 
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all of the law, gentlemen; just some of it."45o Prosser further 
cautioned that changing the traditional rule was "not a good 
idea. "451 Despite Prosser's obvious displeasure with the 
intellectual ambush and the radical eleventh-hour proposal, the 
ALI membership nevertheless quickly voted 85 to 51 to 
"recommit" the objectionable sections of the public nuisance 
chapter back to its reluctant veteran Reporter for further 
revisions along the new liberal lines.452 Darrell then asked the 
vanquished Prosser "what have we next?" Prosser replied: "Well, 
frankly, Mr. President, I don't know. We had arrived, I'd hoped, 
at Section 8210 when we were interrupted, [laughter] and that 
was a long time ago. "453 
This dramatic clash over the Restatement's formulation of 
private parties' access to public nuisance marked an intellectual 
watershed in the long history of the special injury rule and 
represented a powerful new intersection of private law torts and 
public law developments. It reflected the broad social, political, 
and legal upheaval playing out across the United States in the 
late 1960s to early 1970s. It also signaled the denouement of 
Prosser's brilliant career. Shortly after the ALI meeting closed on 
that "unhappy day,"454 Prosser resigned from his position as 
Reporter.455 In July 1970, Prosser's friend and colleague John 
450. Id. 
451. leI- at 298. 
452. 47 A.L.I. PROC •• supra note 369. at 305. Similar objections from the floor by 
those "who took the environmentalist point of view' on Prosser's private nuisance 
sections also resulted in some of those provisions being "recommitted for further 
study: Wade, Environmental Protection, supra note 4, at 170. Wade's "(slubsequent 
meditation' on this issue resulted in controversial amendments to Sections 826 
(unreasonableness of the invasion) and 829 (gravity vs. utility: serious harm), id.. at 
170-71, which are still controversial today. 
453. 47 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 369, at 305. In contrast to Sections 821B and 
821C, the later nuisance sections received virtually no discussion, except that 
Prosser quickly lost a dispute over whether Section 822 should require fault for 
private nuisance, leaving him once again to modernize the statement. Wade, Some 
Impressions, supra note 283, at 1259. 
454. Wade, Some Impressions, supra note 283, at 1260-61 (observing that "that 
long day had taken a lot out of Bill. He was utterly exhausted and as he left he 
whispered to one of the committee, 'I've had it.' And we couldn't persuade him to 
change his mind during the summer that followed, no matter how much we tried."). 
See also Frank, Wade, supra note 416, at 593 (noting Prosser "put down the 
reportership in something of a spirit of indignation because of resistance from the 
floor"). Frank recalls: "1 have no doubt that the distress over this matter [was what 
made him] decide to resign, especially over a matter of this kind." Frank Interview, 
supra note 416. 
455. Tentative Draft No. 17, supra note 366 ("Shortly after the last Annual 
Meeting, Dean William L. Prosser resigned as Reporter . . . a position he filled with 
great distinction from the inception of the work in 1954. "). 
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Wade took his place.456 Although Prosser continued to 
collaborate closely with Wade, Prosser's era, and his influence on 
this particular issue, was eclipsed by the times.457 
C. John Wade's Apostasy 
John Wade faced a monumental task when he replaced 
Prosser as the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) oj Torts. 458 
Not only was there significant work to be done on Volumes Four, 
Five, and Six,459 but he needed to fill the enormous intellectual 
void left by Prosser. Wade, however, was well qualified for the 
mission. 460 Considered "the most distinguished American legal 
scholar currently writing in the field of tort law, "461 John Wade 
joined Prosser's Advisory Committee in 1965 and co-authored 
the fifth through ninth editions of Prosser's Casebook.462 
Although Wade had no obvious background or particular 
456. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORfS (Reporter page) (Council Draft No. 32, 1971). 
Wade's close friendship with Prosser is recounted in his tribute Impressions. supra 
note 283. at 1255 (recalling that Prosser fondly called Wade "my partner in 
committing all the Torts. "I. 
457. The entire Restatement (Second) on Torts. however. undoubtedly stands "as 
one of several monuments" to Prosser. Wade. Environmental Protection. supra note 4. 
at 166 n.5. 
458. Wade served as Reporter from 1970 until 1982. Ronald J. RychJak. John 
Wade: Teacher, Lawyer. Scholar. 65 MIss. L.J. 1. 19 (l995). 
459. By the time of his resignation. Prosser had prepared and revised with his 
Advisers (including Wade) preliminary drafts for the remaining two torts volumes. 
Some areas of the remaining volumes. such as defamation and privacy. had also 
undergone "major upheaval: effectively outdating Prosser's drafts and allowing Wade 
to rewrite them completely. Joyce. Keepers. supra note 280. at 863 n.55. 
460. Wade was the "consensus choice" among the advisers. Robert E. Keeton. 
Restating Strict liability and Nuisance. 48 VAND. L. REv. 595. 607 (1995) [hereinafter 
Keeton. Restating Strict Liability] (noting Wade's intellectual and personal attributes. 
including his reputation for persistently seeking "common ground"). See also Victor 
Schwartz. Dean John W. Wade: A Fitting nibute. 48 VAND. L. REv. 583, 584 (1995) ("It 
was natural that after Dean Prosser's health started to fail. Dean Wade was named to 
be Reporter .... "). Frank called Wade "the best reporter ]ALI] ever had." Frank 
Interview. supra note 416. 
461. Parham H. Williams. Jr .• TIle University oj Mississippi School oj Law Memorial 
Lectures. 48 MISS. L.J. 669 (1977). Wade completed his undergraduate and law 
school education at the University of Mississippi. then obtained his LL.M. from 
Harvard Law School. Id. His teaching career began at the University of Mississippi in 
1936. where he taught for ten years. Id. He was "lured" to Vanderbilt in 1947 and 
named Dean in 1952. a position he held for another 20 years. Id. Throughout his 
career. Wade wrote over 75 "significant" law review articles in the fields of torts and 
restitution. Gilbert S. Merritt. Dean John W. Wade. 48 VAND. L. REv. 587. 589 (1995); 
see also nibute. Dean John W. Wade. 48 VAND. L. REv. 571 (1995). 
462. Gary Myers, Dean John Wade and the Law oj Torts. 65 MISS. L.J. 29, 29 
(1995). The Casebook is now incarnated as VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL •• PROSSER. 
WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S TORIS: CASES AND MATERIALS (10'" ed. 2000). 
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professional interest in environmental issues,463 he viewed tort 
law as "the epitome of social engineering, "464 and ultimately 
viewed the restatement process as one that "reflect[ed] modem 
social and economic conditions and current mores and concepts 
of justice," rather than a cataloging of existing law.465 His 
progressive philosophy, interest in social developments, and 
mastery of restating the law66 led him to the point of apostasy 
following his mentor Prosser's long-standing grip on the special 
injury rule. 
In approaching his task of revising the recommitted public 
nuisance section of Chapter 40, Wade took to heart the 
emotional debate during the 1970 Annual Meeting and 
significantly revised the nuisance sections to promote 
environmental applications. First, Wade addressed the criticism 
of Prosser's criminal definition of public nuisance by completely 
rewriting the definition in Section 821 B to omit the reference to 
"criminal interference" and adding a completely new concept of 
"unreasonableness. "467 The new definition was a flexible one that 
incorporated modern notions of balancing and policy: "A public 
463. See Williams, supra note 461, at 670 (describing Wade's background. 
mentioning nothing related to environmental law or environmental issues); see also 
Tribute. supra note 461. at 571-82 (detailing Wade's extensive personal and legal 
background. indicating no interest in environmental law or environmental issues 
other than his 1972 article speCifically on the Restatement revisions to the public 
nuisance section, Wade. Environmental Protection, supra note 4). 
464. John W, Wade. TIle Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 MISS, 
L.J. 671, 671 (1977). Wade. in fact, saw the purpose of tort law as "attaining a just 
result." Wade, Restatement: TIibute, supra note 317, at 64. 
465. John W. Wade. Second Restatement of Torts Completed. 65 A.BA J. 366. 366 
(1979) [hereinafter Wade, Torts Completed]; see also id. at 371 ("TIle American Law 
Institute has worked aSSiduously to bring the restatement of torts up to date and to 
make it accurately deSCriptive of the current state of the law and reflective of 
recognizable trends that foretell impending developments."). 
The approach taken by Wade, and many others involved in the Restatement 
(Second), see, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 
147, 149 (1969), encountered significant criticism. See Keyes, Misleading Quality. 
supra note 351. Keyes called the Restatement Second "deceptive: id. at 25 & n.8. 
even "sin[full: id. at 40, bordering on unethical. id. at 51 n.132. undemocratic, id. at 
53. and misleading in name, id. at 25. He was particularly critical of Wade's 
contributions. Id. at 35-36. 
466. Keeton. Restating Strict LiabUity, supra note 460. at 595. He was a master 
facilitator. skilled at fmding compromise. See Frank. Wade, supra note 416, at 593 
(calling Wade a "pillow Reporter" because he "had the quality of a down pillow; push 
it here and it will give in but come out somewhere else"); id. ("He simply absorbed the 
sometimes turbulent membership. "J. 
467. Tentative Draft No. 17, supra note 366, § 821BO); see Wade, Environmental 
Protection, supra note 4, at 168-69; see id. at n. to institute ("strong objection was 
expressed by some members to the requirement that a public nuisance constitutes a 
crime, on the ground that this was too restricted and inhibited the incipient 
development of the law in the field of environmental protection"). 
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nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to 
the public. "468 
With respect to Section 821C, regarding "Who Can Sue," 
Wade's changes were even more significant, if not outright 
radical-at least with respect to equitable relief.469 To capture 
the fluidity in the developments in environmental litigation and 
to avoid attempting to hold the law "in frozen form, "470 he 
proposed adding a second rule-821C(2)-that would directly 
fuse modern public law developments onto private common law 
nuisance: "In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin or abate a 
public nuisance, one must... have standing to sue as a 
representative of the general public, or as a citizen in a citizen's 
action, or as a member of a class in a class action."471 Wade also 
added new comment "j": 
Standing to sue: The reasons usually given for not permitting 
a damage action to a plaintiff not suffering damages different 
in kind -the prevention of both multiplicity of actions and 
bringing of trivial suits-are far less applicable to suits to 
abate or enjoin a public nuisance. While the traditional rule 
has been that even an action of the latter type cannot be 
brought unless the complainant has suffered damage 
different in kind, there are indications of potential change. 
Statutes allowing citiZens' actions or authorizing an 
individual to represent the public and extensive general 
developments regarding class actions and standing to sue are 
468. Wade, Environmental Protection, supra note 4, at 168; Tentative Draft No. 17, 
supra note 366, § 8218(1) and (2). n. to institute (adding comments that supported 
his proposed defmition based on unreasonableness); Wade, Torts Completed, supra 
note 465, at 368. Wade's revised Section 821B articulated three factors necessary for 
rmding "unreasonable" interference: (a) the circumstances would have constituted a 
common law crime of public nuisance; (h) the conduct is proscribed by statute, 
ordinance or regulation; and (c) the conduct is of a continuing nature or has 
produced a permanent effect that is detrimental and substantial. and the actor 
knows or has reason to know it. Tentative Draft No. 17. supra, § 821B(2). Wade 
acknowledged Prosser's Citation of "ample authority" for his prior drafts on the 
doctrine's criminal roots but then rejected all of it as based on only "casual 
statements" and one case. Id § 821B. at n. after cmt. j. 
469. Uke Frank, Wade favored the triumph of the merger of law and equity over 
"encrusted jurisdictionalism." Frank, Wade, supra note 416, at 594 (referring to 
Wade's development of a modem standard in Chapter 48, injunctions, that "pushes 
this jurisdictional antique as close to its ultimate grave as it will reach"). Frank 
recalls that he and Wade talked about these issues "endlessly ... I had pushed him 
hard and he masked his exasperation." Frank Interview, supra note 416. 
470. Wade, Torts Completed supra note 465, at 371. 
471. Tentative Draft No. 17. supra note 366, § 82IC(2)(c). Wade acknowledged 
later that the terminology he used for Section 821C(2)(c) was "obviously circular 
language," but was intentionally vague because of the fluidity of the developing law. 
Wade, Torts Completed, supra note 465, at 368. 
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all pertinent. Since standing to sue is primarily a procedural 
matter, not fully appropriate for a restatement of the 
substantive law of torts, it has been regarded as outside this 
[sic) scope of this section to set forth the rules for determining 
when there is standing to sue for abatement or an injunction. 
The purpose of this subsection is to point out that there may 
be a distinction between an individual suit for damages and a 
suit in behalf of the public or a class action. 472 
Two months after conveying the new approach to the 
Council, Wade released Tentative Draft No. 17 for the 1971 
Annual Meeting. Wade continued to propose substantial changes 
to 821 C, expanding the section even further to emphasize the 
new approach.473 After stating the traditional rule in 821C(l). he 
broke 821C(2) into three parts, the first two of which simply 
stated existing law. Subsection (2)(a) allowed injunctive relief for 
anyone "qualified to sue for damages, as indicated in subsection 
(1)." Subsection (2) (b) provided that public offiCials or agencies 
may sue to represent the state or political subdivision.474 
Subsection (2)(c) conveyed the new "environmental standing" 
concept: a private plaintiff in a public nuisance case could sue 
even if she did not have "special damages," if she had "standing 
to sue as a representative of the general public, or as a citizen in 
a citizen's action, or as a member of a class in a class action. "475 
As Wade subtly commented in his "Note to Institute": "The 
revision does not contradict the cases but does afford the 
opportunity for development in the area of environmental 
protection."476 He concluded: "The subsection is worded in such a 
way as to leave the courts (and the legislatures) free to proceed 
with developments regarding standing to sue without the 
472. Tentative Draft No. 17. supra note 366. § 821C. at cmt. j. 
473. In the Foreword to the Tentative Draft, ALI Director Wechsler summarized 
the major changes to be presented to the membership. He noted there was "major 
controversy on the floor as to the scope of liability for harm caused by a public 
nuisance, a topiC the original Restatement had conveniently ignored." [d. at vii. First, 
"[t)he proposition that only a crime can be a public nuisance is rejected, in 
accordance with the judgment of the Meeting. The rejection is accompanied by 
cautionary reselVations. necessary to avoid extrapolations of the concept that would 
plainly be excessive." [d. As to the second change, Wechsler commented that because 
"[t)he old law of public nuisance may well have a larger ecological Significance than 
our ancestors perceived ... [the Reporter's) suggested formulations strike a balance 
that the Institute should weigh with greatest care." [d. 
474. ld. § 821C(2)(b). This subsection was non-controversial, but it had not been 
explicitly stated in the prior drafts. The government's abillty to sue is fIrmly rooted in 
the ancient history of public nuisance and nuisance statutes. See supra Part ILA 
475. Tentative Draft No. 17, supra note 366, § 821C(2j(c). 
476. [d. § 821C, at n. to institute. There were, of course, no cases directly on 
point, and the new rule essentially nullifIed the longstanding different-in-kind test. 
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restrictive effect which would be imposed by a categoric 
statement of the traditional rule which is found in a limited 
number of cases."477 Section 821C(2)(c) was "intended to leave 
the question of standing to sue open to procedural developments 
as they take place."478 
By the time of the 1971 Annual Meeting-the third at which 
the public nuisance chapter received extensive discussion-the 
momentum behind the new liberal approach had grown 
conSiderably. Wade opened the late morning session by paying 
tribute to the ailing Prosser, who, he said, was with them "in 
spirit. "479 Wade proceeded to discuss public nuisance, which he 
labeled "an extremely important topic," and "an area in which the 
ecologists, the environmental protectionists, are very much 
concerned and there is a considerable amount of flux and 
development and growth in the law in this area. "480 He noted the 
"considerable amount of disagreement" at the prior Annual 
Meeting and the recommitment of two sections-821B and 
821C-to Prosser for re-presentation. As to 821B, which 
substituted "reasonableness" for the criminal defmition of public 
nuisance, the comments from the floor were effusive.481 Wade 
effectively blocked some members' last minute attempts to 
reinject restrictive concepts into the section,482 and the 821B was 
approved. 
477. Id. § 821C, at cmt. j. Wade's comments were that of a classic crafter of the 
law. Characterizing the case law as "limited" was a bit misleading given his earlier 
statement that Prosser had eight pages of citations in Tentative Draft No. 16 in 
support of the rule. See id., § 821C, at n. after cmt. j. The "new developments" in 
environmental law were, even according to Wade, a collection of federal 
administrative law, not state common law, cases. [d.. Similarly, he generously stated 
that oral number of statutes authOrize suits by a private citizen to abate a nuisance," 
id., but then cited only three states (Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and the newly 
enacted federal Clean Air Act. [d. 
478. Id. § 821C, at n. after cmt. j. 
479. As Wade put it: "1 think that the time will come not too far in the future when 
people will look back on these days and they will make that traditional remark, There 
were giants in those days.' And they will realize that one of the tallest of the giants 
was Bill Prosser." Discussion oj the Restatement oj the Law, Second, Torts, Tentative 
Draft No. 17,48 A.L.1. PROC. 49, 50 (1971). 
480. ld.. 
481. Id.. at 52 (comments of Lyman M. Tondel. Jr. (New York) calling the new 
defmition "far superior"): id, at 62 (comments of Philip K. Verleger (California) stating 
the Reporter "has done an extraordinarily good job"); id.. at 63 (comments of Frank 
complimenting Wade and the Council for a "perfectly splendid resolution of a truly 
difficult problem"); id. (comments of Fred B. Helms (North Carolina) adding an 
"Amen"); id.. (comments of Charles H. Willard (New York) calling it a "superb job"). 
482. For example, Tondel suggested both that a defendant's compliance with a 
statute, ordinance, or regulation should bar a public nuisance claim, and that the 
concept of "legalized nuisance" (Le. where a legislature expressly approves a 
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The discussion of 821C was more raucous. Wade 
acknowledged that Prosser was "the expert" on the special injury 
rule issue but noted the "sharp debate" at the prior year's 
Annual Meeting on "the availability of an action for public 
nuisance as a means of improving and protecting the 
environment."483 Wade explained that Prosser's traditional rule 
continued to make sense if the relief being sought were damages, 
but if the claim was for injunctive relief, the concerns about 
multiplicity of actions were not "as significant. "484 He 
acknowledged that most of the cases in the injunctive relief or 
abatement context still applied the traditional rule, but he 
minimized their significance by adding "most of those cases are 
early cases, cases before the kind of problems which are now 
arising had begun to develop. "485 The justifications for the rule 
had less force, and the development of the private attorney 
general concept in statutes warranted revision. His approach 
admittedly was "ducking, avoiding the issue of when there is 
standing to sue, "486 and he conceded that these issues were "a 
little bit outside my prime area of competency."487 Nonetheless, 
he felt that it was the best the ALI could do given the rapidly 
changing case law.488 Several members gave their immediate 
support to Wade's remarks. Bennett Boskey from Washington, 
D.C. called it "a very happy compromise"489 and quickly moved 
for approval, which Eldridge seconded.490 The motion carried 
unanimously, and the coup was complete.491 
nuisance) be Included. [d. at 53-54. John G. Buchanan (Pennsylvania) suggested that 
the defmition of public nuisance was so broad as to be meaningless, and he wanted 
to restrict it to Interferences with the right to use and enjoy public land. ld. at 55. 
Judge W.W. Braham (Pennsylvania) proposed changing the defmition to limit it to 
"the physical environment. [d. at 60. Except for the "legalized nuisance" concept. 
these suggestions were not adopted. See id. at 61. 
483. ld. at 66. 
484. ld.; see Wade, Environmental Protection, supra note 4, at 169. 
485. 48 A.L.1. PROC .. supra note 479, at 66-67. 
486. ld. at 67; see also id. at 71 ("what we were intending to do was to duck that 
question, not to decide it, to leave it just open according to the procedure of a 
particular state"). 
487. ld. at 70 (regarding the wording of Section 821C(2)(c) and the difference 
between "a citizen In a citizen's action" and "a member of a class in a class action," 
Wade acknowledged "I would be ready to get enlightened advice on this as to the best 
language. "I. 
488. Id. 
489. Id. at 67. 
490. Boskey noted his concern with Illustration 12, the worst case scenario raised 
by Prosser in his Private Action article, see supra notes 340-344 and accompanying 
text, where, according to Prosser, a business would be barred from economic recovery 
against a defendant who blocked access to an isolated town because the injUI)' was 
common, not different-in-kind. 48 A.L.1. PROc., supra note. 479 at 68. Wade agreed 
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When Prosser had announced his resignation shortly after 
the 1970 Annual Meeting, Prosser's colleagues noticed his 
weariness. Eldredge described a later vacation with Prosser to 
Yosemite National Park. Although Prosser's conversation "had 
never been better" and "his sense of humor was priceless," he 
seemed to tire quickly and appeared exhausted, "curl[ing] up on 
the back seat" during the long ride back to San Francisco. 492 
Soon thereafter, Prosser was admitted to the hospital. He died on 
May 21, 1972, almost a year to the day after the consummation 
of the rebellion. 
D. Scholarly Euphoria, the Redirection of the Handbook, and the 
Failed Revolution 
Shortly after he had succeeded in incorporating the new 
"ferment"493 in public law standing principles into the 
Restatement (Second) on Torts' public nuisance section, Wade 
could hardly contain his enthusiasm for the new approach and 
how it responded to the felt need of the times.494 Although the 
traditional private law tort remedy "established to take care of an 
injury imposed by a single defendant on a single plaintiff' was 
not easily adapted to public injuries, public nuisance was "very 
amorphous and therefore malleable," and "would appear to 
prOvide more opportunity for aid in the legal effort to protect the 
environment than all of the other tort actions combined. "495 He 
that the illustration was troubling. that he did not know what case Prosser -had in 
mind." and said he would reconsider it. Id. The illustration was dropped in the fmal 
version. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7. § 821C. at 99. 
491. 48 A.L.1. £>Roc .. supra note 479. at 71. At the 1972 Annual Meeting. Wade 
reported on revisions to other sections of Chapter 40. but Section 821 was not 
mentioned. having been well settled. Wade mopped up the revisions in Tentative 
Draft No. 18. see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 18, 1972), and 
Reporter's Proposed Official Draft. (making only stylistic and editorial changes). see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Reporter's Proposed Official Draft 1977). Volume 4 
of the Restatement (Second) on Torts was fmally "adopted and promulgated" by the 
American Law Institute on May 19. 1977 and published two years later in 1979. 14 
years after Volumes 1 and 2. two years after Volume 3. and 24 years after Prosser 
started working on the project. 
492. Eldredge. Prosser. supra note 280. at 1250. 
493. Wade. Environmental Protection. supra note 4. at 169. 
494. Id.. at 166 ("quite as obviously this common law remedy (public nuisance) 
prOvided the greatest opportunity for attaining results which the ardent 
environmentalists desired. "J. 
495. Id.. at 166. 173-74. Wade reviewed six other related common law doctrines 
(trespass. negligence. abnormally dangerous conduct. products liability. riparian 
rights. and -intended consequences") for their potential application to pollution 
problems. concluding that they "really have very little to add to the availability and 
effectiveness of the relief offered by the two actions for nuisance." Id.. Wade's 
850 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:755 
hoped that the new Section 821C(2)(c) ''will provide meaningful 
guidance as to the current state of the law but will not constitute 
a strait-jacket inhibiting judicial growth and development to 
meet the mounting problems of protecting the environment in 
accordance with changing mores and concepts of what justice 
requires. "496 With an optimism that history would prove 
unfounded, he concluded: "It is to be hoped that lawyers and 
judges and scholars will make substantial use of [the revised 
treatment of nuisancel."497 
The earliest commentators on Wade's revisions were public 
interest environmental law practitioners John E. Bryson and 
Angus Macbeth,49B who gushed that the Restatement change 
"breathes fresh vitality into the concept of tortious public 
nuisance." The final definition as accepted by the ALI "provides 
the tort considerable space in which to develop and adapt to the 
needs of the time."499 Praising Wade's "substantial step toward 
liberalization, "500 they applauded the linking of public nuisance 
and general standing law: "This is a persuasive position-no 
sound reason exists for treating public nuisance standing as 
distinct from standing elsewhere in the law. "501 The authors were 
as optimistic as Wade that, now that the ALI "hal d) put its 
authority behind bringing the law of public nuisance, at least as 
to injunctive actions, into harmony with the general body of 
procedural law," courts would soon follow. 502 Scattered 
commentary in public nuisance articles over the next several 
years also lauded the proposed liberalization of the special injury 
comments about the future utility of the common law reflected a noteable increase in 
scholarship touting the private law remedies of private and public nuisance for 
addressing pollution issues. See id. at 174 n.35 (citing ten law review articles 
between 1970 and 1972 focusing specifically on common law nuisance as an 
"environmental tool"). 
496. Id. at 169-70. 
497. Id. at 170. 
498. Bryson and Macbeth published Public Nuisance. the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and Environmental Law. in 2 ECOWGY L.Q. 241 (1972). They had served as 
staff attorneys for the Natural Resources Defense Council, litigating some important 
early federal standing cases. 
499. Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 5, at 249. 
500. ld. at 255. 
501. Id. at 256. 
502. Id.: see also id. at 263 ("The prospect for citizen public nuisance actions is, 
then, that standing will increasingly be determined according to the general 
principles of standing applicable elsewhere in the law. This desirable result has been 
given a substantial boost by the Restatement. j. 
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rule and, despite the lack of cases, continued to purport to 
detect a liberal trend in the decisions. 503 
In the 1980s, the Restatement modification received a hearty 
endorsement from leading environmental scholar Professor 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., of the University of Washington Law 
School. In his 1986 treatise Environmental Law: Air and Water, 
Rodgers called it the "proper and effiCient solution" because the 
purpose of the special injury rule was "indistinguishable from 
the functions of the law of standing," which had already been 
modernized. 504 He characterized the "different injury" test as "an 
historical procedural appendage," no longer justified in an era 
when the private attorney general concept was well accepted. 505 
Despite the lack of cases directly on point, Rodgers also 
expressed his belief that courts were beginning to move toward 
unification of the special injury rule and federal standing 
doctrine. 506 Citing Akau, he optimistically suggested that the 
"'different' injury super-standing requirement as a prerequisite to 
private enforcement of a public nuisance continues in full 
retreat, both by explicit rejection and by findings that the test is 
503. E.g .• Lawlor. supra note 5. at 669 ("It can be expected that the proposed 
revisions of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, addressing itself to public nuisance law. 
and in particular to the application of public nuisance law to environmental 
concerns, will have a liberalizing effect on public nuisance law. In fact. a certain 
liberalization of public nuisance law may be detected in the cases discussed herein. "I; 
Note. Public Nuisance. supra note 8, at 366 n.65 ("1be authors of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS 19 (Tent. Draft No. 17. 1971). have also recognized that where the 
relief requested is an injunction or abatement. the special injury rule is far less 
applicable and there are indications of possible change."). But cf. Abrams and 
Washington. supra note 4. at 379 (mentioning Section 821C(2)(c), but without 
comment); Wyche. supra note 40. 346 n.72 ("Under the Restatement. any citizen. as a 
representative of the general public. has a right to maintain an action to enjoin a 
public nuisance [citing Section 82IC(2)(cll: but noting that the South Carolina 
courts had not addressed the issue); FLEMING. supra note 8. at 381 (citing Section 
821C(2) and Bryson & Macbeth. supra note 5. noting in other countries "an 
undoubted modem tendency to reject the elUSive distinction between difference in 
kind and degree"); Note. Public Watchdog. supra note 4. at 1751 (commenting. 
optimistically. that. because of the Restatement change. the "standing problem in 
equitable actions against polluters is easily overcome by plaintiffs"). 
504. RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. at 37-38. Rodgers' handbook-style 
treatise Environmental Law (2d ed. 1994) also strongly emphasizes the role of 
nuisance as the historical and principal "backbone" of modem environmental law. id. 
at 112-13. but. unlike AIR & WATER. provides no discussion of the special injury rule 
issue. 
505. RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8. at 37. 
506. Rodgers optimistically suggested the liberal standing developments were 
influencing the ·'different' injury test." but the cases he cited. id. at n.26, neither 
explicitly rejected the traditional rule nor adopted the new Restatement test. Indeed. 
the cases Rodgers noted as ·unfortunate holdovers," id .. are actually more illustrative 
than exceptional, 
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satisfied by allegations of injury hardly distinguishable from the 
hurts suffered by everybody else. "507 Similarly, Widener 
University Law Professor David R. Rodas observed in 1989 that 
the Restatement modification "did breathe new life into private 
actions for public nuisance." and suggested that "liln the past 
decade courts have begun to accept this invitation" to make "a 
fundamental change in the law of public nuisance. "508 Even by 
1989. however. the only supportive case Rodas cited was 
Akau. 509 Rodas suggested that, even though courts were not 
expressly liberalizing the rule, they were bending the doctrine in 
a liberal direction. 51o Like Rodgers, Rodas concluded that 
"[plublic nuisance doctrine is in the midst of an important 
transformation."511 and he urged elimination of the special injury 
rule "outright."512 
In the past decade, optimism has periodically re-surfaced. 513 
but most scholars seem resigned to the fact that the traditional 
doctrine is thoroughly entrenched. Even Rodgers noted with 
obvious chagrin in his 1998 revisions to Air and Water that the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon Valdez "has kept alive the 
507. Id. at 39-40 n.6 (citing Akau). Rodgers also cited Rothstein. supra note 8. 
which was published after the favorable Save Sand Key intermediate court decision 
but before reversal by the Florida Supreme Court. see supra Part LB (discussing Save 
Sand Key]. Rodgers' optimism, in turn, inspired others. See Ronald J. Rychlak, 
Common-Law Remediesfor Environmental Wrongs: 11Je Role of Private Nuisance. 56 
MISS. L.J. 657. 659 n.12 (1989) (noting the different-in-kind rule but citing Rodgers 
for conclusion that it is not strictly enforced and that the modern trend is away from 
the rule). 
508. Hodas. supra note 5. at 885-86. 
509. Id. at 902 (discussing Akau as "an important step" and suggesting. without 
additional citation. that "courts seem increasingly prepared to impose only minimal 
standing requirements on plaintiffs seeking equitable relief"l. 
510. Id. at 89l. Hodas states that "courts have permitted at least some plaintiffs 
to proceed in almost every environmental public nuisance case. even when the court 
supposedly was applying the special injury rule.· but that none of the cases cited 
mention the Restatement modification. Id. nn. 83-98 and accompanying text. 
51l. Id. at 907. 
512. rd. at 888 ("private plaintiffs must not be barred at the courthouse door by 
an outdated special injury rule if public nuisance claims are to fill statutory gaps and 
help establish standards of reasonable conduct"). Hodas provided a compelling 
discussion of a series of cases in the 1980s that suggested. in his view. a "growing 
minority of courts now require that a plaintiff show only an injury-in-fact to gain 
standing," and he concluded that the issue then was how courts will "defm[e] the 
outer limits of liability with prOximate cause analysis." fd. Most of these cases. 
however. involve federal maritime common law and the commercial fishers' exception, 
and are thus not typical nuisance cases. see supra note 104. This may explain why 
none mention the Restatement debate or modification. 
513. See. e.g .. Comment. Exxon Valdez. supra note 8. at 709 ("These changes in 
the Restatement create the potential to transform the public nuisance doctrine into 
an important tool for environmental protection. "I. 
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outmoded 'special injury' requirement, "514 No new cases have 
adopted the Restatement proposal, and the old rule, he said, has 
"shown vitality in recent decisions. "515 In short, although the 
environmental law commentary was thoroughly favorable,516 even 
sympathetic observers faced a near-impossible task finding any 
movement in the case law to support their hopeful claims. 
In contrast to environmental commentators' glowing 
treatment of the Restatement, the general torts literature scarcely 
mentioned the rule's modification , 517 Worse yet, the post-Prosser 
Fifth Edition of the Handbook, edited by W. Page Keeton of the 
University of Texas518 and his distinguished team of revisers not 
only grossly distorts the issue but, in a surprising divergence 
from the Restatement approach, calls for the elimination of public 
nuisance as a tool to address environmental problems. 519 Keeton 
514. RODGERS, AIR & WATER, supra note 8, at Preface (Supp. 1998). 
515. Id.. at Preface, page 8. One of Rodgers' explanations for the entrenchment is 
the secondary role that nuisance plays in modem environmental litigation. See infra 
PartV.D. 
516. Indeed, several commentators criticized the proposal for not going far 
enough, suggesting that the rule should also be eliminated for damages suits. Bryson 
& Macbeth, supra note 5, at 260 (criticizing Wade's proposal for being limited to 
~unctive actions): Comment, Exxon Valdez, supra note 8, at 712 ("the justification 
for maintaining the distinction between suits in equity and those for damages is 
particularly enigmatic."); Hodas, supra note 5, at 889 (calling distinction between 
Restatement approach to equity and damages cases "inconsisten[tl" and 
"anachronistic" in light of federal environmental litigation developments). 
517. One of the few torts treatises to mention the rule change is John Fleming's 
Torts, a comparative tort law treatise focused on the common law of England, 
Australia, Canada, and other commonwealth countries. See FLEMING, supra note 9, at 
381 n.19. 
518. Because Prosser died before designating a successor editor for the Handbook, 
his publisher West was faced with selecting an editor without his input. West chose 
Professor W. Page Keeton, of the University of Texas, and his brother Professor Robert 
Keeton, of Harvard University, co-authors of West's leading torts casebook, to lead a 
team of revisers, Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 853. 
519. Id.. at 864 & n.64 (nuisance was one of Keeton's three major revisions to the 
Prosser Handbook). Keeton initially made several stylistic changes to Prosser's fourth 
edition that deliberately undermine the recognition of public nuisance as a viable 
private cause of action. The chapter now emphasizes private nuisance before public 
nuisance, just the opposite of Prosser's prioritization. Compare PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
(4th ed. 1971), supra note 300, at Chapter 15, with PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
157, at Chapter 15. I suspect that Keeton changed the title for the public nuisance 
section to reinforce the conservative notion, which he apparently shared with Chief 
Justice Baldwin in the 1535 case, that the cause of action belongs not to private 
individuals but only to "the state." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 157, § 90, at 643 
("Public Nuisance: Remedies Available to the State") (emphasis added). Keeton also 
misleadingly changed the title of the private nuisance section to "Private Nuisance: 
The Tort Action for Damages." Compare PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1971), supra 
note 300, § 87, at 619, with PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 157, § 89, at 640 
(emphasis added). Keeton then excised Prosser's early references in the remedies 
section to the private right of action for public nuisance. Id.. at 641. These changes 
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retitled the public nuisance section vaguely, calling it 'The Tort 
Action -General Case Approach, "520 and he added an extensive 
new footnote that directly rejected (and simultaneously ignores, 
if that is possible521) the Restatement rule modification. Keeton 
dismissed the "great debate" as "agitation for abolition of the 
rule,"522 noting the lack of case support.523 Keeton then added an 
entirely new subsection, called 'The Tort Action-A 
Recommended Approach"524 that takes a position 180 degrees 
different from the Restatement and suggests an extremely 
conservative525 construction of the private action-public nuisance 
rules that, if followed. would ultimately disembowel the cause of 
action.526 Without citing any supporting cases or commentary 
conveyed a substantive disagreement. See Joyce. Keepers, supra note 280, at 873 
n.115 (discussing Keeton's changes in the public nuisance section headings as 
contrasting with the rest of the edition. where "the revisers have been at pains to 
preserve at least the structure of the presentation that Prosser employed in earlier 
editions"). 
520. PROSSER AND KEETON. supra note 157. at 646. 
521. Keeton's lack of references to the Restatement (Second) is surprising given its 
importance to courts. his other "frequent references" to it elsewhere. Joyce, Keepers. 
supra note 280. at 867. and the fact that both Keetons were Advisers to the 
Restatement (Second). REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS, supra note 7, at v. 
522. PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 157, at 646-47 n.4l (emphasis added). Unlike 
in other areas of the Handbook, in this area, Keeton obviously does not place 
"correspondingly greater stress on contemporary developments," Joyce, Keepers, 
supra note 280, at 867. 
523. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 157, at 646-47 n.41 (neglecting to cite Akau). 
524. [d. at 651. 
525. By "conservative," I mean appearing to favor greater restrictions on citi2en 
access to the courts for public nuisance claims. See also Joyce, Keepers, supra note 
287, at 870-71 (noting the conservatism of the Keeton edition revisers). The Keetons' 
torts casebook provides some insight into their conservative views on the special 
injury rule. See PAGE KEETON & ROBERT KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF 
TORTS (1971). It neglects to cite the proposed RESTATEMENT modification in either of 
the two areas where it places nuisance cases (Chapter 3, "Interference with Property" 
and Chapter 12 "Strict Liability and Other Theories"), even though it tracks 
Restatement proposals in other areas. In the Preface, the Keetons express "doubts 
about [tort law's) relative usefulness Ito address environmental problems) in 
comparison with administrative and political remedies." [d. at xviii. G. Edward White 
suggests that the Keetons were a product of the traditional doctrinal approach 
fostered by Harvard Law School. See WHITE, supra note 240, at 154. 
526. Keeton attempted to support the "new approach" of disabling public nuisance 
by using fallacious illustrations from four supposed "classifications· of public 
nuisance cases. First, he suggested that claims that a public nuisance created by a 
purpresture upon public property (perhaps the most ancient of public nuisance 
examples) were, in essence, an action for trespass or negligence, not public nuisance. 
By defmition, however, a trespass claim would not have been appropriate for any 
obstruction on public roads because the only appropriate plaintiff in trespass is the 
owner /possessor of the affected land. See supra Part II.A. Second, he suggested that 
all pollution cases ultimately involve "the use and enjoyment of private property," 
therefore, air, soil and noise pollution "must affect the plaintiff in a substantial way 
and for that reason constitute a private nuisance." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
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and without reconciling his new position with Prosser's, Keeton 
suggested "a better description of the results of cases would 
show that a private individual cannot complain of public 
nuisance either by way of maintaining a tort action for damages 
or by way of obtaining an abatement of the so-called nuisance 
unless the conduct has resulted in the commission oj an 
independent tort to the plaintiff."527 If this were the case, of 
course, there would be no need or rationale for the public 
nuisance action, other than to graft an injunctive remedy onto a 
private tort action. Keeton's chapter on nuisance, in particular, 
"presents perhaps the most conspicuous example of strong 
disagreement" between Prosser and the revisers. 528 
These stylistic and substantive changes to the public 
nuisance chapter of Keeton's 5th Edition cloak this section of 
"Prosser on Torts," which is still the primary tort law reference 
tool for judges and practitioners, with a new, radically 
conservative tone and approach. State courts that continue to 
rely on "Prosser" as a key authority are provided no clues about 
the true doctrinal contours of the special injury rule. 529 Without 
digging into the history or literature, courts undoubtedly 
attribute Keeton's views to the revered Prosser. Thus, ironically, 
Prosser's influence on the issue today now undermines decades 
of his own work on the issue and, most importantly, puts 
intellectual blinders on inquiring courts. Keeton's revisions do 
157, at 651 (emphasis added), Again, Keeton misunderstands public nuisance 
doctrine and ignores the broad spectrum of cases where pollution affects more than 
just private land -indeed, the very point of the "ancient" public nuisance doctrine 
was to protect the commons, leaving its sibling private nuisance to cover injuries to 
private landowners (see supra Part II.A). Keeton's third and fourth examples of 
supposed misuse of public nuisance (unlicensed medical practitioners and moral vice 
cases), id. at 652, are also conveniently characterized strawmen drawn from the rag-
tag margins of basic nuisance law. 
527. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 157, at 650 (emphasis added). 
528. Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 873. Joyce described Keeton's treatment 
of public nuisance "odd" because of the way that Keeton left in the Prosser text 
without explaining the new departures. in contrast to the style of revision elsewhere 
in the text. Id. at 874. 
529. The new weighty West torts treatise authored by University of Arizona 
Professor Dan B. Dobbs, DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS (2000), intended to fill the 
void left by the decades since Prosser's death and the now-dated Keeton edition, does 
not repeat the mistakes of Keeton, but it unfortunately indicates no particular 
interest in the special injury rule debate and states the traditional doctrine without 
indicating the Restatemenfs differing position. the controversy in the literature. or 
Keeton's mistreatment. See id. § 467, at 1335 (private action requires "harm [that] 
differs in kind from the harm caused to other members of the public generally"); id. at 
1337 ("if the defendant's pollution causes respiratory problems for everyone in town, 
the plaintiffs respiratory harm does not differ in kind from that suffered by others 
and she cannot recover on public nuisance theory") (citing Exxon Valdez). 
856 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:755 
not, as Prosser might have condoned, "bury[) the dead, discreetly 
but fmally, and showcas[el the living."530 Rather, Keeton appears 
to have buried the living and sh9wcased an alien.531 Given his 
devotion to the issue and the seriousness with which he viewed 
the scholarly debate over the special injury rule, Prosser would 
not be pleased. 
Ultimately, a survey of case law since the Restatement 
rebellion thirty years ago confinns that only one court-the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court in Akau-has ever expressly adopted the 
proposed change to the special injury rule/different-in-kind test 
for public nuisance cases.532 Although many courts have bent or 
confused the rule,533 and some jurisdictions have created an 
important exception for commercial fishing,534 the Restatement 
has not been rejected but, worse yet, simply ignored by courts. 535 
530. Joyce, Keepers, supra note 280, at 875. 
531. See id. at 871 (stating that, particularly on the issue of public nuisance, "the 
Fifth Edition seems to be much less of a vehicle for reform than were its 
predecessors.") . 
532. Comment, Public as Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 517: see also id. at 518 
("Hawaii consciously joined the movement toward expanded standing for public 
nuisance recommended by the Restatement . ... "): Abrams & Washington, supra 
note 4, at 389 n.171 (calling Akau a novel, unusual, hybrid case). 
533. See Hodas, supra note 5, at 891. 
534. See supra note 102 (discussing the commercial fishers' exception). 
535. The cases applying the traditional different-in-kind rule in the past three 
decades are numerous. See, e.g., Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 350 (1971) (applying different-in-kind rule to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for public 
nuisance against air emissions from fiberglass plant): Clabaugh v. Harris, 273 N.E. 
2d 923 (Ohio 1971) (applying different-in-kind and different-in-degree rules and still 
rmding residents of a farm community seeking to enjoin highway construction project 
during late night and early morning due to noise and vibration had no public 
nuisance claim): Frady v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 637 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Or. App. 
1981) (affirnJing dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint because injuries they sustained 
were not different from those suffered by others in the vicinity of an electricity 
generating turbine): Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 315-16 
(3d Cir. 1985), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (rejecting a property owner's public 
nuisance claim for ground water contamination from a chemical plant because 
plaintiffs economic loss was not different from that suffered by other members of the 
public): cJ. Westwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. V. Nat. Fuel Gas Oist. Corp, 737 F. Supp. 
1272, 1281 (W.O.N.Y. 1990), aJfd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding, under the 
different-in-kind rule, and in light of the growing public need for avenues to address 
environmental contamination by hazardous substances, the public nuisance claim of 
a landowner that incurred response costs cleaning up a contaminated site): Graham 
Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716 (W.O. Pa. 1994) (allowing a landlord to sue its 
tenant to recover damages from property contamination from a gas station, finding 
that pecuniary loss not common to the entire community was different-in-kind, and 
that the public right interfered with was the right to soil and water free of 
contamination); Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1056 
(O.N.J. 1993) (holding that a landowner with a contaminated water supply had 
alleged special injury different-in-kind from that suffered by the public in general and 
therefore could sufficiently allege a public nuisance claim): New York State Nat'l Org. 
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The next Part examines possible explanations for this failure to 
bridge the gap between the Restatement and the case law-
between scholarship and jurisprudence. 536 
V 
lHAT WAY MADNESS LIES" 537; ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MODERNIZING THE 
SPECIAL INJURY RULE 
Given the underwhelming success thus far of the 
Restatement's attempt to modernize the traditional special injury 
doctrine. perhaps Prosser was right in his parting caution to the 
rebels at the 1970 ALI annual meeting-"that way madness 
lies. "538 The strict different-ill-kind test has. indeed. been 
amazingly persistent. despite its doctrinal infirmities and the 
chorus of critics. 
This Part examines why the Restatement rebellion failed and 
the lessons we can draw from the experience when evaluating 
alternative formulations of the rule. In doing so. this Part seeks 
to discover if public nuisance can be modernized. or if it will 
forever be entangled in anachronistic "ancient" restrictions like 
the different-in-kind test. This Part sets a new stage for the 
discussion of alternative approaches by reflecting on the lessons 
learned from this Article's earlier examinations of the traditional 
doctrine. 
To "tame the dragon. "539 this Part compares three alternative 
approaches to modernizing the "standing" doctrine for public 
nuisance: 1) the earliest departure from the traditional rule-the 
more liberal and truly ancient different-ill-degree test: 2) the 
for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting a public 
nuisance claim in a case where a coalition of women's organizations and abortion 
providers sought an injunction against anti-abortion protesters because the court 
was "unclear at this time what special damages the plaintiffs asserted" to support a 
claim different from the rest of the public): Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 622 
N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Ohio App. 1993) (holding that a landowner who sued a county for 
strong odors from a sewage treatment plant could maintain private and public 
nuisance claims because interference with enjoyment and physical illness related to 
odors was suffiCiently distinct and peculiar harm under the special injury rule); 
Chemical Weapons Working Group v. U.S. Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 1220 (D. Utah 
1996) (nuisance claim alternatively dismissed on the basis of the different-in-kind 
rule). For a summary of the most recent (post-1997) special injury rule cases, see 
supra note 153 (listing cases), confinning courts' continuing conservative approach to 
the doctrine. 
536. Comment, Exxon Valdez, supra note 8, at 701 ("Although many scholars 
question the continued application of the special injury rule in today's legal arena, it 
has not been abandoned."). 
537. 47 A.L.1. PROC., supra note 369, at 304 (remarks of Prosser). 
538. [d. 
539. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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proposed abandonment of the rule-the Restatement 
modification and "Restatement Plus" (that is, eliminating the rule 
for damages cases as well as injunctive relief cases); and 3) a 
new approach to the rule -an "actual community injury" rule, a 
modem reformulation of Smith's actual (pecuniary) damages 
interpretation with a Significant new focus on common injury to 
community rather than unique injury to individuals. This Part 
then considers the theoretical, jurisprudential, and practical 
implications of the proposals and evaluates the actual 
community injury rule in terms of the tripartite rationale for the 
traditional rule. 
In viewing these alternatives, this Article maintains an 
overarching focus on two important purposes of public nuisance. 
First, the essential function of common law public nuisance is to 
protect public values, such as public health, safety, peace, 
comfort, or convenience.540 It is neither meant to be, nor likely 
ever to function properly as, a substitute for purely individual 
injury claims. 541 Second, law should protect these public values 
from unreasonable and significant interference, primarily from 
localized risk-creating activities by private landowners or 
businesses. Public nuisance should not replace the legislative 
function. Federal, state, and local statutory protections for broad 
social or environmental ills are an indispensable complement to 
common law remedies,542 but public nuisance will always be 
needed to fill interstitial gaps ,543 particularly for "localized" 
540. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 821B I"a right common to 
the general public"}. 
541. Public nuisance cases that seek damages as well as injunctive relief pose 
some doctrinal difficulties. If the baSis of the lawsuit is to vindicate public values, 
then it may seem anomalous that the plaintiff receives individual damages, e.g., for a 
loss to recreational fishing resources. On the other hand, the plaintiff has been 
injured, and even though most injuries in tort law cannot be "fixed" in the direct 
sense by money, monetary damages are tort law's vehicle for compensation. In public 
nuisance cases, courts could address this problem by keeping the focus on the loss 
to the greater public, looking first toward injunctive relief rather than monetary 
damages, and also by considering whether damages paid can be held partially in 
trust to address the windfall problem rather than paid to the individual plaintiffs. If 
the plaintiff proves a personal injury as part of the damage to public values or 
widespread personal injury, then the normal tort rules for compensation should be 
applied to allow appropriate individual compensation on such claims. 
542. See Grad & Rockett, ErtuironmenLal Utigation, supra note 8, at 744 (noting 
doctrinal and practical limitations of a case-by-case approach for non-localized 
problems). 
543. See supra note 5; Comment, Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 1135 
(statutes "lack the strength or flexibility to adequately deal with small-scale pollution 
concentrated near the source"). 
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neighborhood problems544 and for significant aspects of regional 
disasters like the Exxon Valdez Spill.545 
For the affected community, the availability of a public 
nuisance remedy may be as important as the modem statutory 
safety net. Public nuisance may not be as broad or effective as 
statutory remedies, but it can be more targeted, flexible, and 
controllable, and can offer direct compensation. Moreover, as 
political winds shift and threaten well-used statutory 
remedies,546 the national environmental bar should take a 
renewed interest in common law remedies like public nuisance, 
which should remain available to private plaintiffs regardless of 
the shifts in the enforcement priorities of political agenCies. 
A. Three Alternative Approaches Toward Solving the Paradox 
1. The Dusty Different-in-Degree Test 
The now-forgotten twin of the traditional different-in-kind 
test was the different-in-degree test. As Fleming explained, 
The more liberal approach is to allow recovery so long as the 
plaintiffs injury and inconvenience was appreciably more 
substantial. more direct, and prOximate without necessarily 
differing in nature. This would include all personal injury and 
actual pecuniary loss, even from mere delay and 
inconvenience, prOvided it was 'particular' to him, i.e., 
exceeded in degree what was suffered by others. 547 
The work of tort critics Smith, Prosser, and Fleming, and 
this Article's own analysis suggest that this test derives from a 
fair interpretation of the English and some American 
544. See supra note 4: see also RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. § 2.1, at 33 
(public nuisance has "contIibuted conSistently to the just resolution of neighborhood 
environmental conflict"). 
545. See supra Part LB. 1. 
546. See generally Sevinsky, supra note 4. at 30 (noting weakened federal 
enforcement after the "new federalism" of the 1980s): Richard J. Lazarus, Essay: 
Fairness in Environmental Law. 27 ENVrL. L. 705 (1997) (describing President 
Reagan's campaign against "excessive environmental regulation.· and stating that 
after he was elected and Republicans gained control of the Senate, "environmentalists 
had substantial reason to anticipate a significant rollback"): WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 310-11 (3d ed. 1995) (describing emergence of 
Wise Use movement in mid-1980s, successor to the Sagebrush Rebellion in early 
1980s): Warren L. Ratliff. The De·Evolution oj Environmental Organization. 17 J. LAND 
REsOURCES & ENVrL. L. 45 (1997) (noting trend toward states' rights in environmental 
law). 
547. FLEMING. supra note 8. at 381 (emphasis added). 
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(particularly federal) cases.548 and thus has considerably deeper 
historical roots than most modem courts and commentators 
acknowledge. 
There are three important distinctions between the 
difference-in-kind test and the difference-in-degree test. First. 
the difference-in-degree test is arguably more faithful to the 
original language of the 1535 case and many of the subsequent 
old English cases.549 Second. the different-in-degree test 
describes how many courts have actually decided public 
nuisance cases. given the difficulty of applying the in-kind 
test.550 Third. the different-in-degree test opens the gate more 
widely to public nuisance plaintiffs by lowering. but not 
eliminating. the threshold barrier.551 Although it presents less of 
a conundrum. the difference-in-degree test. however. suffers the 
same infirmity of accepting the paradoxical premise that a 
private plaintiff's injuries should be distinct from those of the 
community. even if only by degree. Therefore. although the 
degree test seems historically valid and doctrinally sound. it also 
emphasizes individual injuries over community values. 
2. The Restatement Proposal: Federal Iryury-in-Fact Standing 
The more modem approach. as proposed by the 
Restatement. is to abandon the traditional rule and substitute 
modern federal standing law. Section 821C(2)(c) would grant 
private plaintiffs "standing to sue as a representative of the 
general public. as a citizen in a citizen's action or as a member of 
a class in a class action."552 Wade and the Restatement Second's 
rebels intended to bring public nuisance law in line with 
developments in federal standing law and to eliminate the special 
injury rule. replacing it with the then-emerging federal injury-in-
fact test. 553 
The Restatement rule. however. is limited only to injunctive 
relief cases. To recover damages. the plaintiff must still meet the 
548. See, e.g., supra note 252 (discussing Piscataqua) and supra note 337. 
549. See supra Part II.A & B (discussing the 1535 case and English cases). 
550. See supra Part III.A (discussing Smith's criticism of judicial application of the 
traditional doctrine). 
551. See id. (noting Smith·s observations that just claims were being barred and 
that inherent limitations of nuisance doctrine would prevent an undue flood of 
litigation). 
552. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS, supra note 7, § 821C(2)(c). 
553. See supra Part lV.B (discussing the Restatement (Second),s Rebellion). 
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strict different-in-kind test. 554 Plaintiffs making injunctive claims 
would continue to face the double challenge of financing the 
lawsuit with no prospect of compensation. The Restatement's 
bold approach thus only partially opens the gate, and only those 
plaintiffs who are very highly motivated to obtain an injunction 
and who can somehow afford to litigate pro bono publico will 
pursue the claim. For the many public nuisance cases that 
involve damages, Section 821C(2)(cj maintains the traditional 
rule and paradox. 
Some commentators have argued that the Restatement 
should have gone farther and eliminated the rule for damages 
cases as well, a "Restatement Plus" approach that, in effect, 
would eliminate the special injury rule entirely.555 Although this 
accomplishes the goal of eliminating the perceived injustice of 
the rule, it leaves courts without doctrinal gUidance suffiCient to 
bridge the jurisdicational and jurisprudential gap between 
federal standing law and state private damages case law. As 
discussed further below, simply importing federal public law 
developments into private common law torts, while expedient, 
leads to numerous challenges. 556 
3. A New Approach: An "Actual Community Iryury" Test 
Thirty years of experience with the Restatement's 
unsuccessful approach provide a foundation for exploring a new 
doctrinal formulation more aligned with the original nature and 
purpose of public nuisance as a community-based remedy. This 
proposal may also face barriers, which this Article explores, but 
an "actual community injury" standard would provide a more 
satisfactory doctrinal approach, would directly resolve the 
paradox of the traditional doctrine, and would allow state courts 
facing these issues in public nuisance cases the comfort of 
grounding their departure from the traditional doctrine in the 
familiar territory of state administrative law. 
554. Compare REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7. § 82lC(1) with § 
821C(2). 
555. See supra note 516; see also Rothstein, supra note 8, at 475-79 (arguing for 
complete abolition of the special injury rule); RODGERS. supra note 8. § 2.2. at 106 
(noting that in light of the Restatement's realignment of Section 82lC with modern 
standing law for injunctive relief actions. "one wonders why the [damages] limitation 
remains in Section 82lC(l): and concluding that "raIny person injured in fact should 
be able to sue for equitable relief or money damages"). 
556. See infra notes 609-620 and accompanying text. 
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This "actual community injury" formulation is a modernized 
version of Smith·s "actual damages" test,557 with two important 
distinctions. First. it would not limit recognized damages to 
pecuniary loss but would include modern injuries recognized in 
each respective state's administrative and environmental law. 
such as environmental and aesthetic harm. Second. it would 
focus on harm to the community instead of to the individual. 
The actual community injury test solves the special injury 
rule paradox by re-orienting the doctrine to recognize explicitly 
that public nuisance is a public action-"an action brought by a 
private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the 
enforcement of public obligations. "558 If public nuisance is truly 
about protecting communities from threats to shared values of 
health. safety. and welfare. then those who seek to vindicate 
those values in the courts should share rather than stand apart 
from those values. Thus. the plaintiff must demonstrate both 
that she suffered the harm and that the injury is common and 
not unique or solely individual.559 Essentially, by turning the 
traditional special injury doctrine on its head. courts can ensure 
a truer alignment with the fundamental purpose of public 
nuisance actions. 560 This should be the case regardless of 
whether the plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief. 
Yet, this new rule would have its own natural doctrinal 
boundaries. An actual community injury standard would 
substitute for Section 821 C and read: 
To recover damages or obtain injunctive relief in a private 
action for a public nuisance. the plaintiff must have suffered 
an actual or threatened injury in common with the 
community that was the subject of the nuisance. "Injury" 
means SUbstantial interference with community values. is not 
limited to pecuniary loss, may include environmental and 
557. See supra Part III.A (discussing Smith·s criticism of the traditional doctrine 
and his actual damages test). 
558. Jaffe. Private Actions, supra note 380, at 302. 
559. This proposal echoes those state public nuisance statutes that allow "any 
person" to step into the state's shoes and pursue such an action without showing 
special injury. See supra note 43. Few states, however, have such statutes, and those 
that do often limit the scope of such suits to social vices only. State-by-state 
statutory reform to broaden access Is desirable but outside the common law focus of 
this Article. 
560. In arguing for expanded public actions, Jaffe pOints out that in most early 
English mandamus cases, "there is little or no positive precedent requiring" special 
injury, Jaffe, Public Actions, supra note 380, at 1308, and that "many of the states do 
not insist even in constitutional adjudication that the plaintiff have an interest 
distinct from his citizen interest." Id.. at 1309. 
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aesthetic injury, and may be defmed according to the 
administrative law principles of the jurisdiction.561 
863 
On the one hand, the actual community injury rule is much 
less restrictive than the twin traditional rules. It would not 
require the plaintiff to show that her injuries are either different-
in-kind or even different-in-degree. They need not be different at 
all; rather they must be common injury, not unique, peculiar, 
special, or particular. But, there must be actual, not theoretical 
or speculative. injury personally suffered by the plaintiff. This 
would eliminate plaintiffs with no real injury and curious 
interlopers from outside the community. 
Instead of looking to federal injury-in-fact law as the 
Restatement suggests, judges could look to state law to define 
injury, such as health problems or economic loss, and to state 
administrative law, which recognizes modern injuries such as 
aesthetic. conservational. and cultural losses. Defendants could 
challenge the representativeness of plaintiffs injury, but 
otherwise courts would treat nuisance more like other tort cases, 
where the determination of harm is inherent in the jury's view of 
the merits. Plaintiffs could argue common injury without 
jeopardizing their public nuisance case. their ability to sue as an 
organization. or their right to bring a class action. 
On the other hand. the rule maintains important existing 
doctrinal boundaries on public nuisance. such as substantiality 
of interference, and adds a significant new one by requiring that 
the type of injury be to community. not individual, values. The 
trier-of-fact would determine what constitutes the "community" 
by looking at custom, history, contemporary social context, state 
statutes or local ordinances, and other evidence presented by the 
parties. For example, a homeowner plaintiff who complained of a 
small farm's hog sty in a rural agricultural area and brought a 
public nuisance case seeking broad damages or injunctive relief 
would be unlikely to show that the community values included 
air free of hog odor. A private nuisance case, however, based on 
561. Prevailing plaintiffs could recover attorneys fees and costs under the 
"common fund" or "private attorney general" theory. Note. Public Watchdog, supra 
note 4. at 1735-65 (proposing that courts Jump start" public nuisance cases by 
awarding attorneys fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs based on courts' inherent 
equitable power to invoke "common fund" and "private attorney general" exceptions to 
the traditional American rule requiring each side to bear its own costs and fees); 
Interview with Victor M. Sher, supra note 4 (noting the common fund exception in 
class actions as a viable theory for development); Robert L. Rabin. Lawyers for Social 
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law. 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 259-60 (1976) 
(discussing rejection of these theories in federal courts but noting that the "common 
benefit" exception is still a viable theory in state court). 
864 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:755 
interference with the plaintiffs right to use and enjoy his 
property, would remain a viable cause of action. The actual 
community injury rule would also eliminate from the realm of 
public nuisance those cases that are simply disguised personal 
injury negligence cases, where the plaintiff is seeking vindication 
of purely personal and not community values. The pedestrian 
injured by a falling awning could not show the broader 
community injury but would be left to the more appropriate 
negligence action. 
Thus, the public nuisance plaintiff would more truly 
represent the public and protect public values, replacing 
privately motivated litigants seeking strategiC advantage by 
cloaking private nuisance or personal injury cases in public 
nuisance claims. Concomitantly, the actual community injury 
rule would not make public nuisance totally accessible to 
environmental groups nor would it substitute for statutory 
redress. The emphasis on protecting local community values and 
the jurisdictional limitations of state courts would discourage 
cases (e.g., national air pollution cases) that reach beyond a 
court's concept of "community" and are the likely subject of state 
or federal statutory regulation as well as legislative attention. 
Absent such attention, a plaintiff may convince the court to 
broaden its view of "community" and intervene. 
B. Theoretical Reflections on the Traditional Doctrine and Its 
Alternatives: Legal Realism, Public Law, and New Public Law 
Theory 
The fundamental differences between the traditional doctrine 
and the three alternative fonnulations discussed above reflect a 
deeper theoretical tension among competing visions of the role of 
law in SOCiety. The debates over legal formalism versus realism, 
private versus public law, and new public law (legal process 
versus republicanism) all provide some insight into why state 
courts, even if aware of alternative fonnulations, might be 
reluctant to adopt a more liberal approach to judicial access. 
1. Formalism and Legal Science Versus Realism: Understanding 
the Historical Entrenchment oj the 7raditional Doctrine 
The different-in-kind test and the judiciary's finn adherence 
to it flow from a "fonnalist"562 or "scientific" view of law that 
562. Fonnalism, as described by Harvard Law Professor Joseph Singer, includes 
"mechnical jurtsprudence" and the principles of legal science, Le. "a logical, objective, 
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dominated the American legal landscape563, when the traditional 
doctrine became entrenched.564 Formalism suggested that judges 
should use "objective standards" that are "composed of rigidly 
defined concepts to generate specific legal conclusions by a 
lOgical, objective, and scientific process of deduction. "565 The 
traditional special injury doctrine naturally appealed to judges 
disposed toward formalism: it purported to provide a restrictive 
bright line test for determining who could bring a public 
nuisance claim566; it helped to limit the judicial role in cases that 
presented unusual demands on courts to intervene in 
community conflict567; and it provided judges a method for 
limiting the tort of nuisance, which was incongruous with the 
growing dominance of negligence law.568 Although courts often 
struggled with application of the doctrine because of the 
difficulty of drawing the different-in-kind line, on the surface the 
doctrine resonated with formalists because it provided an 
objective, seemingly clear, and purportedly historically justified 
way to weed out extraneous and "improper" plaintiffs. 569 
and scientific process of deduction." Joseph W. Singer, Review Essay: Legal Realism 
Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465.496-97 (1988). The "classical era" merged the view that the 
market-based private sphere was separate from the governmental sphere and the 
view that the "judicial method was. .. scientific. apolitical. principled. objective. 
logical. and rational." Id. at 499. 
563. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century "scientific" movement 
assumed law was "capable of orderly classification and analysis through the use of 
proper metholodological techniques." WHITE. supra note 240. at 21. "The conception 
of law as science substantially affected both the doctrinal state of tort law and the 
analytical techniques employed in the discussion of tort cases between 1880 and 
1910." Id. at 55. Tort law became dominated by the rule-based doctrinal approach .. 
ld. at 38-39 (discussing the transformation of tort law into a distinct field of study 
with the goal of "doctrinal conSistency. clarity. and predictability"). 
564. See supra Part III (discussing the American entrenchment of the traditional 
rule in the late 1800s and early 1900s). 
565. Singer. supra note 562. at 497-98. 
566. The different-in-kind rule allowed judges to be more mechanical by avoiding 
judgments of variation in degree. See supra notes 306-308 and accompanying text. 
567. See WHITE. supra note 240. at 61 ("The principle thrust of late nineteenth-
century tort doctrines was to restrict, rather than expand. the compensatory function 
of the law of torts."); id. at 58 (noting the dominance of the judge's role in the 
scientific view, compared to the "subversive" role of the jury); id. (discussing Justice 
Holmes' fears of the "corrosive effect" of juries on judicial doctrine). 
568. ld. at 61 (noting that the negligence principle that dominated "scientific" tort 
law had "virtually" swallowed nuisance law by 1910). 
569. lei at 32 (discussing how the scientific case method emphasized that 
"analysis of an historical 'line' of cases could give fuller meaning to an extracted 
principle," in contrast to recognizing the historical context or "felt necessities" of the 
times). The goal of providing a uni1}ring classification scheme to tort law led some 
torts scholars. including even Jeremiah Smith. to propose that torts allowing liability 
Without fault be eliminated entirely from the tort field. ld. at 38. 
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Given early English commentary's entrenched conseIVative 
interpretation of the case law and many American states' firm 
adoption of the doctrine in the late 1800s to early 1900s, the 
direction for a judicial formalist was well mapped out: follow the 
ample authority that reiterated the traditional rule. Moreover, for 
the formalist, the very idea of a private person acting as a private 
attorney general was contrary to the common law system.570 The 
formalist view was laissez jaire-leave private parties to their 
own devices.571 The "government was not fundamentally 
implicated in the processes and outcomes of private life. Instead, 
society was governed by individual free decisions and voluntary 
collaborative efforts. "572 
In contrast, all three alternative formulations of the rule 
derive strength from the "realise perspective. Legal realism-
popular from the early 1900s to the 1940s573 and still highly 
influential through its modern successors such as critical legal 
theory574- a ttempted to unmask formalism. It suggested that 
''judges should make law based on a thorough understanding of 
contemporary social reality" and "fit the law to social practice 
and to satisfy the felt needs of society to achieve a 'satisfying 
working result.'"575 Rules should not be applied "regardless of 
their social consequences" but rather with an eye toward the 
purposes of the law, social goals, and practical effects. 576 
The different-in-degree test represents a departure from the 
formalist/scientific mode of the traditional doctrine and is more 
realist in approach. It offers greater judicial flexibility, recognizes 
the artificiality of bright line tests, and considers the historical 
and policy context of the early case law. The impassioned plea of 
the rebels at the 1970 ALI meeting, Wade's approach in the 
570. During the "classical period" from 1860-1940. legal theorists saw a sharp 
distinction between the private market-based sphere. within which the autonomous 
individual operated. and the public goveITlmental sphere of goveITlffient regulation. 
Singer. supra note 562. at 478. "The ultimate result of this reorganization and 
reconceptualization of private law was to portray the market as largely self-regulating 
and outside governmental control." Id. at 48l. 
57l. Id. 
572. Id. 
573. WHITE. supra note 240. at 63-64. 
574. Singer. supra note 562. at 503 (arguing that current schools of thought. such 
as critical legal theory. are "both a reaction to. and a current version of. legal 
realism"). 
575. Id. at 501 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN. THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 60 (1960)). 
576. Id. Realists argue that judges should. and do. "balance pragmatically 
competing interests in light of competing poliCies. prinCiples. and values." by 
identifYing alternative legal solutions to problems. by understanding the 
consequences of their decisions. by understanding the conflicts among values ill each 
case. and by promoting social values. Id. at 502. 
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Section 821C revision, the call by environmental commentators 
for liberalization, and the proposed actual community injury rule 
even more explicitly and strongly share the realist vision of law. 
They deliberately depart from the traditional doctrine for the 
purpose of making public nuisance a more viable modem 
remedy to address current social needs. Although the very 
nature of the common law is to evolve,577 formalist jurists are 
loathe to deviate from what they perceive to be well-established 
doctrine. On the other hand, courts with a more realist or 
activist approach-like the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Akau-
are eager to change with the times. The history of American legal 
theory. therefore. begins to deepen our understanding of why the 
traditional special injury doctrine is so firmly entrenched in tort 
law. The strict doctrine is a reflection of the larger formalist-
scientific view that dominated American law at least until the 
mid-J900s, when the advent of realism set the stage for a 
transformation away from the rigidity of the early common law. 
At the same time, the arrival of "public law" offered another 
challenge to the traditional private law model. Exploring its 
application to nuisance law helps to explain the unique nature of 
the special injury doctrine. 
2. Private Versus Public Law: Another Perspective on the 
Traditional Doctrine 
"Public law" theory, pioneered by Professor Abram Chayes. 
describes another important conceptual difference between the 
two divergent jurisprudential approaches to the traditional 
doctrine, and aids our understanding of why doctrinal 
modification of the special injury "gate" is inherently difficult. To 
set up his public law theory. Chayes fust describes the 
traditional private law model, where private law has five primary 
features. 578 First. the private lawsuit is "bi-polar." i.e. it is 
"organized as a contest between two individuals or at least two 
unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be deCided on a 
577. See OLNER WENDELL HOLMES. JR .• 1l-IE COMMON LAw 1 (Dover ed. 1991) ("'The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. "); but see WHITE. supra note 
240. at 32 (suggesting that even Holmes' view of history was to buttress 
"contemporary philosophical arguments rather than as a device by which to 
understand the 'felt necessities' of earlier generations"); BENJAMIN CARDOZO. 1l-IE 
GROWfH OF THE LAw 19-20 (1924) ("Overemphasis of certainty may carry us to the 
worship of an intolerable rigidity .... But hereafter. as before. the changing 
combination of events will beat upon the walls of ancient categories .... The law ... 
must have a prinCiple of growth. "). 
578. Chayes. supra note 1. at 1282-83. 
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winner-takes-all basis."579 Second, the lawsuit is retrospective.580 
The case involves "completed events. whether they occurred. and 
if so, with what consequences for the legal relation of the 
parties."581 Third, this kind of civil adjudication involves 
interdependency, which means that the relief is linked directly to 
the substantive violation. such as paying money damages in a 
tort action.582 Fourth, Chayes states that the lawsuit is "a self-
contained episode. "583 The judgment is typically confmed to the 
parties. involving a transfer of money or specific performance 
that ends court involvement. Finally. a key feature of the private 
lawsuit is party initiation and control, meaning that the parties 
initiate and control the legal 'and factual issues, with the judge 
playing "neutral arbiter."584 This traditional private law model 
reflects the late nineteenth century vision of society based on 
notions of the autonomous individual and the role of courts as 
passive "adjuncts" that protected private activities and 
"stringently limited" governmental powers.585 Chayes' model 
parallels the nineteenth century's formalist-scientific view of the 
court system and traditional special injury doctrine.586 
At first blush, the general field of common law torts fits well 
within the traditional private-law litigation world described by 
Chayes. The garden variety tort case-for example, a personal 
injury case arising from a car accident where driver Joe injures 
pedestrian Sara-can be seen as a hi-polar contest between 
diametrically opposed parties (Joe and Sara); a retrospective look 
at the parties' past conduct (Joe's driving and Sara's walking) 
and plaintiffs past injury (Sara's broken leg); a situation where 
the relief and the violation are interdependent (Sara's specific 
and general compensatory damages); a self-contained judicial 
task ending once the judgment is entered; and a case where 






584. Id. Chayes acknowledged that this traditional model was "no doubt 
overdrawn" but was also "thoroughly taken for granted" and "central to our 
understanding and our analysis of the legal system." Id. at 1283. 
585. Id. at 1285-88-
586. See id. at 1286-88 (describing the traditional private law model in formalist 
and SCientific terms). 
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judicial control. Indeed, taking this Simplistic view,587 torts may 
be the "paradigm[atic] private law field. "588 
In contrast, Chayes' public law model focuses on the 
distinctive aspects of federal statutory and constitutional 
litigation used to settle public rights disputes. 589 The primary 
features of the public law model. which operates primarily in the 
federal court system, include: (1) lawsuits arising from 
constitutional or statutory policies, instead of private rights; (2) 
often "sprawling and amorphous" parties, such as non-profit 
organizations or class actions, that may change during the 
litigation; (3) a judge actively dominating the case, often using 
587. Realist scholars severely criticize this simplistic characterization of tort law. 
Singer, supra note 562, at 480-81; see also Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in 
Disguise (parts 1 & 2). 38 TEx L. REv. I (1959). 38 TEx L. REv. 257 (1960). Even 
classic tort law could be seen as a form of public law because it inherently expressed 
social decisions. e.g .. about which injuries the courts should redress and how. See 
Singer. supra. at 486-87. If brought today. Joe and Sara's case is likely to be 
complicated by multiple parties, statutory issues. and punitive damages. will 
consider factors beyond the case itself, and may involve the judiciary in post-
judgment appeals and enforcement actions. Modern products liability. class actions. 
and mass torts particularly resemble public law litigation. See David Rosenberg. The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System. 
97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984). 
588. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey. In the Shadow of the Legislature: The 
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law. 89 MICH. L. REv. 875.889 (1991). 
589. For other definitions, see. e.g., L. Harold Levinson. The Public Law/Private 
Law Distinction in the Courts. 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1579. 1580 (1989) ("any 
litigation to which a government or a governmental official is a party"); Carl Tobias. 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 74 CORNELL L. REv. 
270. 270 n.1 (1989) (defining public law litigations as "lawsuits which seek to 
vindicate Important social values that affect numerous individuals and entities"). 
Public law litigation arose in response to federal legislation in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s that intruded on the private sphere of individuals and corporations. 
Chayes, supra note 1. at 1288-89 & nn. 35-36. Simultaneous changes in federal 
procedure. such as liberalized joinder. pleading. and intervention, complemented 
these substantive law changes and set the stage for the new model of litigation to 
dominate the federal landscape. Id.. at 1289-91. Public law forcefully erupted on the 
American legal landscape in 1970s, ushering in a "new model of civil litigation." 
Chayes, supra note I, at 1282. This model was firmly incorporated into American law 
by the panoply of congressional statutes passed in the 1960s-1970s that included 
specific citizen suit provisions and allowed for the award of attorneys fees and costs 
to the prevailing plaintiff. The old private law model was criticized as "anachronistic" 
in a "postindustrial, multicultural democratic SOCiety." Chayes recognized the realist 
influence on his public law model. Id.. at 1304. See also Eric K. Yamamoto. 
E.fficiency·s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities. 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 341, 398 n.268 (1990) (discussing Chayes' public law model). The post-1970s 
environmental litigation movement is a classic illustration of this model. RODGERS. 
AIR & WATER, supra note 8, at Preface. p. v ("Environmental law makes a mockery of 
the traditional model of dispute where A sues B for a sum certain. . .. Environmental 
law arises in a world of many parties, where issues are linked together in mysterious 
ways. and each 'deflnitive' resolution is but the prelude to future bargaining. 
compromise, and defection. "I. 
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outside experts, masters, and personnel; (4) a "predictive and 
legislative" inquiry, instead of a retrospective one; and (5) relief 
that is typically injunctive and prospective, with "widespread 
effects on persons not before the court and requir[ingl the judge's 
continuing involvement in administration and 
implementation. "590 
A public nuisance case is, virtually by defInition, a hybrid of 
the typical Joe-Sara tort case and the typical environmental 
case. Let's suppose that, since his youth, Conrad has been a 
frequent and avid user of Blue Bay for his own enjoyment and 
recreation, as well as for tourism, recreational fishing, and 
commercial fishing businesses, but suppose also that he does 
not own land near the bay. Acme Corporation, an industrial 
manufacturing facility, has been discharging process wastewater 
into Blue Bay for years, in compliance with federal, state, and 
local laws. Mter beginning a new product line, Acme begins 
discharging new pollutants not regulated by its permits, causing 
Blue Bay near the facility to turn brown, smelly, and foul, 
resulting in fish kills. 591 As a result, Conrad can no longer use 
Blue Bay; he has lost personal and aesthetic enjoyment, 
recreational opportunities, food for personal consumption, and 
profits from his businesses. If Conrad's complaints to 
government regulators prove futile, Conrad can try to obtain free 
services from a public interest firm, which may turn him down 
because there are no easy permit enforcement issues, there is no 
prospect for fee recovery, and because it has higher priority 
cases in its large caseload. Conrad may resort to a local private 
attorney, who might deCide to file a public nuisance lawsuit 
against Acme only after determining that the damages recovered 
might cover fees and costs, leaving a reasonable amount for the 
client. 
Conrad's case is a hybrid of both the theoretical private and 
public law models. On the one hand, Conrad's public nuisance 
case has many attributes of classic private law tort litigation. The 
dispute is bipolar between Conrad and Acme; the suit requires 
application of the state's common law of public nuisance, not 
federal statutory or constitutional law; the focus is retrospective 
on Acme's and Conrad's past conduct; and Conrad is likely to 
seek money damages to cover his lost profits and uses and to 
590. Chayes. supra note 1. at 1284 (describing all but the fourth characteristic); 
see also id. at 1302 (listing all eight characteristics of the public law model). 
591. See. e.g .• Stoddard v. WesteITl Carolina Regional Sewer AuthOrity. 784 F.2d 
1200 (4th CiT. 1986) (fmding no NPDES pennit violations because the discharge was 
not specifically prohibited). 
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pay his attorney fees and costs, rather than seek prospective 
relief. 
On the other hand, Conrad's case has many important 
public law features and is unlikely to be as straightforward as 
described. A public-spirited and upset Conrad is likely to ask 
also for injunctive relief against Acme, invoking the court's 
inherent equitable authority to force Acme to change its 
operations, to monitor, and to clean up Blue Bay. He may seek 
damages for the community's resources, even though that would 
be difficult for a single plaintiff because of the special injury 
rule. 592 Moreover, unlike Joe and Sara's car accident case, the 
interdependency of the relief and the substantive violation are 
closer and more fluid in the public nuisance context. Conrad 
wants both monetary and injunctive relief, but unlike a jury's 
calculation of money damages, a court's view of the appropriate 
injunctive remedy will be largely a matter of judicial discretion. 593 
The court will be concerned about the interplay of existing 
government regulation and the need for future judicial 
enforcement, even though Conrad's public nuisance suit will 
never likely approach the high level of judicial intervention 
involved in complex federal public law cases, such as 
desegregation or hazardous waste clean up. Moreover, Conrad is 
likely to ask Similarly affected community members Tate, Chase, 
and Kylie to join as plaintiffs to increase his leverage and spread 
the costs of litigation; his attorney may sue several defendants, 
including Acme's parent company594; and plaintiffs may pursue a 
class action to address the widespread community injury. Thus, 
even the "typical" nuisance case may have fundamental features 
quite apart from, and indeed contradictory to, the classic private 
law model of a typical tort lawsuit. 
Conrad's public nuisance case lies, therefore, at the 
intersection of the private law universe of torts and the public 
law universe of statutory and constitutional law. It shares 
important characteristics of both worlds: it is polycentric, which 
592. See supra Part LB. 
593. While common to the public law world. injunctions. whether affirmative 
orders to fmce positive behavior or negative ones to stop violations. are alien to the 
traditional tort case. Indeed. a common requirement of injunctive relief is that no 
adequate remedy at law (e.g .• money damages) be available to the plaintiffs. Except 
for public and private nuisance. no common law tort generally allows for injunctive 
relief. 
594. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 7. §§ 834-840A (persons 
liable for nuisance); Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4 (noting new 
developments in nuisance law that allow greater extenSion of suits to parent 
companies). 
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produces significant doctrinal tension; it involves public rights, 
not just private ones; and it may involve prospective equitable 
relief that affects the broader community. The special injury rule 
and different-in-kind test developed as a judicial "gatekeeper" to 
control the cases that flow through this intersection, similar to 
the standing rules in federal administrative law cases. 
Concerned with the tripartite rationale of sovereignty, 
multiplicity, and triViality, the English courts struggled for three 
hundred years to deVise a rule that would control the nature and 
number of plaintiffs who could make use of what is essentially 
the sovereign's police power. The traditional doctrine reinforces 
the private, bi-polar, and retrospective nature of private torts, by 
allowing those claimants who most closely resemble the private 
law model greatest access to the courts. 
The different-in-degree test alters this balance, but not 
radically. It retains language and doctrine from the ancient 
English cases but still acts as a gatekeeper that favors the 
private law modeL In contrast, the Restatement rebels contended 
that the litigation tools such as standing and class actions that 
evolved from polycentric and prospective cases at the federal 
level should be the new gatekeepers. The Restatement proposal 
sought to realign the gate consistent with these new public law 
concepts and move public nuisance closer to the public law 
world of enVironmental litigation. The actual community injury 
rule would similarly move public nuisance closer to the public 
law model, but on a parallel, not merging, track-it would be 
based on state common law principles of actual damages and 
administrative law standing, but, unlike the Restatement 
proposal, it would not incorporate wholesale federal public law 
standing developments. 
3. New Public Law Theory: The Questfor Reform in Light of Public 
Choice and New Republicanism 
In addition to Chayes' original public law theory described 
above, new public law theo~95 also proVides some insight into 
the prospects for reform of the special injury rule. New public 
law scholarship includes two distinct political camps in legal 
595. See Symposiwn: The New Public Law. 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991). As 
explained above. see supra Part V.B.2, a primary contribution of original public law 
theory was the distinction it drew between the public law world dominated by 
constitutional and statutory issues and the private law world characterized by 
common law litigation. New public law theory arose from scholarly criticism that 
Chayes' model was too Simplistic. See Symposium, supra. 
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academe: those from the more conservative public choice or legal 
process school and those from the progressive "new 
republicanism" or "community values" school. 596 The traditional 
special injury rule is consistent with public choice theory, the 
different-in-degree rule straddles these two camps, and the 
Restatement rule and the actual community injury rule are 
consistent with new republicanism. 
Public choice theory is "positivist, "597 focusing on an 
economically based world of individuals and groups pursuing 
their own self interest, as well as special interest group 
domination of politics, "provid[ingl an axiomatic pedigree to 
Blackstonian formalism. "598 Under the public choice view, the 
special injury rule would be necessary to maintain the 
separation of private law litigation from the essential legislative 
function of government. 
From this perspective, redress of public nuisances is, as 
expressed in Chief Justice Baldwin's 1535 opinion,s99 best left to 
the sovereign. Public choice theorists would suggest that the 
federal standing model or the actual community injury rule 
improperly distorts the judicial role. By opening the door to such 
cases, courts would face questions of broad social, 
environmental, and political significance best left to the 
legislative and executive branches of government.600 In direct 
596. See. e.g .• Farber & Frickey. supra note 588. at 877-80. See also William N. 
Eskridge. Jr. & Gary Peller. The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a 
Postmodem Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707. 743 (1991) ("New Public Law was 
the response of those in the baby boom generation" seeking to "seize the middle 
ground between Chicago School law and economics. which struck many as 
normatively impoverished and apologetic. and [Critical Legal Studies], which struck 
many as insuffiCiently affirmative in its agenda."). 
597. Farber & Frickey. supra note 588. at 879 (noting that public choice theory 
"applies the economist's methods to the political scientist's subject"). 
598. leI. at 884 n.40 (explaining that public choice "shares much with 
Blackstonian common law formalism"). As discussed in Section 1 above. the formalist 
view espoused rigid adherence to doctrines scientifically extracted from the case law. 
See also supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (discussing Blackstone's 
influence on the development of the traditional dOCtrine). 
599. See supra Part II.A. 
600. To legal process theorists like Henry Hart. Albert Sacks. and Lon Fuller. 
"legal rules can be justified if they are created through a legitimate set of procedures 
by legitimate institutions keeping within their proper roles." Singer. supra note 562. 
at 505-06. Echoing formalism and the private law model, Fuller further argued that 
"courts should refrain from deciding substantive legal questions that involve 
'polycentric' tasks. These tasks include resolving disputes that encompass many 
parties or require policy decisions that have complex ramifications.... Such 
decisions cannot reasonably be reduced to the kind of binary choices that are 
capable of argument and just resolution by adjudication.» leI. at 506. The executive 
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contrast to the arguments of reformists, the Restatement rebels, 
Wade, and environmentalists, a public choice theorist would 
argue that "[w)hat is 'desirable' or 'advisable' or 'ought to be' is a 
question of policy. . . and its determination by the judiciary is 
an exercise of legislative power when [such choices) involve[) 
political considerations.''601 Public choice theory would limit the 
role of courts in public nuisance cases to the traditional private 
law function of deciding bipolar disputes and would look askance 
at any liberalization of the traditional doctrine that would blur 
the dividing line between the legislature and the judiciary.602 
In contrast, the new republican strand of new public law 
theory is "explicitly normative, "603 and "derives from a 
communitarian strain in modem political thought" that is "based 
on the allure of civic virtue" and is a "superior sphere in which 
citizens rise above their merely private concerns to join in a 
public dialogue to defme the common good."604 New 
Republicanism605 "lends a historical, traditional aura to New Deal 
reformism. "606 It describes well modem commentators' view that 
public nuisance lawsuits provide a powerful and appropriate tool 
and its agencies, and not courts, are the legitimate institutions to address questions 
that require "continuing discretion" to choose between alternatives. Id 
601. Id at 507 (quoting Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 248 (1982) (Callow, J., 
dissenting) (quoting In re City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d. 637, 644 (1968)); see also Richard 
A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 49, 100-02 (1979) (suggesting that an agency remedy is more suitable for 
widespread public wrongs, such as air pollution). 
602. See Yamamoto. supra note 589, at 356. The public choice view's strong 
sentiment against a broadeT judiCial function is typified by Justice Scalia's view in his 
dissent in the recent Laidlaw standing case, arguing that turning the sovereign police 
power over to private citizens undermines the separation of powers necessary for 
democratic government. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 
167, 198 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (tracking this legal process view, attacking the 
very notion of citizen suits in the context of the federal Clean Water Act). 
603. Farber & Frickey, supra note 588, at 879. 
604. Id. at 877-79. 
605. The term "New Republicanism" surlaced in the 1980s and is "unfortunately 
misleading," having "no particular connection to the Republican party." Farber & 
Frickey, supra note 588, at 877. In contrast to the political philosophy of liberalism, 
which focuses on individual human rights, neo-republicanism would use the 
machinery of government to "make the Citizenry mOTe virtuous by modifying existing 
individual preferences to further the common good.' Id at 879. The role of the courts, 
according to the latter approach, is to promote public values. Id For more discussion 
of New Republicanism, see Symposiwn, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988). See also Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the 
National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVfL. L. 53, 
56-59 (1996); Jonathan Poisner. Environmental Values and Judicial Review After 
Ltgan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
335,382-83 (1991). 
606. Farber & Frickey, supra note 588. at 884 n.40. 
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for private individuals to invoke to redress injuries to community 
values. Particularly where there are gaps in statutory remedies 
or lack of agency will, new republicans would say that public 
nuisance is a critical tool for achieving democracy and justice.607 
This view would support modernizing the doctrine to protect 
communities from the externalities imposed by certain private 
property uses and would support expanding access to damages 
and injunctive relief by community members who can 
demonstrate actual shared injury.6os 
These three theoretical tools-legal realism, public law, and 
new public law theory-provide some valuable new insight into 
the conceptual tensions inherent in the traditional special injury 
doctrine as well as the alternative formulations. These 
fundamentally conflicting views of the role of law may be 
irreconcilable, but recognizing their different perspectives can 
clarify the debate and pave the way for a more sophisticated 
dialogue about modernizing public nuisance. 
C. Jurisprudential RejlectiDns: Considering State Courts' 
Perspectives 
State courts are quite enamored with the traditional special 
injury doctrine and exhibit virtually no interest in exploring 
alternatives.609 This judicial entrenchment probably perSists for 
several reasons, ranging from the compulsion to follow strong 
precedent, to judicial economy, jurisdictionalism, and a generally 
conservative approach to the balancing of private property rights 
and public values. To succeed, alternative formulations must be 
sensitive to these jurisprudential constraints. 
The primary reason courts continue to adhere to the 
traditional doctrine seems to be the self-fulfilling prophecy of 
stare decisis, particularly where, as with this issue, the case law 
is perceived to have been virtually unanimous in its strict 
607. See Louis L. Jaffe. The Citizen as Utigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Holifeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033. 1045 (1968) [hereinafter 
Jaffe. Citizen as Litigant) (noting "democracy in our tradition emphasizes citizen 
participation as much as it does majority rule. Citizen participation is not simply a 
vehicle for minority protection. but a creative element in government and 
lawmaking. "I. 
608. See Farber & Frickey. supra note 588. at 905-06 (discussing the New 
Republican view that the "institutional insulation of judges and the deliberative 
qualities stressed by republicanism-judicial advantages usually considered only in 
the public law setting-will sometimes empower the common law judge as well to 
promote legal change in the pursuit of public values"). 
609. See supra notes 532-535 and accompanying text (summarizing modern case 
law). 
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approach for almost four centuries. State courts have at their 
disposal decades of public nuisance cases from their own 
jurisdictions that adopt the traditional doctrine.6lo which hardly 
leave room for innovation. The unusual court that has any 
inclination to look beyond the cases would most likely turn to 
Prosser's Handbook for guidance. There. it will find not only the 
traditional doctrine enshrined but no mention of the modified 
Restatement rule.611 Indeed. the current Keeton edition argues 
against the legitimacy of public nuisance as a tort altogether.612 
For this reason. of the three alternative fonnulations. the 
different-in-degree test could be the most attractive to the courts 
if the courts could be convinced that the early legal history of 
public nuisance supports a different-in-degree approach as well 
as, if not better than. it supports the different-in-kind test. 613 
Although a court may be reluctant to reinterpret supposedly 
"ancient" case law. preferring instead to rely on a well-
established majority rule enshrined in modern American case 
law. if a court's blind faith in the "ancient" nature of the 
traditional doctrine can be shaken. then it may be persuaded to 
delve further into the debate over the traditional doctrine and 
approach the issue with a fresh perspective and a modern lens. 
Similar to the conservative pull of stare decisis, the tendency 
of courts to favor the law of their own jurisdiction may also play 
an important role in the success of the traditional doctrine and 
the failure of the Restatement modification. By referring judges to 
"standing" law, Section 821C(2)(c) asks state court judges to look 
to federal standing case law and follow authority outside of their 
state's own common law. Particularly in a localized tort case. this 
may be an unappealing exercise for a state court judge likely to 
be concerned about state sovereignty and federalism. In 
unfamiliar territory that involves conflicts between community 
values and private property, judicial psychology may predispose 
judges to follow what is supposedly ancient. familiar. and 
traditional. Although impossible to prove. this factor may have 
played a role in the failure of the Restatement approach. The 
actual community injury rule proposal seeks to overcome this 
psychological stumbling block by encouraging state courts in 
public nuisance cases to look not at federal but at their own 
610. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 821C (Supp. 1998) 
(citing cases from fourteen states applying traditional doctrine). 
611. See supra Part N.D (discussing the redirection of the Handbook by its editors 
after Prosser's death). 
612. fd. 
613. See supra Part II. 
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state law in more familiar administrative and environmental 
cases. If state courts can be guided by their own state's standing 
case law, they might be more inclined to bring public nuisance 
up to the state's public law standards. 
Another factor that may explain the conservative approach of 
state courts to the traditional doctrine is that they may believe 
that strict application of the traditional doctrine, although not 
always easy,614 is much easier and more convenient than 
attempting to wrestle with the complex issues presented by a 
formal "standing" inquiry or a controversial environmental 
case.615 Yet, in many ways, the traditional rule encourages 
judicial contortion because of its inherent paradox. In contrast, 
courts may prefer the actual community injury rule because it is 
more harmonious with the basic purpose of public nuisance. 
Given that the fundamental purpose of public nuisance is to 
protect community values against privately created risk, a court 
viewing a plaintiff whose injury is shared by others and therefore 
not unique should fmd it intellectually acceptable to allow that 
plaintiff to proceed in a lawsuit designed to protect those shared 
values. By requiring the plaintiff to set herself apart from the 
community, the traditional doctrine forces courts into the 
paradox. 
Concerns about retaining control over cases, the proper 
judicial role, and protection of institutional legitimacy may also 
constrain courts from adopting a more liberal formulation of the 
rule. The traditional doctrine strengthens the role of the judge in 
public nuisance cases by presenting a dispositive threshold 
question of access. It prevents certain plaintiffs at the margins of 
the traditional tort law model from ever getting to a jury that 
might sympathize with the plaintiffs view of deteriorating 
community conditions. Without the different-in-kind test, the 
legitimacy of plaintiffs claim is much more likely to go to the 
jury, a jury that will deliberate on the substantiality of the 
problem and express the community's sense of the appropriate 
balance among conflicting values. Judicial reluctance to 
liberalize the traditional doctrine may reflect deep concerns 
about how such a move would erode the judge's ability to act as 
a gatekeeper, particularly in public nuisance cases that involve 
broad community confliCt. 
614. Comment. Exxon Valdez. supra note 8. at 710 ("although meant to be a 
bright-line rule. [the special injury rule) is often a difficult test to apply"). 
615. RODGERS. AIR & WATER. supra note 8. at 8 (Supp. 1998) (calling the special 
injury rule an "issue ducker" for the courts. allowing them to "dispose of claims likely 
to be peripheral to a statutory dispute"). 
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On the other hand, the very purpose of public nuisance is to 
protect public rights. Denying access conflicts with the very 
purpose of the ancient tort. Although retaining legitimacy and 
moral force while handling public law-like cases may be, in light 
of the active judicial role required, more challenging for courts 
than handling the traditional private law docket, modern state 
courts handle a wide range of cases that involve complex and 
politically challenging issues, including not only mass torts and 
class actions, but difficult statutory and constitutional cases. 
Another reason why state courts may adhere to the 
traditional doctrine and might be hostile to a more liberal test is 
that state courts today may be increasingly conservative in their 
view of the judicial role in addressing broader social problems. 
Particularly during the conservative movement of the 1980s, 
legal observers noted "preliminary signs of a countermovement" 
to the liberalized standing decisions of the 1960s and 1970s,616 a 
sentiment that resonated with state courtS.617 The "reforms" 
supported by a coalition of the bar: judges, political 
conservatives, and Congress ultimately discourage litigation in 
the public interest by those "outside the political and cultural 
mainstream who are challenging prevailing legal, political, and 
social norms."618 The Ninth Circuit's Exxon Valdez deciSion, 
which affirmed the traditional doctrine,61g may exemplify this 
countermovement. The resurgence of the Republican Party in the 
2000 elections suggests this political pendulum continues to 
swing and will continue to discourage judicial activism.62o 
In conclusion, a range of institutional, doctrinal, and 
political reasons may help explain courts' continued invocation 
of the traditional doctrine. These considerations will also affect 
the judiciary's attraction to alternative formulations of the rule. 
Nevertheless. the community injury rule possesses qualities 
616. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization oj Public Law, 88 
COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1432 (1988). 
617. According to Professor Sunstein. "[r)ecent and still quite tentative innovations 
in the law of standing have started to push legal doctrine [back) in the direction of 
what we may call a private-model of standing. Under this model, a nineteenth 
century private right is a predicate for judicial intervention; as a result. courts may 
not redress the systemiC or probabilistic harms that Congress intended regulatory 
schemes to prevent." [d.. at 1433. 
618. Yamamoto. supra note 589, at 353. Professor Yamamoto has observed a 
parallel retrenchment in the use of civil procedure and class actions in the federal 
courts. [d.. 
619. See supra Part I.B.l. 
620. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Election Fight Lights Spark Under the Right: 
Galvanized by What They See as Judicial Overreaching, Conservative Lawyers and 
Scholars PrepareJor Return to Power, LEGAL TiMES, Dec. 4,2000, at 20. 
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capable of allaying some of these concerns while resolving 
paradoxes in the application of the public nuisance tort. 
D. Practical Reflections: Why Practitioners and Plaintiffs 
UnderutiUze Public Nuisance 
An analysis of the prospects for modernizing the speCial 
injury doctrine would be incomplete without examining the role 
that practitioners and their clients play in the development of 
public nuisance law. Any proposal for reform, particularly one 
that represents a significant departure from the dominant rule, 
must have avid proponents. The natural proponents of a 
liberalized "standing" rule are plaintiffs' attorneys and their 
clients. Courts are unlikely to move away from the traditional 
doctrine sua sponte, but they might conSider the issue seriously 
if prompted by counsel who bring the trial and appellate courts 
compelling new reasons for reform. 
This section explores the range of reasons why practitioners 
and plaintiffs fail to recognize the potential promise of liberalized 
versions of the special injury rule. Their underutilization of 
public nuisance is attributable to two factors: the nature of the 
split between the private and publiC-interest plaintiffs' bar, and 
strategiC conSiderations of costs and attorneys' fees for each of 
these groups. 
1. The Private Plaintiffs' Bar 
Two types of practitioners have an inclination to represent 
plaintiffs in public nuisance cases and would be interested in 
overcoming the traditional doctrine: private "local" state law torts 
attorneys and national public interest environmental 
attorneys.621 The two groups, however, have very different 
approaches to litigation. 
The same influences that constrain state jurists will likely 
hinder the first practice group from arguing for a liberalized 
formulation-the apparent enormity of adverse precedent and 
the lack of favorable secondary authority in the tort field, 
especially Prosser's Handbook. 622 Focusing on the unpopular 
Section 821C(2)(c)623 and pointing to the isolated Akau case624 
621. Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4 (describing a distinction between 
lawyers that practice "mainstream" law and those that practice public interest law. 
and commenting that "lawyers are not fungible"). 
622. See supra Part IV.D. 
623. See supra Part IV.C. 
624. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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may do a plaintiff's counsel more strategic harm than good. 
Moreover, the typical private practitioner is unlikely, where the 
doctrine is clear and adverse cases numerous, to spend the time 
it takes to dig into old cases, to unearth legal commentary, or to 
review the ALI debates to uncover criticism of the rule or to 
discover alternative fonnulations. Even if he did, rather than 
advocate for a new rule, a private practitioner is much more 
likely to massage the facts of the case to argue, flrst, that the 
nuisance is "mixed," that is, also a private nuisance thus 
avoiding the special injury rule,625 and, second, that his client's 
injuries are sufficiently different-in-kind to satisfy the traditional 
rule. Particularly where the plaintiff may already be perceived as 
a troublemaker for bringing the case and complaining about a 
neighbor or local business, a strategic practitioner's inclination 
is to make the case flt within the existing doctrinal framework 
and to de-emphasize the novelty of any claims. The more 
vigorously plaintiff's counsel argues for a modiflcation of the 
traditional doctrine, the more convinced a court might be that 
the plaintiff should lose under existing law. 
In addition, for private plaintiffs' practitioners, Le. the torts 
bar, costs can present an enormous barrier to bringing and to 
winning public nuisance cases.626 Although public nuisance 
allows plaintiffs the opportunity, not available under federal 
environmental law, to recover personal damages, individual 
plaintiffs usually cannot afford to bring the case unless there is a 
strong likelihood of substantial economic recovery.627 For a 
private practitioner, a common law public nuisance case must 
pass the normal cost-beneflt test for a torts case-would the 
damages award be sufficient to compensate the client, cover 
costs, and pay counsel?628 Moreover, because the Restatement 
rule is limited to injunctive relief actions, a practitioner has no 
financial incentive to argue for its application. Even if a court 
625. Bryson & Macbeth. supra note 5, at 276 ("Liberalization of public nuisance 
law would obviate the necessity for plaintiffs and courts to fit their challenges and 
remedies within the property-protection standards of private nuisance doctrine .... 
[P[rivate nuisance [should[ be reserved for situations in which the principal problem 
is invasion of property interests, and environmental threats to health, comfort, and 
beauty of the community will be treated-as they lOgically should-as public 
nuisances. "). 
626. Note. Public Watchdog, supra note 4. at 1757. 
627. Id.. at 1735 ("When citizens realize that the legal fees of a public nuisance suit 
often surpass any pecuniary gain, many are discouraged from taking action."). 
628. State statutes that authoriZe citizens' public nuisance actions without fee 
recovery provisions may be underutilized for this reason. See Comment. 
Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6. at 1127. 
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allowed the claim, a plivate attorney could not recover damages 
for his client, and the client recovers no funds with which to pay 
fees. 
Thus the plivate practitioner will typically avoid public 
nuisance cases that seek only injunctive relief and promise 
complexity, costs. controversy, and compelling arguments from 
defendants about interference with property lights and economic 
dislocation. Under the Restatement Plus position, which would 
eliminate the rule for damages as well, or the actual community 
injury rule, the economic incentives for plivate practitioners 
would change dramatically because the plaintiff could seek 
damages for the full extent of the community injury. Although 
this would substantially reduce the economic barrier for this 
group of public nuisance practitioners, it would also raise new 
issues about the appropliate breadth and proper recipient of 
damages. 
2. The Public Interest Plaintiffs' Bar 
The second practitioner group -national and regional public 
interest environmental attorneys-face very different constraints 
and practical considerations that inhibit their advocacy of a 
liberalized rule such as the Restatement proposal. This group 
began in the early 1970s as a small number of national and 
regional public interest law firms.629 Although these practitioners 
have made a tremendous impact on the national environmental 
law landscape,63o they are still few in number,631 and they 
typically have heavy caseloads, tight budgets, and little time or 
interest in common law remedies that lack the same "bang for 
the buck" as federal statutory claims. Although a handful of 
today's more senior public interest lawyers might recall the 
Restatement fight or the discussion in the law reviews afterward, 
629. See supra notes 395-396 and accompanying text. 
630. Since the mid-1970s. public interest litigation has "increased significantly" 
and ·public interest litigants have become institutionalized participants in 
administrative proceedings and in courtroom litigation challenging agency activity." 
Tobias. supra note 589, at 293. 
631. Charlie Halpern. 111e Public Interest Law Movement in the United States. in 
INNOVATIONS IN THE LEGAL SERVICES 101. 106 (Erhard Blankenburg ed .. 1980) (stating 
that public interest practitioners constitute "a minute fraction of the lawyers in the 
United States"). Moreover, these lawyers are "clustered on the East and West Coasts," 
and "[flew public interest lawyers devote their attention to representation in state and 
local matters." Id.. Based on the author's experience in practicing public interest 
environmental law from 1988-1996, the size and composition of the environmental 
public interest bar has since significantly expanded, but public interest lawyers still 
generally avoid common law and state remedies. 
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the vast majority of public interest attorneys practicing today 
began their careers in the 1970s or 1980s and would find a 
window into the "great debate" only through the literature, 
which, given their intense litigation schedules, few have the 
luxury of perusing. Moreover, like private plaintiffs practitioners, 
public interest lawyers will, as a matter of strategy in 
controversial cases, seek to couch their claims in non-
controversial ways so as to appeal to, or at least obtain a fair 
hearing from, naturally conservative courts. 
The most significant barrier to this second group's interest in 
a rule change, however, is simply that, ever since the early 
1970s, public interest attorneys in environmental, consumer, 
and civil rights fields have focused almost exclusively on the 
exciting, tailored, and rewarding federal statutory remedies 
rather than on common law approaches. The federal 
environmental laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s contain 
powerful and enforceable standards, expressly permit citizen 
suits, and allow recovery of attorney's fees and costS.632 The vast 
majority of national and regional public interest law firms focus 
almost exclusively on these federal633 statutory remedies of the 
public law world. 634 
Thus, the public interest sector of the plaintiffs' bar-
organizations with the resources to undertake large and 
controversial nuisance cases, the strongest inclination to argue 
vigorously for elimination of the special injury rule, and the 
greatest familiarity with liberal standing concepts from federal 
administrative law-ironically has little interest in public 
nuisance. Without an express statutory authorization to sue, a 
community nuisance case may be professionally unattractive 
and finanCially burdensome to the public interest bar. It also 
may not fit within a public interest law firm's mission that gives 
priority to issues of regional and national significance rather 
632. See generaUy MICHAEL AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS § 1.02-03, at 1-5 
to 1-10 (1993) (describing history of citizen suit provision in federal environmental 
laws); id. at Chapter 8 (discussing attorneys fees and costs). 
633. Public interest litigators do also avail themselves of state remedies, such as a 
state's "little NEPA," see supra note 391 (discussing the early Michigan act), but these 
too are usually statutory, not common, law cases or remedies. 
634. Interview with Victor M. Sher, supra note 4 (asserting that the environmental 
community "got lazy by following citizen suit provisions and statutory remedies, 
coupled with a preference for suing the federal government," and stating that the 
"contemporary environmental movement has not yet broken the mold of the early 
cases" based on citizen suit provisions and that it is "always difficult to break 
paradigms, you get comfortable and stop asking questions"); MAXWELL P. BARRETf, 
JR., EASTERN MINERAL LAw FOUNDATION, 14 PROC. § 14.02, at 3 (May 1993) (observing 
that public nuisance has lost most of its importance due to citizen suit provisions"). 
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than localized disputes. For the public interest bar. then. a 
public nuisance claim may be. at most. a throw-away claim 
tacked onto a complaint that is otherwise grounded in federal 
statutory violations. 635 
For a public interest litigator. a public nuisance claim. if 
pursued. also requires a significantly different and less appealing 
approach to litigation than that required by statutory claims. 
Public nuisance claims may be more fact intensive and complex 
than statutory enforcement issues. requiring proof of injury and 
causation. and presentation to a state court jury.636 This is 
foreign territory for many public interest practitioners who. for 
strategic and economic reasons. gravitate toward federal637 
citizen suits against the government. 638 The typical citizen suit 
turns on issues of law,63g is based primarily on the agency's 
administrative record. IIDmmizes factual disputes and 
evidentiary issues. and is presented to an Article III judge. who 
is, in theory, more independent than an elected or appointed 
state court judge. 
Moreover. as is true for private practitioners. public interest 
practitioners who bring a public nuisance claim face substantial 
costs.640 If the claim is for injunctive relief only. it brings in no 
funds at all for the client to use in covering costs or attorneys 
fees. Although the lack of finanCial reward for clients is normal 
for public interest cases, attorneys fees and costs are usually 
available to plaintiffs and their counsel who prevail in federal 
635. 4 WILLIAM RODGERS. JR .. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: HAzARDous WASTE § 8.D (1984) 
(discussing the role of nuisance claims under CERCLA's pendent jurisdiction): see 
also RODGERS. AIR & WATER, supra note 8. at 8 (Supp. 1998) ("TIle proliferation of 
statutes in recent times has pushed common law nuisance into a secondary role. and 
into the category of also-mentioned deep in counts seven or eight of the complaint. "I. 
636. See Paul D. Rheingold. Civil Cause of Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban 
Atmosphere, 33 BROOK. L. REv. 17 (1967) (discussing the scientific and legal 
complexities of common law actions for air pollution); see also Comment. 
Environmental Lawsuit. supra note 6. at 1102-03 (noting the burden of proof 
requirement can present "a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the plaintiff in an 
environmental lawsuit). 
637. Scott, supra note 103, at 407 (observing that environmental practitioners 
prefer the federal forum). 
638. Interview with Victor M. Sher, supra note 4 (noting that. although early 
environmental law observers assumed that most Citizen suits would be against 
polluters, the actual dockets show an "overwhelming percentage are brought against 
the federal. and some against the state, government"). 
639. Id. (commenting on the burden of proof problem, and stating that summary 
judgment provides an efficient early mechanism to win the case). 
640. Id. (noting that. due to emphasis on factual issues, the costs of public 
nuisance cases can be Significant compared to citizen suits). 
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citizen sUitS.641 If the claim is for damages, which would be 
highly unusual for a public interest firm to pursue, there are 
even more institutional hurdles, such as the tax code prohibition 
on such firms taking cases that could be handled by private 
practitioners,642 as well as the strongly held belief that recovery 
of private damages denigrates the fundamental mission of public 
interest law. 
On the other hand, public nuisance presents some unique 
attractions for public interest practitioners that make it worth 
adding this arrow to the litigator's quiver. It offers the prospect of 
direct compensation to clients and communities, unlike federal 
environmental statutes that allow only injunctive relief or that 
require civil penalties be paid to the United States Treasury, not 
to the plaintiffs643; it allows for a jury trial644; and it provides the 
unusual opportunity for obtaining lucrative punitive damages.645 
Moreover, public nuisance has the advantage of severely limiting 
the defenses a defendant can assert, giving plaintiffs some 
unique strategic advantages. 646 Unlike many environmental 
cases that focus on procedure or what defendants call "technical 
violations," public nuisance focuses squarely on the merits and 
is brought directly against the source, not the government.647 
Nonetheless, although some public interest firms have explored 
moving in the direction of greater use of common law remedies 
and recovering damages in environmental contamination cases, 
the approach has yet to be taken seriously.648 
641. For any refonnulation of the special injury rule to succeed in widening 
community access to the courts. the incentive for all types of practitioners may need 
to be financial. If the state courts could be persuaded to apply a "common benefit" or 
·private attorney general" theory to the attorneys fees/costs recovery issue, the 
incentives for private and public interest practitioners would change substantially. 
The realistic opportunity for fee and cost recovery would provide a stronger Incentive 
to pursue such claims particularly where the loss is widespread to the community. 
See generally Note. Public Watchdog. supra note 4. 
642. Halpern. supra note 631. at 101-02 (stating that public interest law fIrms are 
required to provide services to those "who were otherwise unable to purchase legal 
services"). 
643. AxLINE. supra note 632, § 7.02. at 7-4 through 7-5, 
644. Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4 (noting that an environmental 
lawyer might prefer a state jury in some pollution cases). 
645. ld 
646. See. e.g .. id. (stating that public nuisance ·sucks the wind out of the statute 
of limitations defense"). 
647. Bryson & Macbeth. supra note 5. at 277 ("Public nuisance focuses. in 
contrast. on the merits: Does the activity in question unreasonably violate the rights 
of the affected community?"). 
648. Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4 (noting the "huge need" to 
address environmental contamination and the "tremendous potential" of 
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In short, the private plaintiffs' practitioners who are most 
likely to bring public nuisance cases are the least likely to know 
about or to advocate for doctrinal change. The public interest 
practitioners who are most able to advocate for change, have 
almost no institutional motivation to pursue it. These practical 
dynamics suggest an important complexity inhibiting 
liberalization of the rule. The emergence of the relatively new 
environmental torts bar, a hybrid of tort and environmental 
lawyers, provides a source of optimism for bridging this gap 
between the two sectors of the bar described above. The toxic 
torts lawsuit for hazardous waste dumping dramatized in A Civil 
Action649 and the recent infusion of tobacco-style litigation tactics 
in environmental cases650 suggests that this new breed of 
attorneys is well suited to be the agent for modernizing public 
nuisance law. 65l Yet, if the plaintiffs' bar-private or public-
does not vigorously advocate for change grounded in a new 
examination of doctrinal history, courts have little inspiration to 
modernize the doctrine. 
The actual community injury rule may provide both private 
and public interest practitioners a new approach that combines 
their strengths as advocates for injured communities. For both 
groups, the rule would make public nuisance cases more 
attractive by significantly reducing the threshold "standing" 
barrier. In addition, by allowing plaintiffs with shared injuries to 
seek damages as well as injunctive relief, the actual community 
injury rule reinvigorates the normal economic incentive of the 
client and counsel in tort litigation. In particular, plaintiffs' 
counsel may have a greater ability to bring public nuisance class 
contamination cases not being brought by established environmental public interest 
fInns and environmental organizations). 
649. See LEWIs A. GROSSMAN & ROBERI' G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO 
A CML ACTION (1999) (based on Jonathan Harr's bestselling book, A CML ACTION, 
about the Anderson v. Cryovac case in Woburn, Massachusetts, Jan Schlictman. the 
lead attorney in Anderson v. Cryovac. Inc .. 862 F.2d 910 (lst. Cir. 1988). is advising 
the local law fInn handling the Coldwater Creek case. see supra note 111. indicating 
increasing cross-fertilization between the typical small-town practitioner and 
experienced environmental torts lawyers in such cases. Smith Interview. supra note 
III (noting Schlictman's involvement). See also supra note 3 (discussing mass-tort 
style case brought for pollution by hog fanns in North Carolina). 
650. See Margaret Graham Tebo. Fertile Waters. A.B.A. J .. Feb. 2001. at 36. 38 
(suggesting that recent victories in tobacco cases and toxic tort cases are creating a 
"new wave of environmental litigation" by building on classic state law tort theory): 
but see id. at 39 (noting that standing is still a "high" hurdle in such cases). See 
supra note 3 (noting dismissal of hog fann case for lack of special injury). 
651. Victor Sher's cutting-edge MTBE groundwater contamination cases in 
California are another example of this new hybrid litigation. See Tebo. supra note 
650. at 39: see also Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4. 
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actions. Currently, to show special injury, they must emphasize 
the uniqueness of their client's injuries, which contradicts their 
claim for common interests required in a class action suit. The 
public interest bar may also have more interest in the actual 
community injury rule for the same reasons. A lowered 
"standing" barrier, the promise of damages, and class actions all 
make public nuisance more attractive strategically and 
financially. 
E. The Actual Community Iryury Rule and the Tripartite Rationale 
The actual community injury rule has important advantages 
in light of the theoretical, jurisprudential, and practical 
considerations discussed above, and it also satisfies the well-
accepted tripartite rationale for the traditional doctrine-
sovereignty, multipliCity, and triviality. 
1. Sovereignty 
The conservative pOSition taken by Chief Justice Baldwin in 
the 1535 case-that redress for public nuisances should reSide 
only in the power of the sovereign -continues to have vigorous 
and powerful adherents today. United States Supreme Court 
Justices, from Harlan in the 1960s652 to Justice Scalia today, 
raise this objection to federal citizen suits.653 Public nuisance 
presents fewer concerns than federal citizen suits, however, 
because it is typically brought against private defendants and 
not against the government.654 The implications for usurping 
police powers are therefore more attenuated. Moreover, the 
general concept of allowing a public action against private 
defendants is grounded in a long line of English and American 
652. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the concept of private attorneys general in taxpayer actions because "[tlhe 
interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or 
proprietary coloration"). 
653. See supra note 602 (referring to Justice Scalia's dissent in Laid[aw). 
654. I found few cases where a private citizen successfully sued a governmental 
entity under a public nuisance theory for creating a nuisance. See e.g., Littleton v. 
State of Hawaii, 656 P.2d 1336 (Haw. 1982) (rmding the City and County of Honolulu 
liable for injuries caused by a floating log to a woman harvesting seaweed in 
shorebreak, focusing on a state statute that requires counties to keep shorelines free 
of debris). A suit against the government for failing to take action to address a private 
party's nuisance would likely be barred as a disgUised mandamus action. See 
Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 1087. 
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cases.655 To supporters, citizen suits effectively supplement the 
role of democratic government.656 Moreover, today, the American 
political and judicial system are, after three decades of public 
law litigation, comfortable with the concept of citizen suit 
litigation657 and experienced at managing the difficulties posed by 
large and complex public law cases even at the state level. 
In any event, as with federal environmental lawsuits, public 
nuisance cases, even under the more generous actual 
community injury rule, pose minimal threat to state sovereignty 
because they supplement rather than supplant government 
action. Few, if any, individuals or community groups would have 
the interest to initiate and pursue costly litigation if the 
government is simultaneously addressing the problem. When 
statutory remedies exist, defendants will undoubtedly argue that 
they should pre-empt the common law remedy. Judges and 
juries presented with public nuisance cases where there is 
ongoing government action would naturally conSider it in 
determining the appropriate remedy. Government always has the 
options of intervening in the case or taking legislative action. 
Where governmental resources, willpower, or priorities differ 
significantly from those of communities, however, communities 
could present their claims to courts. Because public nuisance is 
a community-based interstitial remedy, and because of courts' 
inherent discretion to define a nuisance and impose the remedy, 
expanding the public nuisance avenue presents little or no threat 
to the sovereignty of government. 
2. Multiplicity 
State courts are naturally concerned about the potential for 
multiplicity of lawsuits that result from increased judicial access. 
655. See Jaffe. Public Actions. supra note 380. at 1269 (discussing the common 
law "prototype" of public actions. the ancient "prerogative writs of mandamus and the 
bill in equity for an injunction"). 
656. See Jaffe. Citizen as Utigant. supra note 607. at 1044 (citing the importance 
of citizen suits to include citizens in government and to prevent the problem of 
agency capture); SAX. DEFENDING. supra note 8. at xviii (citizen litigation is "an 
essential format for reasserting partiCipation in the governmental process"); see also 
id. at 57 (" Utigation is thus a means oj access Jor the ordinary citizen to the process oj 
govemmental decision-making. It is in many circumstances the only tool for genuine 
citizen participation in the operative process of government."); Jaffe. Public Actions. 
supra note 380. at 1292 (public law actions are "at the least. not inconsistent with 
our democratic premises. and arguably they reinforce them"). 
657. See Jaffe. Public Actions. supra note 380. at 1292 ('The widespread and ever-
growing acceptance of public actions by the state courts and legislatures attests to a 
deeply felt need and provides adequate support of their use."). 
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If a claim can be based on common injury. courts and 
defendants risk being burdened with numerous piggy-back 
claims. Properly defined. however. multiplicity does not mean 
simply more lawsuits or many plaintiffs. rather it means 
"multiple lawsuits involving the same nuisance or against the 
same defendant," that is. duplicative litigation.658 The constraints 
on multiplicity differ between injunctive and damages actions. 
In an injunctive relief case. given the inherent flexibility of 
the remedy. courts' broad discretion in fonnulating the remedy. 
and the economic and non-economic costs of litigation. the 
multiplicity risk is low to none. Even the actual community 
injury rule's risks of multiplicity are largely imaginary and 
rhetorical.659 Using a version of Akau660 for illustration. if Kainalu 
brought the initial lawsuit and won injunctive relief in the form 
of an order for the landowners to keep the trail open. no other 
community member would have a reason to file his own copy-cat 
lawsuit. Even if Kainalu lost his quest for an injunction. the 
defendant could argue-and a court could fmd-that a second 
suit was barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 661 
658. Although defendants may understandably complain about numerous 
plaintiffs. when there is actual injury to each of them. a defendant should answer for 
its actions to all of those injured. See Piscataqua Nav. Co. v. N.Y .. N.H. & H.R. Co .. 89 
F. 362. 364 (D. Mass 1898) (commenting on criticism that "actual pecuniary loss" 
test would lead to "an intolerable multiplicity of suits.' as "hardly justified by the 
experience of the courts" and. even if restrictions were necessary. "it certainly should 
be applied only when found necessary for the protection of the public and the courts. 
and should not be given to a wrongdoer to defend himself from the natural 
consequences of his wrong"). 
659. See Davis. supra note 2. at 470-71 (commenting that the relaxed standing 
requirements of state courts did not appreciably increase dockets); see also Sax & 
Conner. supra note 391. at 1003 (noting the "modest number" of filings under the 
landmark 1970 citizen suit provisions drafted by Sax); Scanwell Laboratories v. 
Shaffer. 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rejecting the multiplicity criticism and 
recognizing courts' ability to exercise judicial discretion to deter multiple and 
frivolous suits): United Church of Christ v. FCC. 359 F.2d 994. 1.005-06 (D.C. Cir. 
1966) (fears of flood of suits "are rarely borne out.' due to costs of litigation); Bryson 
& Macbeth. supra note 5. at 254 ("nuisance lawsuits are so costly and difficult to 
bring that it is extremely unlikely that defendants and the courts would be burdened 
with numbers of harassing or unjustified suits should the standing requirement" be 
relaxed). 
660. See supra Part I.B.2. 
661. The doctrine of collateral estoppel can bar non-parties from bringing 
subsequent litigation under a variety of theories. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET 
AL •• 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RElATED MAITERS § 4454 
(1981) (discuSSing preclusion by representation. including class actions. 
associational plaintiffs. "virtual representation." and governmental and Citizens 
enforcement actions); see also id. § 4458 (discussing res judicata and issue 
preclusion in the context of governmental. official. and citizen litigation). 
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The concern about burdensome multiplicity is applicable 
primarily, if not exclusively, to damages suits, where the 
likelihood of duplicative litigation would depend, in part, on the 
extent of the injury and the size of the initial award. The 
Nebraska Innkeepers662 case illustrates, however, that these 
concerns are misplaced. If the damages award to the Innkeepers 
was either none or low-below $20,OOO-several practical 
disincentives would discourage a second law suit by nearby 
Motel A. Motel A would have to pay the costs of the lawsuit and 
it may still have to pay its own attorneys' fees if the case is not 
taken on a contingent fee. If Innkeepers recovers a substantial 
sum, say $1 million in damages, however, Motel A would have a 
significant incentive to bring the second lawsuit. Yet, Motel A will 
still incur intangible costs, such as time, energy, and damage to 
its reputation; it will incur out-of-pocket costs; and it will be 
subject to the political, economic, and legal risks of suing a 
defendant who may be a greater economic force in the same 
community. Motel A may still run afoul of a statute of limitations 
or laches663 because it chose to wait in the weeds. In addition to 
these practical limitations on Motel A's suit, the risk of 
duplication is reduced by either offenSive or defensive use of 
class actions.664 Moreover, res judicata and collateral estoppel 
662. See supra Part I.B.3. 
663. See supra note 75 (discussing limited defenses to nuisance). 
664. The complex issues of class action environmental lawsuits are beyond the 
scope of this Article. For present purposes, however, it is notable that the suitability 
of class actions in public nuisance cases is unclear. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, the primary vehicle for class actions, applies, of course, only to federal actions. 
The typical public nuisance cases will be brought in state court, and state class 
action rules vary considerably. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 661, § 1782 & n.24 
(referring to commentary on state class actions lawsuits); Comment, Environmental 
Lawsuit. supra note 6, at 1098 ("pollution traceable to the activities of a single 
industrial fIrm and affecting a substantial number of neighboring individuals would 
certainly appear to be an apt subject for class litigation."); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (allowing class action in a public 
nuisance case against a coal storage and shipping facility but neglecting to mention 
the special injury rule). But see James W. Elrod, Comment, The Use of Federal Class 
Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution Torts, 56 TENN. L. REv. 243 (1988) (argUing for the 
Viability of pollution cases under Rule 23); Rothstein, supra note 8, at 472 (noting 
that the "vitality of Biechele" in federal courts was "completely destroyed by the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Zahn" that held separate and distinct claims 
based on a paper company's pollution of a lake could not be aggregated for purposes 
of meeting the jurisdictional amount requirement). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 
U.S. 332 (1969); Zahn v. Inn Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding the amounts 
claimed by each class member may not be aggregated to establish the amount in 
controversy required for federal jurisdiction unless plaintiffs show joint interest); see 
also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 661, § 1782, at 67 (noting "the jurisdictional amount 
requirement may prove a signillcant barrier to environmental class action suits" and 
observing that Zahn was an environmental case brought by landowners for water 
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could also prevent multiple lawsuits on the same issues.665 
discouraging practitioners from over-filing. If Motel A overcame 
these barriers. then the additional compensation may well be 
just and appropriate. 
The same objections based on multipliCity concerns were 
raised regarding federal and state citizen suit provisions but 
have proven largely if not wholly unfounded.666 Additionally. 
organizational plaintiffs in federal environmental cases can. by 
consolidating claims that otherwise might be brought separately. 
function to control the multiplicity problem. 667 In short. the 
multiplicity rationale appears to present few. if any. reasons in 
the modern litigation era to object to the more generous access 
for public nuisance plaintiffs offered by the actual community 
injury test. 
3. Triviality 
The last part of the tripartite test-triviality-is an obvious 
concern to courts considering a replacement for the special 
injury rule. but modern doctrinal and practical constraints on 
such litigation respond to this concern. 
In general. the tort system weeds out the trivial from the 
substantial in at least five ways. First. plaintiffs themselves have 
little incentive to sue for trivial injuries. given the real and 
intangible personal costs of litigation. Second. practitioners' own 
economic interests act as a gatekeeper. Plaintiffs' counsel have 
an incentive to avoid claims with trivial or small injuries because 
pollution); Interview with Victor M. Sher. supra note 4 (commenting on his "aversion" 
to class actions due to the commonality problem); Rothstein. supra note 8. at 471 
(noting that class actions in public nuisance cases have been "almost a total failure" 
because of the special injury rule and the normal "pitfalls" such as class composition 
and representation. injury in fact. and in the federal courts. jurisdictional amount); 
Comment. Exxon Valdez. supra note 8. at 520 (suggesting that the environmental 
groups' public nuisance case could have been framed as a class action to satisfy the 
Restatement rule. but "to do so would create a protracted certification struggle"). 
665. See supra note 661; see. e.g .. Note. Public Nuisance. supra note 4. at 364 
("precedential value of a prior decided case on a given point and the prinCiples that 
adhere with the doctrine of res judicata would restrict the number of actions 
brought"). 
666. See supra note 659; see also Comment. Environmental Lawsuit. supra note 6. 
at 1127 (noting that. even in the two states with statutes permitting private 
individuals to sue to enjoin a public nuisance. "few citizens of those states have 
chosen to take advantage of the opportunity" because of the "prohibitive expense 
involved"). 
667. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission. 
354 F.2d 608. 617 (2d eir. 1965) ("Representation of common interests by an 
organization such as Scenic Hudson serves to limit the number of those who might 
otherwise apply for intervention and serves to expedite the administrative process. "). 
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they are unlikely to recover sufficient compensation for their time 
and expenses. Third, defendants and judges are often able to 
dispose quickly of trivial claims through dispositive motions, 
either by finding that the prima facie case fails or there is 
insufficient evidence for the jury. Fourth, particularly in damages 
cases, juries are unlikely to be sympathetic to trivial claims 
against defendants in their own communities and will award 
either small or no damages, making plaintiffs worse off than 
before the case. Fifth, when considering injunctive relief, judges 
balance the equities and are unlikely to issue an injunction if the 
injury does not justify interfering with the defendant's activity or 
land use. 
With respect to this Article's actual community injury rule, 
courts would apply the common terms "actual or threatened" to 
ensure that the injury or the threat is real and not imagined, 
speculative, or fabricated. The value injured must be one 
important to the community, not just personal or marginal. In 
fact, the actual community injury rule may better screen out 
trivial claims than the traditional rule, which ironically 
emphasizes the unique, peculiar, and special nature of the 
plaintiffs injury. For example, the loss of subsistence fishing 
rights by over three thousand Alaska Natives in the Exxon Valdez 
case is undoubtedly more substantial than the soiling of one 
boat's fishing gear. Yet, under the current rule, the latter injury 
would pass as special injury and be compensable, while the 
former would not.668 
Moreover, the actual community injury rule would encourage 
state courts to apply their own state tort. administrative. and 
environmental law principles to determine if an injury is 
cognizable. Although John Wade commented that, under the 
Restatement (Second), Section 821C(2)(c), state courts are to look 
to their own state law,66g the intent of the rebels and the entire 
thrust of the proposal-and its citizen suit language-was to 
persuade states to track federal standing developments.67o Many 
state courts began following federal standing law in the 1970s 
and 1980s and have now developed their own versions of the 
traditional three part "injury in fact" test. 671 Plaintiffs who allege 
injuries not traditionally recognized under the special injury rule, 
such as enVironmental injury, could point to contemporary 
668. See supra Part I.B.! (discussing Exxon Valdez rulings on fishing claims). 
669. See supra note 486. 
670. See supra Part lV.A & Part lV.B. 
67!. See, e.g., Bremner v. City and County of Honolulu, 2001 WL 675369. *3-*4 
(Haw. App. 2001). 
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definitions of injury in analogous administrative law contexts. 672 
The issues of how to compensate for public losses like the 
subsistence or recreational fishing claims in Exxon-Valdez, which 
might be more novel for courts, would be left to the jury to 
determine. 
In short, in the modern litigation world, the tripartite 
rationale for the traditional special injury doctrine should not 
pose a significant barrier to judicial conSideration of alternative 
formulations such as this Article's actual community injury rule. 
The tripartite rationale now seems as anachronistic as the 
ancient rule itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Even in the modem statutory era, public nuisance offers a 
unique and powerful common law remedy for a community's 
social and environmental problems. Historically, however, courts' 
strict application of the traditional special injury rule and the 
purportedly "ancient" different-in-kind test has significantly 
limited its effectiveness. Despite thirty years on the books, the 
ALI's proposal to broaden private plaintiffs' access to public 
nuisance by incorporating liberal federal standing prinCiples 
through the Restatement (Second) of Torts' Section 821C(2)(c) has 
gained little judicial attention or support in the case law. 
This Article explored the doctrinal history of the special 
injury rule with a focus on understanding why courts have so 
firmly adhered to the traditional rule in the face of substantial 
scholarly criticism. The jurisprudential, doctrinal, and practical 
reasons for the failure of courts to adopt the ALI's more liberal 
proposal suggest that the traditional rule will remain firmly 
entrenched unless the dragon's shaky historical and doctrinal 
roots are exposed to greater scrutiny. 
A new "actual community injury" test, which would require a 
private plaintiff in public nuisance cases to show shared, not 
unique, injury should be advocated by practitioners and scholars 
and adopted by courts. It is more harmonious with the 
fundamental purpose of public nuisance and contemporary 
notions of community injury. The very point of public nuisance is 
to protect and to vindicate shared community values. yet the 
traditional doctrine runs afoul of these concepts. The actual 
community injury rule honors the unique legal and social role of 
public nuisance and discourages those claims that are truly 
672. See id. at 4 (stating that aesthetic and environmental harm are cognizable 
insterests): id. (recreational interests): id. at 5 (cultural and religious interests). 
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private in nature. In this way, the remedy of public nuisance 
directly matches the evil of community injury. By adopting this 
new rule, the judiciary would be facilitating rather than 
discouraging the vindication of community values. 673 
The actual community injury test would reasonably broaden 
access to public nuisance as a community remedy, make such 
claims more attractive to practitioners, and should render them 
more palatable to the state common law courts. Relaxed 
standing may also enhance environmental protection, 
particularly at the local level. When political winds shift at the 
federal level to disfavor statutory avenues of access such as 
environmental citizens suits, a renewed focus on state common 
law remedies can provide important supplemental paths for 
community and environmental justice. If the actual community 
injury rule can be used to cut the Gordian knot created by the 
crusty historical paradox of the special injury doctrine, public 
nuisance may continue to thrive in its vital role as a flexible 
community remedy throughout this new century. 
673. See Yamamoto, supra note 589, at 389 ["Expressing one's views in a public 
forum links dignity and participation. Participation values reflect an appreciation of 
'litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence. or have their wills 
counted, in societal decisions they care about.'") (citing Miche1rnan, The Supreme 
Court and Utigation Access Fees: The Right To Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L. REv. 
1153. 1172 (1973». 
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